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Published in: The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics 1/2007

01-07-2007

Introduction: Real Estate Brokerage

Author: Abdullah Yavas

Published in: The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics | Issue 1/2007

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Excerpt

Each real estate transaction involves a number of strategic decisions. First, the seller needs to determine an optimal asking price under incomplete information without the knowledge of the preferences and valuations of potential buyers. Then, sellers and buyers have to decide on an optimal search strategy, an optimal reservation price and an associated stopping rule. However, a contact between the buyer and seller does not necessarily result in a mutually acceptable match, depending on the reservation prices and outside options of the two sides. Once a contact is achieved, the two sides engage in a bargaining game, again under incomplete information without the knowledge of each other’s reservation prices. If the bargaining results in an agreement, then a sale contract is signed. To finance the purchase, the buyer often chooses among a rich menu of mortgage contracts, where the choices offered by the lender often aims at screening borrowers of different risk types. Along the way, the buyer and seller deal with agents and intermediaries, including lawyers, lending agencies and real estate brokers, and they need to worry about the effectiveness of the compensation structure to minimize potential agency problems. …

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Footnotes
1
The standard result in the theoretical literature is that the current commission structure fails to align the interests of the broker and the client. Williams (1998) and Fisher and Yavas (2006) are two exceptions where under certain set of conditions the percentage commission structure does not necessarily create agency problems.
 
Literature
go back to reference Fisher, L., & Yavas, A. (2006). A case for percentage commission contracts: The impact of a “Race” among agents. Working Paper. Fisher, L., & Yavas, A. (2006). A case for percentage commission contracts: The impact of a “Race” among agents. Working Paper.
go back to reference Hsieh, C.-T., & Moretti, E. (2003). Can free entry be inefficient? Fixed commissions and social waste in the real estate industry. Journal of Political Economy, 111, 1076–1122.CrossRef Hsieh, C.-T., & Moretti, E. (2003). Can free entry be inefficient? Fixed commissions and social waste in the real estate industry. Journal of Political Economy, 111, 1076–1122.CrossRef
go back to reference Levitt, S., & Syverson, C. (2005). Market distortions when agents are better informed: The value of information in real estate transactions. National Bureau of Economic Research, NBER Working Paper 11053. Levitt, S., & Syverson, C. (2005). Market distortions when agents are better informed: The value of information in real estate transactions. National Bureau of Economic Research, NBER Working Paper 11053.
go back to reference Rutherford, R. C., Springer, T. M., & Yavas, A. (2005). Conflicts between principals and agents: Evidence from residential brokerage. Journal of Financial Economics, 76, 627–665.CrossRef Rutherford, R. C., Springer, T. M., & Yavas, A. (2005). Conflicts between principals and agents: Evidence from residential brokerage. Journal of Financial Economics, 76, 627–665.CrossRef
go back to reference Williams, J. T. (1998). Agency and brokerage of real assets in competitive equilibruim. Review of Financial Studies, 11, 239–280.CrossRef Williams, J. T. (1998). Agency and brokerage of real assets in competitive equilibruim. Review of Financial Studies, 11, 239–280.CrossRef
Metadata
Title
Introduction: Real Estate Brokerage
Author
Abdullah Yavas
Publication date
01-07-2007
Published in
The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics / Issue 1/2007
Print ISSN: 0895-5638
Electronic ISSN: 1573-045X
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11146-007-9030-1

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