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Nonlinear Self-Adjointness for some Generalized KdV Equations Read chapter Read first chapter

2014 | OriginalPaper | Chapter

24. Privatization and Government Preferences in a Mixed Duopoly: Stackelberg Versus Cournot

Authors : Fernanda A. Ferreira, Flávio Ferreira

Published in: Discontinuity and Complexity in Nonlinear Physical Systems

Publisher: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

We analyse the relationship between the privatization of a public firm and government preferences for tax revenue, by considering a (sequential) Stackelberg duopoly with the public firm as the leader. We assume that the government payoff is given by a weighted sum of tax revenue and the sum of consumer and producer surplus. We get that if the government puts a sufficiently larger weight on tax revenue than on the sum of both surpluses, it will not privatize the public firm. In contrast, if the government puts a moderately larger weight on tax revenue than on the sum of both surpluses, it will privatize the public firm. Furthermore, we compare our results with the ones previously published by an other author obtained in a (simultaneous) Cournot duopoly.

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previous chapter Patent Licensing: Stackelberg Versus Cournot Models
Footnotes
1
For a detailed survey, see De Fraja and Delbono [4].
 
2
Throughout the paper, we use the notation superscript M to refer to the mixed duopoly.
 
3
Throughout the paper, we use the notation superscript P to refer to the privatized duopoly.
 
4
We use the notation subscript Q to refer to the Cournot duopoly.
 
Literature
1.
Brander JA, Spencer BJ (1984) Tariff protection and imperfect competition. In: Kierzkowski H (ed) Monopolistic competition and international trade: 194–207. Oxford University Press, Oxford
2.
Chao C-C, Yu E (2006) Partial privatization, foreign competition, and optimum tariff. Rev Int Econ 14:87–92CrossRef
3.
Clarke R, Collie DR (2006) Optimum-welfare and maximum-revenue tariffs under Bertrand duopoly. Scot J Polit Econ 53:398–408CrossRef
4.
De Fraja G, Delbono F (1990) Game theoretic models of mixed oligopoly. J Econ Surv 4:1–17CrossRef
5.
Ferreira FA, Ferreira F (2009) Maximum-revenue tariff under Bertrand duopoly with unknown costs. Comm Nonlinear Sci Numer Simulat 14:3498–3502CrossRefMATH
6.
Ferreira FA, Ferreira F (2012) Privatization and government preference in a public Stackelberg leader duopoly. In: IEEE 4th international conference on nonlinear science and complexity proceedings, Budapest, pp 87–89
7.
Fjell K, Heywood J (2004) Mixed oligopoly, subsidization and the order of firms’s moves: the relevance of privatization. Econ Lett 53:411–416MathSciNetCrossRef
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Kato H (2008) Privatization and government preference. Econ Bull 12:1–7
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Larue B, Gervais J-P (2002) Welfare-maximizing and revenue-maximizing tariffs with few domestic firms. Can J Econ 35:786–804CrossRef
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Matsumura T (1998) Partial privatization in mixed Duopoly. J Publ Econ 70:473–483CrossRef
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Metadata
Title
Privatization and Government Preferences in a Mixed Duopoly: Stackelberg Versus Cournot
Authors
Fernanda A. Ferreira
Flávio Ferreira
Copyright Year
2014
Book
Discontinuity and Complexity in Nonlinear Physical Systems

Print ISBN: 978-3-319-01410-4

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-319-01411-1

Copyright Year: 2014

DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-01411-1_24

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