2. Legal Certainty

Waldron (2008), pp. 45–47.

Lyons explains the classic and contemporary ideas about positivism. He reviews the differences between divine law, positive law and positive morality according to Austin, Hart and Dworkin. See Lyons (1977), pp. 416–418.

According to Waldron, there is a threshold for the existence of the rule of law. These minimal requirements are described by Waldron in part V of his essay. They are: Courts as norm applying institutions, public norms, positive rules, orientation to the public good, and systematicity. For more detail, see Waldron (2008), pp. 19–36.

Clark writes that the importance of the state in ancient Greece relied on its authority to enact the laws that would organize social life and would limit the selfishness of individuals. At that point in history, the first notions of the social contract were born to separate moral from law and to allow legal rules to organize society without the interference of individual preferences. According to the author, Epicureo developed the ideas of separating the state from the individual whose main role in life is pursuing his own happiness and the necessity of preserving people from the tyranny of the authorities. See Clark (1999), pp. 28–29. See also De la Hidalga (2008), pp. 215–218.

Beaulac (2007), pp. 3–4.

O’Donnell (2004), pp. 32–33. See also Gribnau (2013), p. 53.

Bastiat (1968), p. 3.

Waldron (2008), p. 31.

Ibid., p. 7. See also Beaulac (2007), p. 7; Epstein (2007), pp. 19–20.

Clark (1999), p. 32.

Beaulac (2007), pp. 5–6.

Waldron (2008), pp. 55–56.

Waldron mentions that positivity requires the lawmaker’s use of imagination and creativity. See Waldron (2008), p. 31.

Clark criticizes some modern doctrines of the rule of law that prefer formal aspects of law over substantive aspects. Laws based on mere formality are, according to him, usually unfair and compatible with tyrannic regimes. See Clark (1999), pp. 32–33.

Waldron (2008), pp. 14–16.

See, e.g., Ungar (2002), p. 20, on how the law is the basis for state action.

Gordillo (2012), IADA–II–1–3.

See, e.g., López Guerra (1980), pp. 22–23, for more on the legal personality of the state.

Gordillo (2012), IADA–II–1–3.

Epstein (2011), pp. 190–192.

See, for instance, Constitution of Chile Art. 7 para 1 [English Translation of Constitución Política de la República de Chile, Gazeta Oficial, 24 October 1980] [hereinafter Const. Chile]: “[T]he organ of the State act validly, with the prior regular investiture of their members, within their field of competence, and in the form that the law prescribes.”

See, for instance, Constitution of Colombia with Amendments through 2015 Art. 260 [English Translation of Constitución Política de Colombia, Diario Oficial No. 49.554, 25 June 2015] [hereinafter Const. Colombia] that lays out that the citizens “elect in a direct manner the President and Vice President of the Republic, senators, representatives, governors, deputies, mayors […]” among others.

Const. Chile Art. 78 on Supreme Court selection: “Ministers and judicial prosecutors of the Supreme Court shall be appointed by the President of the Republic, choosing from a list of five people that, in each case, will be proposed by the same Court with the agreement of the Senate.[…]” According to Art. 239 Const. Colombia, the “judges of the Constitutional Court shall be elected by the Senate of the Republic […] from lists presented to it by the President of the Republic, the Supreme Court of Justice and the Council of State.”

For instance, according to Art. 98 Const. Chile, the General Comptroller “[…] will be designated by the President of the Republic with the agreement of the Senate […]”. According to Art. 264 Const. Colombia, the members of the National Election Commission, “are elected by the Congress of the Republic […] on the basis of proposals submitted by the political parties or movements with legal personality or by coalitions formed between them.”

Article IV of the Ley de Procedimiento Administrativo General [General Act of Administrative Procedure of Peru, Official Diary of 10 April 2001] lays down legality as one of the principles that govern the competences of the public administration. This article states that “the administrative authorities must respect the Constitution, the legislation and the law, within scope of the allocated powers and in accordance with the purposes for which they were conferred on them. (1.1) [Own Translation]” See also Rafael Selume Sacaan v. Congreso Nacional de Chile, TC Chile, Sentencia Rol No. 472, 30 August 2006.

Epstein explains that there is a direct connection between the rule of law and democracy because the rule of law prevents the tyranny of autocratic rulers. Moreover, in the context of democracy the rule of law shall avoid the “tyranny of the majority” by setting some minimum standards that must be respected even by the majority of people deciding in elections. See Epstein (2011), p. 13 and pp. 190–191.

O’Donnell (2004), pp. 32–33.

Prillaman (2000), pp. 1–2; see also O’Donnell (2004), pp. 36–42.

To read more about impunity within the Latin American judicial system, see Mainwaring (2003), p. 22.

O’Donnell (2004), p. 42.

Prillaman (2000), p. 2. See also Shirk and Rios Cazares (2007), pp. 3–7, explaining how during the transition from dictatorships to democracy that took place in the 1980s and 1990s the new political authorities focused on enhancing the perception of a legitimate delegation of sovereignty rather than on the traditional elements of the rule of law. State representatives had incentives to satisfy people’s expectations and favored a system of redistribution of wealth to legitimize the new regimes at the expense of the rule of law. People, on the other hand, accepted violations of the key elements of the rule of law to achieve “social justice”.

Ungar (2002), pp. 20–23.

Shirk and Rios Cazares (2007), pp. 3–7.

Morris (1992), pp. 11–12.

Schedler (1999), p. 159.

Schor (2006), p. 4.

Waldron (2008), p. 28.

O’Donnell (2004), p. 35.

According to Maxeiner, even if Americans have resignated to live with legal indeterminacy, the opposite, legal certainty is still a guiding principle of European law. See Maxeiner (2006), p. 543.

Epstein (2011), p. 14.

Von Hayek (2005), pp. 75–76.

Epstein (2011), pp. 20–21.

See Popelier (2000), p. 339.

Levy (1996), p. 189.

Krajewski explains how the GATS (General Agreement on Trade and Services) embody certain elements of legal certainty such as transparency and clear and precise scheduling. At the same time, the GATS recognize the right of state members to introduce new regulations. See Krajewski (2014), pp. 89–90.

See, e.g., Wroblewsky (1975), pp. 318–319. Wroblewsky explains that legal security and legal certainty are often considered the same.

Oxford Dictionary, Definition of certainty in English.

Oxford Dictionary, Definition of security in English.

Wroblewsky (1975), p. 314.

Sarlet (2010), pp. 8–9.

Francisco Javier Lara Sabogal v. Congreso de la República de Colombia, CCC, Sentencia C-634-11, 24 August 2011.

Const. Colombia Art. 1.

According to the Art. 2 Const. Colombia, “[t]he essential goals of the state are […] to guarantee the effectiveness of the principles, rights and duties stipulated by the Constitution […].”

The Const. Colombia Art. 5 states that state authorities are obliged to “recognize, without any discrimination whatsoever, the primacy of the inalienable rights of the individual […].”

The Const. Colombia Art. 4 establishes: “The Constitution provides the norm of regulations. In all cases of incompatibility between the Constitution and the statute or other legal regulations, the constitutional provisions shall apply.” Furthermore, “[i]t is the duty of citizens and of aliens in Colombia to obey the Constitution and the laws, and to respect and obey the authorities.”

Colegio de Notarios de Junín v. Congreso de la República de Perú, TC Perú, Sentencia Exp. No. 016, 30 April 2013. See also Scotiabank Perú S.A.A. v. Quinta Sala de lo Civil de la Corte Superior de Justicia de Lima, TC Perú, Sentencia Exp. No. 037, 25 January 2012, and Corporación Pesquera San Fermín S.A. v. Cuarta Sala de lo Civil de la Corte Superior de Justicia de Lima, TC Perú, Sentencia Exp.No. 02835, 13 December 2012.

Waldron (2008), p. 34.

Bernitz et al. (2008), p. 26.

Raitio (2003), p. 125.

Wroblewsky (1975), pp. 313–314.

Braithwaite (2002), p. 69.

O’Donnell (2004), p. 34.

Burgoa and Carlos (2011), pp. 62–63.

Ratio explains that legal certainty requires a balance with other principles of law, like the principles of legality and proportionality. The search for proportionality demands a balance between the private and the public interest. See Raitio (2003), pp. 116–117.

Bernitz et al. (2008), p. 26.

Paunio explains that there are two different “reasons” that judges apply to justify their decisions: authority reasons (rules, precedent, and doctrine) and substantive reasons (principles). Furthermore, Paunio explains that in the context of adjudication there is also an important difference between principles and policies. From a judicial reasoning perspective, principles prevail over policies because they are linked to individual rights while policies are linked to society goals. Legal certainty falls within substantive reasons for adjudication and while being a principle, legal certainty has also deep importance for policy. For this reason, legal certainty can be considered a “meta-principle”. See Paunio (2013), pp. 60–63.

Federal Civil Code of Mexico Art. 19 [Código Civil Federal de México, Diario Oficial de la Federación, 26 May, 14 July, 31 August, 1928] [hereinafter Civ. Code Mexico] prescribes that “when the meaning of the law is clear, its wording cannot be disregarded under the excuse of consulting its spirit. But it is possible to interpret an obscure legal expression by consulting the intentions or spirit clearly manifested in the law, or in the reliable history of its establishment [Own Translation].” See also the Civil Code of Colombia Art. 27 [Código Civil de Colombia, Diario Oficial No. 46.494, 27 December 2006] [hereinafter Civ. Code Colombia] for instance, in case of legal gaps or obscurity in civil cases in Mexico, judicial decisions must be made according to the general principles of law. The Const. Mexico Art. 14 para 4: “In civil trials, final sentence must agree with the law writing or the legal interpretation thereof. In the case of lack of the appropriate law, sentence must be based on the general principles of law.”

Calderón (2009), p. 183.

Popelier (2000), p. 340.

In Europe, specifically in Germany, there is a huge interest in the prevalence of the principle of legal certainty. Legal certainty is entrenched in the German legal framework through practical methods of law making and law applying. See Maxeiner (2006), pp. 551–552.

Maxeiner (2006), p. 543. See also Maxeiner (2008), p. 35.

Popelier (2000), p. 328.

Waldron (2008), pp. 34–35.

Popelier (2000), p. 340.

For conditions of proper law making, see Popelier (2000), pp. 321–323. See also Calderón (2009), p. 184.

De Logue (2005), pp. 251–252.

Rivero Ortega (2013), pp. 51–52.

Villegas (1993), p. 40.

Civ. Code Mexico Art. 9: “The law is repealed only by a subsequent law that expressly declares so or that contains provisions that are wholly or partially incompatible with the previous law. [Own Translation]”.

Maxeiner (2008), p. 32. See also Popelier (2000), pp. 321–323.

For more on “uncertainties in language and law”, see Paunio (2013), p. 12.

Raban explains the differences between clearly written rules and flexible standards. See Raban (2010), pp. 175–190.

Civ. Code Colombia Art. 27: “Grammatical interpretation. When the meaning of the law is clear, it is not possible to disregard its literal wording as an excuse to consult its spirit. But it is possible to interpret a dark legal expression by interpreting its clearly manifested intention or spirit or the reliable story of its establishment [Own Translation].” Furthermore the Civ. Code Colombia Art. 28 states: “Meaning of the words. The words of the law will be understood in their natural and obvious sense, according to their general use, but when the legislator has expressly defined them in some subjects, they will be given their legal sense [Own translation].”

Paunio (2013), p. 83.

Braithwaite (2002), p. 55.

Waldron (2008), pp. 32–33.

Paunio departs from Dworkin’s idea of law as an integrity or global coherence of the legal system. For more on the different notions of coherence, see Paunio (2013), pp. 83–84.

Popelier (2000), p. 330.

Civ. Code Colombia Art. 30: “The context of the law will help to illustrate the sense of each one of its parts, so there must be among them due correspondence and harmony. The dark passages of a law can be illustrated by other laws, particularly if they are concerned with the same subject [Own Translation].”

Popelier (2000), p. 335.

For a clarification on the importance of a stable taxation regime for entrepreneur, see Epstein (2003), pp. 81–82.

Oropeza Barboza (n.d.), p. 70.

Van Alstine (2001), p. 1305.

Epstein (2003), p. 76.

For more on the costs of legal transitions, see Epstein (2003), pp. 81–85.

For more on how legal transition costs affect the administration of justice, see Van Alstine (2001), pp. 1314–1316.

Paunio (2013), p. 2.

Suominen (2014), pp. 6–7.

Waldron (2008), pp. 20–21.

It is claimed that legal certainty and justice are not the same. Even though foreseeability of the legal outcomes protects people from the arbitrary action of public officials it does not guarantee fairness in the content of the legal provisions nor in the judicial adjudication. Legal certainty and justice are two objectives of the rule of law that can be in conflict. Some argue that it is more important for the rule of law to be certain than to be just. The reason is that if people know with certainty that acting in some way will produce negative consequences, they can prevent themselves from committing deeds that can trigger negative legal outcomes. Moreover, even though people may feel distressed by a conflicting situation, it is a much greater distress for people to find themselves at risk of committing an illegal act and carrying the consequences. This can be the case when the law is obscure, the legal provisions are not consistent among each other or because the law was changed from one day to the other. Nevertheless, legal certainty and justice are complementary concepts because both are pillars of a system under the rule of law. The president of the Supreme Court of Justice of Brazil has manifested that legal certainty is a pivotal principle for the effectiveness of justice. Legal rules must provide predictability and the legal decisions must be rationally acceptable to increase the likelihood of fair judicial decisions. See Krajewski (2014), p. 79; see also Neuhaus (1963), p. 796.

Waldron (2008), p. 8.

Maxeiner explains that legal rules have unavoidably legal vacuums because it is impossible for legislators to address all the cases, all the conditions for a legal situation to arise, use an accurate language and avoid subjectivity at doing all this. See Maxeiner (2006), p. 555.

Rodriguez Yong (2008), p. 422.

Levi (2013), p. 502.

Maxeiner (2006), p. 558.

Paunio (2013), p. 3.

Waldron (2008), p. 20. If the courts must decide cases of civil nature, they determine rights of private parties. In criminal cases, they must act like the coercive arm of the society against actions that disturb the peaceful life of a community. In administrative cases the courts may protect the interests of the in front of the state. In constitutional cases, they may determine the attachment of the actions, functions and duties of authorities to the constitution. Among the countries in analysis only Mexico and Colombia have specialized courts to deal with administrative issues between government officials or administrative agencies. Mexico has the “Tribunal de lo Contencioso Administrativo” and Colombia the “Consejo de Estado.” In the other countries, the competence to decide about administrative controversies lies with civil courts or tribunals.

Waldron explains that judges decide by projecting the inherent logic of the law to the controversy or uncertainty of a case. See Waldron (2008), p. 35.

According to Dam, there are two types of judicial independence: “structural independence” and “behavioral independence.” Structural independence entails the autonomy of the courts as an institution within the state. Behavioral independence entails the real freedom in the practice that individual judges have to make decisions. See Dam (2006), p. 16. Shetreet explains that to achieve an accurate degree of behavioral independence the judicial branch must enjoy leeway to decide about the appointment and dismissal of their members, their salaries, or their tenure. See Shetreet (1979), p. 57.

Jordao and Rose-Ackerman explain that the role of the courts of justice should go beyond the protection of people’s rights and try to balance democracy with those rights and with the technical functions of state organisms. See Jordao and Rose-Ackerman (2014), p. 4.

Epstein (2007), p. 9.

Neuhaus (1963), pp. 802–803.

Paunio (2013), p. 32.

The Civil Code of Peru [Código Civil de Perú, Official Journal, 25 July 1984] [hereinafter Civ. Code Peru] made it an obligation for the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Court and the General Fiscal of the Nation to report cases of obscurity that complicate the clear interpretation and application of the law to Congress. Civ. Code Peru Art. X: “The Supreme Court, the Constitutional Court (*) and the Attorney General are required to report to the Congress the gaps or deficiencies in legislation. Judges and prosecutors have the same obligation with respect to the corresponding upper court. [Own Translation]”.

Maxeiner (2006), p. 555.

Paunio explains how multilingualism is a challenge for courts (in this case the ECJ) whose semantic discussions about the meaning of single words show that judges most of the time try to attach to the wording of the law. See Paunio (2013), p. 32.

Maxeiner (2006), pp. 577–578.

Epstein (2007), p. 9.

On more about discretion as an essential element of positivism, see Kress (1984), pp. 372–373.

Epstein (2007), p. 9.

Kress (1984), p. 378. Lyons explains Dworkin’s critics on positivism since a legal system is not only made of positive rules but also of principles. See also Lyons (1977), p. 418.

Steiner (2005), p. 31; see also López Daza (2011), p. 174.

Levi (2013), p. 2.

Braithwaite (2002), p. 51.

Steiner (2005), p. 32.

Paunio (2013), p. 95.

To read more on an analysis of Scalia’s Argument for Discretion-Constraining Norms, see Solum (2002), pp. 10–12.

Dam mentions that in Brazil cases are seldom decided based on precedent. In Brazil cases are mostly decided on a fully individual basis, without considering previous decisions on the same topic. The consequence is the increased uncertainty on issues whose outcome should be clear from the beginning. See Dam (2006), p. 14.

Shetreet (1979), pp. 62–63.

According to Oropeza Barboza the publication must follow a process of promulgation. See Oropeza Barboza (n.d.), p. 68. This process is specified in the Civil Codes of the countries: Consolidated, Coordinated and Systematized Text of the Civil Code Law No. 4,808; about the Civil Registry Law No. 17,344; Minors Law No. 14,908; about Family Abandonment and Payment of Food Pensions and the Law No. 16,271 about Tax on Inheritance, Allocations and Donations [Texto Refundido, Coordinado y Sistematizado del Código Civil; de la Ley No. 4.808, sobre Registro Civil, de la Ley No. 17.344, que Autoriza Cambio de Nombres y Apellidos, de la Ley No. 16.618, Ley de Menores, de la Ley No. 14.908, sobre Abandono de Familia y Pago de Pensiones Alimenticias, y de la Ley No. 16.271, de Impuesto a las Herencias, Asignaciones y Donaciones, Diario Oficial, 30 May 2000] [hereinafter Civ. Code Chile]. According to Art. 6 Civ. Code Chile, “the law is only binding once it is enacted according to the Constitution State and published in accordance with the following precepts. [Own Translation]” Civ. Code Chile Art. 7: “The law shall be published in the Official Journal, and from the date hereof the law is known and mandatory to all. For all legal purposes, the date of the law is the date of its publication in the Official Journal. However, any law may establish different rules about publication and the date or dates on which it takes effect. [Own Translation]”.

Civil and Commercial Code of the Argentine Republic [Código Civil y Comercial de la Nación, Boletín Oficial, 8 October 2014] [hereinafter Civ. Code Argentina] Art. 2: “Laws are only mandatory after their publication and from the date that is determined. If there is not determined date, they will be mandatory after eight days following their official publication. [Own Translation]” See also Civ. Code Mexico Art. 3; Civ. Code Colombia Art. 12.

Maxeiner (2006), p. 603.

Popelier (2000), p. 329.

Braithwaite (2002), p. 57.

Rhode (2001), p. 1793.

Shetreet (1979), p. 63.

To read more about the necessary changes in the judicial system in Mexico, see Shirk and Rios Cazares (2007), p. 1.

Braithwaite (2002), p. 57. Maxeiner explains how even in legal indeterminate environments, legal certainty is improved when people can identify the appliers (in this case their natural judges) of the law. See Maxeiner (2006), pp. 559–560.

O’Donnell (2004), p. 40.

Wroblewsky (1975), p. 314.

The principle of protection of legitimate expectations could be argued as the subjective perspective of legal certainty. According to Popelier, provided there is a perception of objective legal certainty people build legitimate expectations which are defined as “the certainty a subject of law has about the realization of his own expectations and what legal consequences will follow from his actions.” See Popelier (2000), p. 340. See also Craig (1996), p. 303 claiming: “The natural role of legitimate expectations is, however, to reflect individual’s perspective and the value of legal certainty.”

Villegas (1993), p. 36.

For more on real legal certainty as the objective of implementation of the law, see Otto (2002), pp. 23–25.

Villegas (1993), p. 33.

Rodriguez Yong (2008), p. 422. See also Calderón (2009), pp. 183–184.

The discussion in this part of the chapter focuses on analyzing legal certainty as a general principle of law that has to be taken into consideration in the enactment of legal rules. However, it is important to mention the argument about principles providing more legal certainty than the rules themselves. John Braithwaite defends the idea that principles of law are more certain than detailed legal rules about topics related to a continuously modifying and dynamic environment like that of business and economics. The reason is that it is difficult to draw out all the possible details in situations that hardly remain unchanged. Attempting to do this only adds obscurity and inconsistency to the broad picture of the legal system. Therefore, when regulating this kind of areas, it is better to avoid using rules alone. Instead, a mix of precise legal rules backed up by non-binding principles is preferable. It is important the make the rule of law work and prevent adjudicators form ignoring legal prescriptions without justification in cases when the application of a legal rule in unreasonable. See Braithwaite (2002), p. 47.

The legal frameworks of our six Latin American countries include the principle of non-retroactivity of the law in their constitutions. For instance, the Const. Colombia Art. 29, establishes that “Due process shall be applied in all cases of legal and administrative measures. Guarantee of due process No one may be judged except in accordance with previously written laws which shall provide the basis of each decision before a competent judge or tribunal following all appropriate forms.” The Const. Mexico Art. 14 para 1: “No law will have retroactive effect in detriment of any person.” See also Juan Rafael Bravo Arteaga v. Congreso de la República de Colombia, CCC, Sentencia C-549, 29 November 1993. See also Constitution of Peru Art. 2 [English Translation of Constitución Política del Perú, Diario Oficial, 30 December 1993] [hereinafter Const. Peru], prescribes that as part of people’s right to freedom and personal security “a. No one is obliged to do what the law does not command, nor prevented from doing what the law does not prohibit. b. No restrictions whatsoever to personal freedom shall be permitted, except in cases provided by the law. Slavery, servitude, and traffic in human beings are prohibited in any form. […] d. No one shall be prosecuted or convicted for any act or omission that, at the time of its commission, was not previously prescribed in the law expressly and unequivocally as a punishable violation, or did not constitute an offense penalized by law.[…]” The Constitution of Brazil Art. 5 [English translation of the Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil, Diario Oficial da União, 5 October 1988] [hereinafter Const. Brazil], prescribes that all persons are equal before the law, without any distinction whatsoever, Brazilians and foreigners residing in the country being ensured of inviolability of the right to life, to liberty, to equality, to security and to property, on the following terms: “XXXIX. - There is no crime without a previous law to define it, nor a punishment.”

Maxeiner (2006), p. 559.

Popelier (2000), p. 333.

Craig (1996), p. 304.

For the wording, see Raitio (2003), p. 129.

Craig (2006), p. 553.

Raitio (2003), p. 129.

Steiner (2005), p. 1.

Craig (1996), p. 305.

For a comprehensive understanding of legal retroactivity in the context of tax law, see Graetz (1977), p. 49.

Epstein (2003), pp. 78–82.

Epstein (2003), pp. 86–87.

For a more detailed explanation of the principle nullum crimen, nulla peoena sine lege stricta, (scripta), praevia, see Mokhtar (2005), pp. 41–47.

Steiner (2005), p. 2.

Control constitucionalidad “Ley de Caza”, TC Chile, Sentencia Rol No. 244, 26 August 1996. The nulla poena sine lege apllies also for administrative sanctions because they are also punitive. Administrative sanctions “are punitive in nature cannot be imposed unless they have a clear and unambiguous legal basis. See: Raitio (2003), p. 159.

Const. Colombia Art. 29 para 3: “In criminal law, permissive or favorable law, even when ex post facto, shall be applied in preference to restrictive or unfavorable alternatives.” See also Const. Brazil Art. 5 (XL), “penal law shall not be retroactive, except to benefit the defendant.” See also Mokhtar (2005), p. 49.

Popelier (2000), p. 327.

Raitio (2003), p. 200.

Popelier (2000), pp. 333–334.

Reynolds (2011), pp. 330–337.

Steiner (2005), p. 2.

Reynolds (2011), pp. 337–341.

Craig (1996), p. 305; see also Craig (2006), p. 549.

Paunio (2013), pp. 61–62.

Krajewski (2014), pp. 80–81.

Craig (1996), p. 298.

Maxeiner (2006), pp. 561–562.

Lachmann (1971), p. 114.

Kingsbury and Schill (2009), pp. 8–12. See also CMS Gas Transmission Company. v. The Republic of Argentina, ICSID, Case No. ARB/01/8, Award, 12 May 2005, para 274. Similarly, Occidental Exploitation and Production Company (OEPC) v. the Republic of Ecuador, UNCITRAL, LCIA Case No. UN3467, Final Award, July 2004, para 183. Those cases are used in Kingsbury and Schill (2009), p. 10.

Craig (1996), p. 303.

Reynolds explains that both, the principle of legal certainty and the protection of legitimate expectations are creations of German law. Within the German legal framework, they are clearly differentiated. Legal certainty (Rechtssicherheit) stresses the importance of certainty of the content of the law. The protection of legitimate expectations (Vertrauensschutz) focuses on protecting people who trusted that the actions of the public authorities are legal. The principle of protection of legitimate expectations has in this context a specific target that is the actions of the public administration. However, the protection of legitimate expectations can be applied even against legislation threatening the basic requirements of legal certainty such as stability of the legal rules. See Reynolds (2011), pp. 340–341.

The principle of protection of legitimate expectations overlaps also with other principle like proportionality, fairness, abuse of power, good administration. See Reynolds (2011), p. 330. Retroactivity and good faith. The principle of proportionality requires a deeper understanding of the influence that legal rules and public decisions can have on people. See Thomas (2000), pp. 15–16.

Proportionality also requires that legal rules are realistic in their demands. See Popelier (2000), p. 337. From the perspective of law enforcement, the principle of proportionality seeks to avoid arbitrariness in the actions of state officials. Then authorities’ actions cannot override fundamental rights and should not do more than what is necessary to achieve their goals. See Raitio (2003), pp. 97–98.

The principle of protection of legitimate expectations is considered the “technical form” of the principle of fairness. It specifically means “the right to fair treatment at the hands of the public authority.” Further, it is argued that the principle of protection of legitimate expectations is an “application of the principle of abuse of power” that seeks to avoid “unfairness of the public authority”. Reynolds (2011), p. 332.

At the center of the principle of good faith of the administration is the idea of that even though ignorance about the law does not exclude people from the consequences of not applying the law, this is not only in the responsibility of the individual if the authorities have contributed to unlawful action by providing the wrong information either through inaccurate advice or inconsistency in the public actions. See Kuusikko (2001), pp. 458–459, 469.

Rodriguez Yong (2008), p. 422. See also Carlos A. Ballesteros B v. Gobierno de la República de Colombia, CCC, Sentencia C-314, 1 April 2004.