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Introduction: Economics and Environmental Degradation Read chapter Read first chapter

2019 | OriginalPaper | Chapter

5. International Environmental Problems

Authors : Wolfgang Buchholz, Dirk Rübbelke

Published in: Foundations of Environmental Economics

Publisher: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

In this chapter, different types of international environmental problems are analyzed from the perspective of elementary game theory. For the case of reciprocal environmental spillovers, as foremost climate change, the basic strategic interactions between countries are described in a simple binary game model. It is shown that different game types may occur and how the type of the game may be transformed if, e.g., the abatement costs are changing or fairness motivations become relevant for the countries. It is moreover explained how in repeated games international cooperation can be stabilized by means of various threat strategies. Finally, factors are highlighted that are favorable for making international cooperation on environmental problems successful in the real world.

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previous chapter A Comparison of Environmental Policy Instruments
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Metadata
Title
International Environmental Problems
Authors
Wolfgang Buchholz
Dirk Rübbelke
Copyright Year
2019
Publisher
Springer International Publishing
Book
Foundations of Environmental Economics

Print ISBN: 978-3-030-16267-2

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-030-16268-9

Copyright Year: 2019

DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-16268-9_5