Peter Bernholz: Totalitarianism, Terrorism and Supreme Values: History and Theory

Excerpt

In the preface to his book, Peter Bernholz tells us of being informed that the editor of a journal to which he had submitted a paper on supreme values did not have the ‘courage’ to publish the paper. Bernholz seems to have been subject to academic exclusion (as has happened to other authors—see Hillman and Ursprung 2016). Did Peter Bernholz write something that the editor felt people do not want to hear, an unpleasant truth in defiance of what political correctness allows to be said? After proceeding through the book, we understand why the journal editor required the ‘courage’ that he claimed he did not have. Suppose we believe that goodwill solves all problems and that through diplomacy and negotiation compromises with all adversaries can always be found, and that it is sufficient to make concessions to evoke reciprocal concessions from others. We may believe that resolution of conflict through goodwill is always possible because we are ourselves pleasant conciliatory people who always find a way to make others become our friends. Like Bruno Frey in his (2004) book on policies toward terror, we might believe in ‘carrots’ as well as ‘sticks’, and prefer ‘carrots’. Or, like Dominic Moïsi in his (2009) book on ‘the geopolitics of emotion’, we might believe that the source of animosity of our adversaries is humiliation due to their not succeeding while their religion or ideology claims they should, and, if a way can be found to ameliorate their humiliation, enmity will cease. If we hold such beliefs, Peter Bernholz is a threat to our preferred world because, through the concept of supreme values, Bernholz is informing us that there are adversaries with whom, and for whom, compromise is impossible. Such adversaries rank non-substitutable objectives. Compromise requires substitutability—the will to give up something in order to be compensated by something else. Substitutability is the basis for usual economic analysis. Non-substitutable supreme values are found in economics in a Rawlsian social welfare function (maximize the utility of the worst-off in society with no regard for the utility of others) and not much elsewhere. While a core concept of economics is choice through substitution, a supreme-value ideology disallows substitution in objectives. Concessions made to a supreme-value adversary will therefore be one-sided—there will be no reciprocity. Supreme-value adversaries therefore need to be confronted with force. At this point we might declare ‘how awful if would be if Bernholz were correct,’ and we might shout ‘warmonger’ and ‘hawk’ at Bernholz. Ostensibly the editor refused to publish Bernholz’s paper on supreme values out of a desire not to upset readers who believe (or want to believe) that compromise and conciliation are always possible with anybody. …