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2018 | OriginalPaper | Chapter

Rational Coordination in Games with Enriched Representations

Authors : Valentin Goranko, Antti Kuusisto, Raine Rönnholm

Published in: Multi-Agent Systems and Agreement Technologies

Publisher: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

We consider pure win-lose coordination games where the representation of the game structure has additional features that are commonly known to the players, such as colouring, naming, or ordering of the available choices or of the players. We study how the information provided by such enriched representations affects the solvability of these games by means of principles of rational reasoning in coordination scenarios with no prior communication or conventions.

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Footnotes
1
Note that the notion of ‘colour’ is used metaphorically, rather than literally here, because we assume that a choice may have several colours, or none at all. Thus, the notion of colour used here is more in line with its traditional use in logic, not in graph theory. In particular, every choice of every player is associated with a (possibly empty) set of colours, called further ‘colour type’, rather than a single colour.
 
2
Even though the sets of players’ choices are formally pairwise disjoint by definition, common names for all choices would establish a natural 1-1 correspondence between the choices in the different players’ sets.
 
3
Intuitively, structurally unsolvable \(\mathsf {WLC}\) games are those that cannot solved by any structural principle. For a precise definition, see [2] where we give a complete characterisation of such games.
 
Literature
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3.
go back to reference Goranko, V., Kuusisto, A., Rönnholm, R.: Rational coordination with no communication or conventions. Technical report (2017). arXiv:1706.07412 Goranko, V., Kuusisto, A., Rönnholm, R.: Rational coordination with no communication or conventions. Technical report (2017). arXiv:​1706.​07412
4.
go back to reference Lewis, D.: Convention, A Philosophical Study. Harvard University Press, Cambridge (1969) Lewis, D.: Convention, A Philosophical Study. Harvard University Press, Cambridge (1969)
5.
go back to reference Mehta, J., Starmer, C., Sugden, R.: Focal points in pure coordination games: an experimental investigation. Theory Decis. 36(2), 163–185 (1994)CrossRef Mehta, J., Starmer, C., Sugden, R.: Focal points in pure coordination games: an experimental investigation. Theory Decis. 36(2), 163–185 (1994)CrossRef
6.
go back to reference Schelling, T.C.: The Strategy of Conflict. Harvard University Press, Cambridge (1960) Schelling, T.C.: The Strategy of Conflict. Harvard University Press, Cambridge (1960)
Metadata
Title
Rational Coordination in Games with Enriched Representations
Authors
Valentin Goranko
Antti Kuusisto
Raine Rönnholm
Copyright Year
2018
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-01713-2_23

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