13. Lessons for Theory: A Conceptual Framework of Transformative Pathways

Meanwhile, as the Mexican and Philippine case studies confirm, democracy, when confronted by deficiencies, cannot guarantee to promote transformation process towards sustainability. The dominance of institutional activists and social movements in the country indicates a Philippine State with low capacity and low autonomy. The low capacity and low autonomy of the Philippine State are both a cause and an effect. In the case of Mexico, the lack of venues or channels for the effective participation of societal groups can be held responsible for the states low capacity. These societal groups could have contributed important inputs to the effective implementation of relevant energy projects. On the one hand, this situation reinforces the ability of dominant actors to disconnect various bargaining games from policy games. For example, as institutional activists willingly or unwillingly opt to reinforce existing structural imbalances and use privileges previously reserved for the dominant actors, the transformation process is very likely inhibited, because this disconnect will very likely mobilize ‘preference outliers’ leading to the proliferation of fractal systems. The disconnection of various bargaining games will very likely, on the other hand, lead to further limitations in the Philippine State’s autonomy. Because sustainable, low-carbon transformation will virtually certainly touch on various interconnected issues, the State will virtually certainly need insurmountable resources to integrate the dispersed fractal systems of decision-making.

Nevertheless, the level of capacity and autonomy of the state is highly contingent on how the state can ‘depoliticize’ and ‘securitize’ certain issues. The securitization of certain issues will likely initiate “emergency powers”, allowing change agents to tap “exemptions” to the “normal” set of rules and regulations, in order to better address the existing constraints caused by lock-ins. The case study on China exemplifies how China was able to do a complete turn-around on its environmental and climate protection policies. Through the effective securitization of environmental and climate protection, China was able to revise its socio-linguistic narratives and justify the establishment of a “new normal.” These narratives that, for example, link the need to address climate change with China’s economic competitiveness, provided the regime with important capital to establish the “new normal” within limited constraints from many types of carbon lock-ins.

As more bargaining games are disconnected from policy games, decision-making becomes virtually certainly polycentric. Furthermore, as each issue is separated from other issues, where the state encourages public participation in one issue but limits or excludes another issue, governance will likely become polycentric (see Ostrom 2010). The autonomy of the state decreases as more fractal decision-making systems (with each of these fractal systems seeking its own specific equilibrium) emerge, due to the increased polycentrism of governance. This means that the state becomes less capable of constituting and implementing policies by itself. The state will need to address multiple competitions within each of these fractal systems, which strain the state’s capacity. The state will likely prioritize certain issues and delay or even resign in others, leading to individual vacuums in certain issues. These vacuums will likely further reinforce fractal systems. In such a situation, in facilitating and managing sustainable low carbon transformation, the State will virtually certainly be dependent on multiple fractal decision-making frameworks, which will virtually certainly exacerbate both the collaboration problem (e.g., the emergence of more equilibria) and the coordination problem (e.g., an increase in problems related to communication).

In the case study of the United States, the emergence of ‘smart’ cities and ‘smart’ enclaves as well as the re-emergence of social movements following the state’s increased outsourcing of welfare services to the private sector will likely further undermine the autonomy of the state through the reinforcement of technocratic and post-democratic governance principles in the country. As the private sector and social movements continue to set the standards, benchmarks, and norms in various sectors and establish de facto ‘expert committees’ that compete with state institutions in terms of authority and expertise, the state will very likely be more dependent on the private sector and other non-state actors when implementing a wider range of policies, which will virtually certainly further exacerbate legitimacy deficits. These de facto ‘expert committees’ are informal conglomerates of technical experts that compete with experts within state polities. In addition, the dependence on de facto ‘expert committees’ will likely aggravate polycentric decision-making, because these de facto ‘expert committees’ will likely be sectoral in nature. Cross-cutting expertise is likely limited due to the corporate nature of accountability. For example, members of de facto ‘expert committees’ on financial issues will very likely come from the finance sector and have limited exposure to related social issues. In addition, because they are accountable to the stakeholders of the finance sector, there will very likely have limited motivation to encompass, for example, human rights concerns.

Therefore, the success of the transformation process depends virtually certainly on how the objectives of the transformation process can be aligned with the objectives of these de facto ‘expert committees.’ In addition, the increased importance of these de facto expert committees will virtually certainly lead to further legitimacy gaps in the transformation process. Hence, new forms of accountability and transparency are needed to address new types of structural imbalances.

As implied earlier, the convergence of norms and values that resolve coordination and collaboration problems professes a certain degree of identity-based citizenry. Nevertheless, there is a need to consider an understanding of citizenry that is decoupled from the principle of state sovereignty, because this is often used as a pretext for exclusion. Several authors have called for similar concepts (see Arendt 1958; Bogues 2011). For example, Priya Chacko (2011 p. 181) introduced the idea of an “internationalist nationalism.” When analyzing any transformation process, there is a need to identify the various categories that can unify actors, including both the change and status quo agents. For convergence to be initiated, respective norms, values, and principles need to be diffused to the value systems of the others, without causing ruptures in these systems. However, this diffusion presumes one or more entry points. Another idea about diffusion is contributed by David Strang and John Meyer (2010 p. 150), who argue that diffusion is shaped and accelerated by culturally-analyzed similarities among actors, and by theorized accounts of actors and practices. They continue by suggesting that when social entities belong to a common social category, diffusion should be rapid. As convergence moves one step forward, the next step will require less than the resources needed to make the previous step.

In the context of sustainable, low-carbon development, the diffusion of new norms, principles and standards that reinforce sustainability rationales in collective actions is very likely to occur in a homogenous system rather than in a fragmented one. However, there is a need to analyze what makes the system homogenous, particularly when actors will virtually certainly be diversified. Even in classical ‘nation’ states such as France and Germany where the population is generally perceived as homogenous, there are differences, depending on which category (language, religion, level of income) is considered. The difference between homogeneity and heterogeneity depends significantly on the socio-technical and socio-linguistic narratives used. These contend which similarities and differences are deemed relevant and which elements of these similarities or differences (us against them) will likely mobilize identity-building. Therefore, there is a need to find a set of categories that highlight similarities without linking differences with threats—a citizenry based on human solidarity.

Shifts in the underlying structure of power are reflected, sometimes gradually rather than abruptly, by changes in social institutions like regimes at the global level (see Young 2010 p. 175) and in state institutions at the domestic level. While actors accept that power asymmetries are a given, they take the distribution of privileges seriously and contest it, should they find themselves in an unfavorable position. Nevertheless, they will very likely accept the distribution of privileges according to power asymmetries, particularly when this power status is achieved and maintained by costs shouldered by the powerful. However, as soon as power configurations shift, the distribution of privileges is virtually certainly expected to shift as well. If not, the distribution mechanism will be contested and if status quo agents are able to instrumentalize their old privileges to inhibit change in the distribution of privileges, then defection is virtually certain to occur.

Another challenge is linked with the self-reinforcing characteristic of power, often sustained by privileges, with or without active intervention from the actors. In addition, some privileges are latent, which requires addition effort to be properly conceptualized and resolved. Other privileges are symptomatic. These privileges can be caused by variables that are systems-related, which cannot be resolved without causing additional paradoxes. For example, the underrepresentation of scholars from developing countries in the generation of academic knowledge is not always a result of the intended marginalization of these scholars but can also be attributed to differences in orientation or mandate (e.g., the teaching mandate of professors). This underrepresentation is rather a symptom of ‘biased’ indicators of the ‘performance quality’ of scholars, which tend to focus heavily on publications in peer-reviewed journals.

Looking at the international system, emerging powers such as China and Mexico will virtually certainly seek access to privileges enjoyed by contemporary powers, and when confronted by an inability to do so due to existing structural constraints, these emerging powers will very likely evaluate whether defection (and the establishment of competing systems) will bring more benefits. In some cases, emerging powers will establish competing regimes or institutions that will very likely be open only to selected actors. This behavior will likely be interpreted by established powers as rule-breaking and therefore as a threat to international stability and order. In addition, emerging powers will very likely ‘shop for forum,’ which means that in addressing one issue they will very likely prefer to participate in a specific global institution, but in another issue, they will participate in a competing global or regional institution. This behavior will likely be seen negatively by established parties, because this undermines the predictability and consistency of foreign policies. Therefore, power shifts in transformation processes will very likely lead to an international order that is likely more fragmented and therefore polycentric.

Convergence refers to the similarities in experiences between actors in terms of lock-ins, standards, and norms. The increased rapprochement of the policies and actions of countries will very likely promote cooperation or collaboration. As convergence increases, the immediate pay-offs of defection likely decreases, because convergence resolves the ‘prisoner’s dilemma’ in collaboration games (see Layer 1980; Snidal 2010). The rapprochement of multiple equilibria in the context of convergence implies that the suboptimal equilibrium’s pay-offs will very likely become minimal. Furthermore, it needs to be highlighted that convergence does not automatically mean the elimination of asymmetries between actors. Asymmetries in power or privileges can even promote cooperation. As Duncan Snidal (2010 p. 11) contends, asymmetries increase the likelihood of some cooperation. However, the distribution of benefits from cooperation will very likely reflect this asymmetry, and the discrepancy between the asymmetry and the benefits will virtually certainly lead to contestation. As the distribution of costs and benefits can also favor weaker parties, weaker states will likely perceive that this probability of benefits outweighs complete exclusion.

The negotiation outlook on collective decision-making suggests that cooperation in the context of an unequal distribution of privileges is likely tolerated when the actors are confronted with similarities in terms of lock-ins, standards, and norms, implying that the degree of convergence among actors offsets the legitimacy gaps that resulted from asymmetries in power and privileges. Because convergence implies the ability to reciprocate the behavior of the others, actors expect that they can also profit from the privileges of powerful actors without shouldering the costs of achieving and maintaining power. Therefore, because convergence constitutes the anticipation of spill-over effects, asymmetries become tolerable. In this sense, it can also be argued that the incentives to defect from a transformation process in the context of asymmetries are very likely concretized through convergence.

In addition, it can be argued that actors will very likely allot more time to negotiations with those actors with similar lock-ins compared to those which are perceived as being significantly different. This means, for example, that while countries with the same type of policy pathways (democratic, authoritarian, etc.) are expected to prefer negotiations among each other, the caveat to negotiating will likely disappear when the policy pathway taken by the counterparts does not reflect the various lock-ins one is confronted with. In addition, further convergence is achieved as actors explore additional potentials of cooperation, cementing shared values and establishing new capacities, which eventually pave the way for more exclusive membership. Therefore, while convergence promotes further cooperation, it can also limit the scale of cooperation, as actors outside the fractal system (convergent system) will very likely be excluded.

Several collaboration and coordination problem-issues were resolved in the last few years as confirmed by the Paris Climate Agreement. The first signs of pay-offs from mitigation policies made in the past have already occurred. Examples of these signs include the gradual decrease of upfront costs and the market price of renewables. In addition, the slowing growth in the global CO₂ emission level was recorded despite continued economic growth, hinting at stabilization and a slower global growth in fossil fuel consumption (see Jackson et al. 2015; IEA 2016a; Löfken & Martin 2017). While it is still premature to claim that the critical juncture that favors sustainable, low-carbon seems to have already arrived, signs indicate that this critical juncture is only a matter of time.

This critical juncture is expected to be further reinforced, eventually establishing self-driving lock-ins, as the effects of investments in renewables are realized in the next few years. Since 2015, there have been more energy power plants using wind, water, and solar power than those using energy from fossil fuels and nuclear power (IEA 2016a). In addition, 70% of new investments made (or 288 billion USD) in the electricity sector are attributed to renewables (IEA 2016a) and a significant chunk of these investments were made in China, which is the primary source of emission growth. When this critical juncture is established, distortions, such as the election of President Trump, as the case study on the United States shows, are unlikely to cause major reversals of the transformation process or even a system rupture. On the contrary, there are important silver-linings to such distortions that will very likely further reinforce the transformation process. The relevant climate and sustainability initiatives coming from the private sector and civil society under President Trump, which were not available during previous administrations, are likely promising signs that after the term of President Trump, the sustainable, low-carbon transformation of the United States or even of many developing countries will very likely accelerate. New climate leaders such as China have emerged. Because the Chinese regime has recognized that the decrease of coal use in China was largely responsible for CO₂ stabilization, China has garnered the ‘moral legitimacy’ needed for its leadership.

The road towards this critical juncture is long. Additional efforts and time are needed to promote the required convergence of norms, standards, and values, also due to marginal benefits. This road will virtually certainly demand the further relinquishing of personal rights, liberties, and freedoms at the domestic level and sovereignty at the global level. As new lock-ins emerge, more rights and freedoms may be undermined, which may alter preferences, particularly when benefits remain ‘theoretical’ and ‘collective’ while the costs are ‘practical’ and ‘personal’. Because sustainable, low-carbon transformation involves cutting across issues, jurisdictions, and mandates, conflicts of rights and liberties will virtually certainly be inevitable. The failure to adequately address emerging conflicts will very likely further motivate the creation of additional fractals in an already fragmented system.

As hinted at earlier in this book, conversion is inevitable, because identifying benchmarks as well as the contingents of transformation require the comparability of values and, later, of the ‘inventories’ of a policy that need to be replaced without undermining the overall effectiveness of this policy. The resolution of both coordination and collaboration problems are virtually certainly dependent on benchmarks and contingencies, which will likely cross-cut several issues, rights, and mandates. Therefore, social contracts will very likely need to include mechanisms of conversion to diminish the self-enforcement of existing structural biases. Using the conflict between the German wind energy sector and environmental groups, under current conditions, the offshore wind energy sector will very likely produce more compelling arguments to persuade policy-makers and public opinion. The reason behind this is that this sector can easily ‘convert’ its current and future values into more tangible ‘currencies’ that are welcomed by policy-makers and the public. For example, the number of jobs that are created and will be created by the sector are compelling. For the environmental groups, it will be difficult to convert ‘environmental integrity’ into currencies that can equally compel political and public acceptance as much as the arguments of the offshore wind energy sector. How many jobs can one unit of environmental integrity create? Answering this question is not only difficult from the methodological perspective, but it is also difficult because the answer will very likely imply that the others should relinquish rights and liberties and undermine the social mandates of other actors. For example, hypothetically speaking, if one can answer with certainty that one unit of environmental integrity will create 100 jobs, this will very likely mean that the reduction of 100 jobs in the energy sector will be tolerated or demanded, then additional compelling values can be presented by the energy sector such as the economic competitiveness of the city or country. For environmental groups, converting environmental integrity into economic competitiveness may be more difficult to achieve.

The simulation game on the Jamaican austerity measures hinted at the possibility of ‘trading’ values: risk, unhappiness, and ecological damage points (see the case study on Jamaica). This idea came into the discussion as the participants quantified the risks, unhappiness levels and ecological damage. As the participants focused on the co-benefits and synergies of selected austerity measures, some provisions produced positive externalities for the environment. What if this ‘conversion’ could be produced in reverse? This would, however, require further theoretical underpinnings.

An upcoming debate about transformative pathways will raise the question of whether a certain transformative pathway can be best achieved through voluntary or binding commitments. An intuitive answer to that is that this pathway needs to be binding to all or to none. Binding commitments can be designed in such a way that non-participation brings less pay-offs or even unacceptable disadvantages. However, as argued earlier, a sustainable, low-carbon transformative pathway will very likely demand limitations and constraints on liberties and freedoms, which also includes the freedom to decide ‘unwisely’. Relinquishing certain individual rights and liberties to achieve collective sustainable, low-carbon goals will very likely necessitate tedious deliberation, as individual actors will assess the values behind their preferences in terms of incentives. Further inhibiting deliberation is the uncertainty of the future outcomes of present decisions, which motivates actors to agree on commitments that allow exit-strategies.

In addition, appropriate attention needs to be given to the anti-functionalist effect of ‘high’ politics. Functional interactions imply the systemic and social integration of various utilities, which can be distorted if these interactions involve ‘high’ politics. In the case study on the Philippines, it was a game-changing event when the appointed Environment Secretary elevated the mining issue as ‘high’ politics, which in turn transformed her confirmation into ‘high’ politics, in which she had no jurisdiction or bargaining leverage. While the confirmation was initially a formality of appointment, its importance as leverage for her opponents became evident. This demonstrates that policy-makers need to consider how turning an issue into high politics will be very likely translated into other issues, and that one should assess his or her own bargaining leverage in those other issues, including those issues one is indifferent to. Therefore, ‘low’ politics and ‘high’ politics should receive equal attention from both policy-makers and academes, as they both offer opportunities and weaknesses when engaging in functional and bargaining interactions. Focusing mainly on ‘high’ politics will likely imply an underestimation of ‘low’ politics, which can be easily turned into ‘high’ politics as the negotiation process unfolds.