Skip to main content
Disciplines
Automotive Business IT + Informatics Construction + Real Estate Electrical Engineering + Electronics Energy + Sustainability Insurance + Risk Finance + Banking Management + Leadership Marketing + Sales Mechanical Engineering + Materials
Events
DE
EN
Books
Journals
Topic Page
Marketing
Start single access now
Access for companies
EXTENDED SEARCH
Log in
Top
Political Behavior
Published in: Political Behavior 1/2016

05-09-2015 | Original Paper

Participation in the Wake of Adversity: Blame Attribution and Policy-Oriented Evaluations

Authors: Ines Levin, J. Andrew Sinclair, R. Michael Alvarez

Published in: Political Behavior | Issue 1/2016

Log in

Activate our intelligent search to find suitable subject content or patents.

search-config
loading …

Abstract

In this paper we investigate to what extent perceptions of economic conditions, policy-oriented evaluations, and blame attribution affected Californians’ involvement in political activities in 2010. We use a statistical methodology that allows us to study not only the behavior of the average citizen, but also the behavior of “types” of citizens with latent predispositions that incline them toward participation or abstention. The 2010 election is an excellent case study, because it was a period when citizens were still suffering the consequences of the 2008 financial crisis and many were concerned about the state’s budgetary crisis. We find that individuals who blamed one of the parties for the problems with the budget process, and who held a position on the 2010 Affordable Care Act, were often considerably more likely to participate. We also find, however, that the impact of economic evaluations, positions on the health care reform, and blame attributions was contingent on citizens’ latent participation propensities and depended on the class of political activity.
previous article Trusting the State, Trusting Each Other? The Effect of Institutional Trust on Social Trust
next article Public Attitudes Toward Immigration Policy Across the Legal/Illegal Divide: The Role of Categorical and Attribute-Based Decision-Making

Dont have a licence yet? Then find out more about our products and how to get one now:

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

  • über 102.000 Bücher
  • über 537 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

  • Automobil + Motoren
  • Bauwesen + Immobilien
  • Business IT + Informatik
  • Elektrotechnik + Elektronik
  • Energie + Nachhaltigkeit
  • Finance + Banking
  • Management + Führung
  • Marketing + Vertrieb
  • Maschinenbau + Werkstoffe
  • Versicherung + Risiko

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

inform now

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

  • über 67.000 Bücher
  • über 340 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

  • Bauwesen + Immobilien
  • Business IT + Informatik
  • Finance + Banking
  • Management + Führung
  • Marketing + Vertrieb
  • Versicherung + Risiko




Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

inform now
Appendix
Available only for authorised users
Footnotes
1
For example: the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (the “financial system bailout”), the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (the “fiscal stimulus package”), and the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (the “health care bill” or “Obamacare”).
 
2
See Alvarez and Sinclair (2015) for further discussion of politics and public opinion in California at this point in time, and for more details regarding the subsequent political consequences.
 
3
The governor in California is in charge of preparing the budget and submitting it to both legislative chambers; the legislature is allowed to make amendments to the bill. The legislature must pass the budget by June 15 and, until the approval of Proposition 25 in November 2010, passage of the law required a super-majority vote in each chamber, empowering legislative Republicans as well. After the budget passes the legislature, the governor may sign or veto the bill—in which case a supermajority of the legislature may vote to override the veto.
 
4
Governor Schwarzenegger was considered “a moderate Republican” with “liberal views on social issues” (Chandler and Kousser 2008), and often clashed with legislators of both parties.
 
5
We assume that there is a single dimension of conventional political participation, and we break participants into the three classes discussed in the text. The single dimensional model makes sense for the US, as there is very little unconventional political participation—little protesting, little civil disobedience, and few instances of other types of political participation outside the typical political space. Nor does the data available here allow for the estimation and examination of a two-dimensional (e.g., conventional and unconventional participatory dimensions) model. Such a model is better suited for use in other democratic nations, where there is a much greater use of unconventional political participation, such as Argentina (Alvarez et al. 2015).
 
6
We estimate our mixture model using a Bayesian approach, whereby population parameters are not treated as fixed quantities but as random variables that follow probability distributions (Jackman 2000). We use our survey data and MCMC simulation methods to learn about the characteristics of these distributions. In doing so, we assume that intercepts (α T(i)j ’s) follow mixture distributions (that is, “weighted combinations” of distributions, as described by Imai and Tingley 2012, p. 221) and model activity-specific slopes (β j ’s) using a multilevel approach by assuming that they are drawn from a common distribution with mean µ β and variance σ β 2 . The multilevel approach is appealing when making multiple comparisons, as it leads to wider bayesian posterior intervals for model coefficients and implies that there is no need for multiple comparisons corrections (Gelman et al. 2012).
 
7
Thus, we use survey self-reports of political behavior, attitudes, and opinions, to test our hypotheses, building upon decades of research using survey and polling data to study political behavior. There are of course other ways to study political behavior, using other forms of observational data or experimental approaches. While those alternatives have their own merits, observational or experimental data do not allow us to easily test hypotheses that are fundamentally about how individuals perceive their economic situation, nor how who they may blame if they perceive that some political actor needs to be held accountable for how the individual perceives their economic situation.
 
8
In our data analysis, we include two dummy variables quantifying attitudes toward the health care reform: one indicating support and the other one indicating opposition, with “Don’t have strong feelings about it” as the baseline category. Individuals who reported “Don’t know” or “Haven’t heard” about the bill were dropped from the analysis.
 
9
Our data analysis includes one binary indicator of blame attribution for the problems with the budget process, taking value 1 if the respondent blames a single party (either the Republican or the Democratic Party) and 0 if the respondent blames both the Democratic and the Republican Party. Individuals who reported blaming neither party were dropped from the analysis.
 
10
Figure A.1 in the supplementary material gives the distribution of model coefficients for each political activity. Although these plots are not useful for assessing the magnitude of covariate effects, they provide an idea of the sign and statistical significance of each covariate.
 
11
The hypothetical individual has the following baseline characteristics: male, college graduate, annual household income between $60,000 and $80,000, age 40–59, White, Independent, middle of the road ideology, thinks the state's economy and personal finances will stay the same, blames both parties for the problems with the budget process, and opposes the health care bill.
 
12
The non-White indicator encompasses Asians, Blacks, Hispanics, Native Americans, and unspecified non-White races.
 
13
Table A.2 in the supplementary material gives marginal effects by participatory type for all covariates included in the mixture model and for each political activity.
 
Literature
Aldrich, J. H., Bishop, B. H., Hatch, R. S., Hillygus, D. S., & Rohde, D. W. (2014). Blame, responsibility, and the tea party in the 2010 midterm elections. Political Behavior, 36, 471–491.CrossRef
Alvarez, R. M., & Sinclair, J. A. (2015). Nonpartisan primary election reform: Mitigating mischief. New York: Cambridge University Press.CrossRef
Alvarez, R. M., Levin, I., & Nunez, L. (2015) The four faces of political participation in Argentina: Using latent class analysis to study political behavior. Paper presented at the 2015 annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association.
Alvarez, R. M., & Nagler, J. (1995). Economics, issues and the Perot candidacy: Voter choice in the 1992 presidential election. American Journal of Political Science, 39, 714–744.CrossRef
Arcenaux, K. (2003). The conditional impact of blame attribution on the relationship between economic adversity and turnout. Political Research Quarterly, 56, 67–75.CrossRef
Arcenaux, K., & Nicholson, S. P. (2012). Who wants to have a tea party? The who, what, and why of the tea party movement. PS: Political Science & Politics, 45, 700–710.
Barnes, S. H., Farah, B. G., & Heunks, F. (1979). Personal dissatisfaction. In S. H. Barnes, M. Kaase, et al. (Eds.), Political action: Mass participation in five western democracies. Beverly Hills: Sage.
Bennett, W. L. (2012). The personalization of politics: Political identity, social media, and changing patterns of participation. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 644, 20–39.CrossRef
Boehmke, F. J., & Bowen, D. C. (2010). Direct democracy and individual interest group membership. Journal of Politics, 72, 659–671.CrossRef
Boehmke, F. J., & Alvarez, R. M. (2014). The influence of initiative signature-gathering campaigns on political participation. Social Science Quarterly, 95, 165–193.CrossRef
Brady, H. E., Verba, S., & Schlozman, K. L. (1995). Beyond SES: A resource model of political participation. American Political Science Review, 89, 271–294.CrossRef
Brody, R. A., & Sniderman, P. M. (1977). From life space to polling place: The relevance of personal concerns for voting behavior. British Journal of Political Science, 7, 337–360.CrossRef
Campbell, A. L. (2012). Policy makes mass politics. Annual Review of Political Science, 15, 333–351.CrossRef
Carmines, E. G., Ensley, M. J., & Wagner, M. W. (2011). Issue preferences, civic engagement, and transformation of American politics. In P. M. Sniderman & B. Highton (Eds.), Facing the challenge of democracy: Explorations in the analysis of public opinion and political participation. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Chandler, W. M., & Kousser, T. (2008). Governors, geography, and direct democracy: The case of Arnold Schwarzenegger. In F. Douzet, T. Kousser, & K. P. Miller (Eds.), The new political geography of California. Berkeley: Berkeley Public Policy Press.
Cho, W. K. T., Gimpel, J. G., & Dyck, J. J. (2006). Residential concentration, political socialization, and voter turnout. Journal of Politics, 68, 156–167.
Cummins, J. (2012). An empirical analysis of California budget gridlock. State Politics & Policy Quarterly, 12, 23–42.CrossRef
Downs, A. (1957). An economic theory of democracy. New York: Harper and Row.
Enns, P. K., & Kellstedt, P. M. (2008). Policy mood and political sophistication: Why everybody moves mood. British Journal of Political Science, 38, 433–454.CrossRef
Feldman, S. (1982). Economic self-interest and political behavior. American Journal of Political Science, 26, 446–466.CrossRef
Fiorina, M. P. (1981). Retrospective voting in American national elections. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Fowler, J. H., & Kam, C. D. (2007). Beyond the self: Social identity, altruism, and political participation. Journal of Politics, 69, 813–827.CrossRef
Frühwirth-Schnatter, S. (2006). Finite mixture and Markov switching models. New York: Springer.
Gelman, A., Hill, J., & Yajima, M. (2012). Why we (usually) don’t have to worry about multiple comparisons. Journal of Research on Educational Effectiveness, 5, 189–211.CrossRef
Gelman, A., & Rubin, D. B. (1992). Inference from iterative simulation using multiple sequences. Statistical Science, 7, 457–472.CrossRef
Hacker, J. S. (2004). Dismantling the health care state? Political institutions, public policies and the comparative politics of health reform. British Journal of Political Science, 34, 693–724.CrossRef
Hacker, J. S., Rehm, P., & Schlesinger, M. (2013). The insecure American: Economic experiences, financial worries, and policy attitudes. Perspectives on Politics, 11, 23–49.CrossRef
Heunks, F. (1989). From personal to political. In M. K. Jennings, J. W. van Deth, et al. (Eds.), Continuities in political action: A longitudinal study of political orientations in three western democracies. New York: de Gruyter.
Hibbs, D. A., Jr. (1982). On the demand for economic outcomes: macroeconomic performance and mass political support in the United States, Great Britain, and Germany. Journal of Politics, 44, 426–462.CrossRef
Hill, J. L., & Kriesi, H. (2001). Classification by opinion-changing behavior: A mixture model approach. Political Analysis, 9, 301–324.CrossRef
Imai, K., & Tingley, D. (2012). A statistical method for empirical testing of competing theories. American Journal of Political Science, 56, 218–236.CrossRef
Iyengar, S. (1991). Is anyone responsible? How television frames political issues. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.CrossRef
Jackman, S. (2000). Estimation and inference via Bayesian Simulation: An introduction to Markov Chain Monte Carlo. American Journal of Political Science, 44, 375–404.CrossRef
Jacobson, G. C. (2011a). Legislative success and political failure: The public’s reaction to Barack Obamas early presidency. Presidential Studies Quarterly, 41, 220–243.CrossRef
Jacobson, G. C. (2011b). The republican resurgence in 2010. Political Science Quarterly, 126, 27–52.CrossRef
Javeline, D. (2003). The role of blame in collective action: Evidence from Russia. American Political Science Review, 97, 107–121.CrossRef
Kaase, M., & Marsh, A. (1979). Political action: A theoretical perspective. In S. H. Barnes, M. Kaase, et al. (Eds.), Political action: Mass participation in five western democracies. Beverly Hills: Sage.
Key, V. O. (1966). The responsible electorate: Rationality in presidential voting, 1936–1960. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.CrossRef
Kiewiet, D. R. (1983). Macroeconomics & micropolitics: The electoral effects of economic issues. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Kinder, D. R., & Kiewiet, D. R. (1979). Economic discontent and political behavior: The role of personal grievances and collective economic judgments in congressional voting. American Journal of Political Science, 23, 495–527.CrossRef
Konisky, D. M., & Richardson, L. E. (2012). Penalizing the party: Health care reform issue voting in the 2010 election. American Politics Research, 40, 903–926.CrossRef
Kramer, G. H. (1971). Short-term fluctuations in U.S. voting behavior, 1896–1964. American Political Science Review, 65, 131–143.CrossRef
Lane, R. E. (1959). Political life: Why and how people get involved in politics. New York: The Free Press.
Lewis-Beck, M. S., & Stegmeier, M. (2000). Economic determinants of electoral outcomes. Annual Review of Political Science, 3, 183–219.CrossRef
Lohmann, S. (1994). The dynamics of informational cascades: The monday demonstrations in Leipzig, East Germany, 1989-91. World Politics, 47, 42–101.CrossRef
Malhotra, N., & Margalit, Y. (2010). Short-term communication effects or long-standing dispositions? The public’s response to the financial crisis of 2008. Journal of Politics, 72, 852–867.CrossRef
Margalit, Y. (2013). Explaining social policy preferences: Evidence from the great recession. American Political Science Review, 107, 80–103.CrossRef
Marsh, A., & Kaase, M. (1979). Measuring political action. In S. H. Barnes, M. Kaase, et al. (Eds.), Political action: Mass participation in five western democracies. Beverly Hills: Sage.
Martin, P. S. (2008). The mass media as sentinel: Why bad news about issues is good news for participation. Political Communication, 25, 180–193.CrossRef
Milbrath, L. W. (1960). Predispositions toward political contention. Western Political Quarterly, 13, 5–18.CrossRef
Milbrath, L. W. (1977). Political participation: How and why do people get involved in politics?. Lanham, MD: University Press of America Inc.
Mondak, J. J., Hibbing, M. V., Canache, D., & Seligson, M. A. (2010). Personality and civic engagement: An integrative framework for the study of trait effects on political behavior. American Political Science Review, 104, 85–110.CrossRef
Mughan, A., & Lacy, D. (2002). Economic performance, job insecurity and electoral choice. British Journal of Political Science, 32, 513–533.CrossRef
Olson, M. (1965). The logic of collective action. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Peffley, M. (1984). The voter as juror: Attributing responsibility for economic conditions. Political Behavior, 6, 285–294.CrossRef
Popp, E., & Rudolph, T. J. (2011). A tale of two ideologies: Explaining public support for economic interventions. Journal of Politics, 73, 808–820.CrossRef
Radcliff, B. (1992). The welfare state, turnout, and the economy: A comparative analysis. American Political Science Review, 86, 444–454.CrossRef
Riker, W. H. (1982). Liberalism against populism: A confrontation between the theory of democracy and the theory of social choice. San Francisco: W.H. Freeman.
Riker, W. H., & Ordeshook, P. C. (1968). A theory of the calculus of voting. American Political Science Review, 62, 25–42.CrossRef
Rosenstone, S. J. (1982). Economic adversity and voter turnout. American Journal of Political Science, 26, 25–46.CrossRef
Rudolph, T. J. (2003). Institutional context and the assignment of political responsibility. Journal of Politics, 65, 190–215.CrossRef
Sinclair, B. (2012). The social citizen: Peer networks and political behavior. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.CrossRef
Skocpol, T., & Williamson, V. (2013). The tea party and the remaking of republican conservatism. New York: Oxford University Press.
Smith, M. A. (2011). The contingent effects of ballot initiatives and candidate races on turnout. American Journal of Political Science, 45, 700–706.CrossRef
Smith, D. A., & Tolbert, C. J. (2004). Educated by initiative: The effects of direct democracy on citizens and political organizations in the American states. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Southwell, P. L. (1988). The mobilization hypothesis and voter turnout in congressional elections, 1974–1982. Western Political Quarterly, 41, 273–287.CrossRef
Tarrow, S. (1994). Power in movement. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Thomassen, J. (1989). Economic crisis, dissatisfaction, and protest. In M. K. Jennings, J. W. van Deth, et al. (Eds.), Continuities in political action: A longitudinal study of political orientations in three western democracies. New York: de Gruyter.
Tolbert, C. J., Grummel, J. A., & Smith, D. A. (2001). The effects of ballot initiatives on voter turnout in the American states. American Politics Research, 29, 625–648.CrossRef
Tucker, J. A. (2007). Enough! Electoral fraud, collective action problems, and post-communist colored revolutions. Perspectives on Politics, 5, 535–551.CrossRef
Uhlaner, C. J. (1989). “Relational Goods” and participation: Incorporating sociability into a theory of rational action. Public Choice, 62, 253–285.CrossRef
Verba, S., Schlozman, K. L., & Brady, H. E. (1995). Voice and equality: Civic voluntarism in American politics. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Wolfinger, R. E., & Rosenstone, S. J. (1980). Who votes?. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Youniss, J., McLellan, J. A., & Yates, M. (1997). What we know about engendering civic identity. American Behavioral Scientist, 40, 620–631.CrossRef
Metadata
Title
Participation in the Wake of Adversity: Blame Attribution and Policy-Oriented Evaluations
Authors
Ines Levin
J. Andrew Sinclair
R. Michael Alvarez
Publication date
05-09-2015
Publisher
Springer US
Published in
Political Behavior / Issue 1/2016
Print ISSN: 0190-9320
Electronic ISSN: 1573-6687
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-015-9316-6

Other articles of this Issue 1/2016

Political Behavior 1/2016 Go to the issue

Original Paper

Public Attitudes Toward Immigration Policy Across the Legal/Illegal Divide: The Role of Categorical and Attribute-Based Decision-Making

Original Paper

Liberellas Versus Konservatives: Social Status, Ideology, and Birth Names in the United States

Original Paper

How Disgust Influences Health Purity Attitudes

Original Paper

Finding Partisanship Where We Least Expect it: Evidence of Partisan Bias in a New African Democracy

Original Paper

The Rich are Different: The Effect of Wealth on Partisanship

Original Paper

Schools or Pools of Democracy? A Longitudinal Test of the Relation Between Civic Participation and Political Socialization

Premium Partner

    Image Credits