Skip to main content
Disciplines
Automotive Business IT + Informatics Construction + Real Estate Electrical Engineering + Electronics Energy + Sustainability Insurance + Risk Finance + Banking Management + Leadership Marketing + Sales Mechanical Engineering + Materials
Events
DE
EN
Books
Journals
Topic Page
Marketing
Start single access now
Access for companies
EXTENDED SEARCH
Log in
Top
Designs, Codes and Cryptography
Published in: Designs, Codes and Cryptography 4/2023

17-11-2022

Receiver selective opening security for identity-based encryption in the multi-challenge setting

Authors: Zhengan Huang, Junzuo Lai, Gongxian Zeng, Xin Mu

Published in: Designs, Codes and Cryptography | Issue 4/2023

Login to get access

Activate our intelligent search to find suitable subject content or patents.

search-config
loading …

Abstract

Receiver selective opening (RSO) security requires that in a situation where there are one sender and multiple receivers, even if an adversary has access to all ciphertexts and adaptively corrupts some fraction of the receivers to obtain their secret keys, the (potentially related) ciphertexts of the uncorrupted receivers remain secure. All of the existing works construct RSO secure identity-based encryption (IBE) in the single-challenge setting, where each identity is used only once for encryption. This restriction makes RSO security for IBE unrealistic in practice. It is preferable to have IBE schemes with RSO security in the multi-challenge setting in practice, where each identity can be used to encrypt multiple messages. In this paper, we initiate the study of RSO security in the multi-challenge setting (which we call \(\hbox {RSO}_k\) security) for IBE. Concretely, we show that the conclusion of lower bound, proposed by Yang et al. (in: ASIACRYPT 2020, Springer, 2020), on the secret key size of RSO secure public-key encryption also holds in the IBE setting (i.e., an IBE scheme cannot be \(\hbox {RSO}_k\) secure if the length of its secret key is not k times larger than the length of message). For construction, we propose a generic construction of IBE achieving \(\hbox {RSO}_k\) security. Through our generic construction, we can obtain \(\hbox {RSO}_k\) secure IBE schemes based on decisional linear (DLIN) assumption and learning with error (LWE) assumption. Furthermore, we show that the well-known Fujisaki–Okamoto transformation can be applied to construct a practical IBE scheme achieving \(\hbox {RSO}_k\) security.
previous article Perfect LRCs and k-optimal LRCs
next article Characterizations and constructions of plateaued functions on finite abelian groups
Footnotes
1
Note that \((\textsf {id}_i)_{i\in [n]}\) are specified by \({\mathcal {A}}_1\), and they are required to satisfy that \(\{\textsf {id}_i\mid i\in [n]\}\cap {\mathcal {L}}_{\text {id}}=\emptyset \). So \({\mathcal {A}}_1\) cannot obtain secret keys for \((\textsf {id}_i)_{i\in [n]}\) via querying \({\mathcal {O}}_{\text {KGen}}\).
 
2
Note that the case of \(\theta \ge {\widetilde{\theta }}\) has been discussed in (a).
 
Literature
1.
Agrawal S., Boneh D., Boyen X.: Efficient lattice (H)IBE in the standard model. In: EUROCRYPT 2010, pp. 553–572. Springer (2010).
2.
Bellare M., Dowsley R., Waters B., Yilek S.: Standard security does not imply security against selective-opening. In: EUROCRYPT 2012, pp. 645–662. Springer (2012).
3.
Bellare M., Hofheinz D., Yilek S.: Possibility and impossibility results for encryption and commitment secure under selective opening. In: EUROCRYPT 2009, pp. 1–35. Springer (2009).
4.
Bellare M., O’Neill A.: Semantically-secure functional encryption: possibility results, impossibility results and the quest for a general definition. In: CANS 2013, pp. 218–234. Springer (2013).
5.
Bellare M., Waters B., Yilek S.: Identity-based encryption secure against selective opening attack. In: TCC 2011, pp. 235–252. Springer (2011).
6.
7.
Boneh D., Franklin M.: Identity-based encryption from the weil pairing. In: CRYPTO 2001, pp. 213–229. Springer (2001).
8.
Boyen X., Li Q.: All-but-many lossy trapdoor functions from lattices and applications. In: CRYPTO 2017, pp. 298–331. Springer (2017).
9.
Fehr S., Hofheinz D., Kiltz E., Wee H.: Encryption schemes secure against chosen-ciphertext selective opening attacks. In: EUROCRYPT 2010, pp. 381–402. Springer (2010).
10.
Fujisaki E., Okamoto T.: Secure integration of asymmetric and symmetric encryption schemes. In: CRYPTO 1999, pp. 537–554. Springer (1999).
11.
12.
Groth J., Ostrovsky R., Sahai A.: Perfect non-interactive zero knowledge for np. In: EUROCRYPT 2006, pp. 339–358. Springer (2006).
13.
Hara K., Kitagawa F., Matsuda T., Hanaoka G., Tanaka K.: Simulation-based receiver selective opening CCA secure PKE from standard computational assumptions. In: Security and Cryptography for Networks 2018, pp. 140–159. Springer (2018).
14.
Hara K., Matsuda T., Tanaka K.: Receiver selective opening chosen ciphertext secure identity-based encryption. In: Proceedings of the 8th ACM on ASIA Public-Key Cryptography Workshop, pp. 51–59 (2021).
15.
Hazay C., Patra A., Warinschi B.: Selective opening security for receivers. In: ASIACRYPT 2015, pp. 443–469. Springer (2015).
16.
Hemenway B., Libert B., Ostrovsky R., Vergnaud D.: Lossy encryption: Constructions from general assumptions and efficient selective opening chosen ciphertext security. In: ASIACRYPT 2011, pp. 70–88. Springer (2011).
17.
Heuer F., Jager T., Kiltz E., Schäge S.: On the selective opening security of practical public-key encryption schemes. In: PKC 2015, 27–51 (2015).
18.
Heuer F., Poettering B.: Selective opening security from simulatable data encapsulation. In: ASIACRYPT 2016, pp. 248–277. Springer (2016).
19.
Hofheinz D.: All-but-many lossy trapdoor functions. In: EUROCRYPT 2012, pp. 209–227. Springer (2012).
20.
Hofheinz D., Rao V., Wichs D.: Standard security does not imply indistinguishability under selective opening. In: TCC 2016, pp. 121–145. Springer (2016).
21.
Hofheinz D., Rupp A.: Standard versus selective opening security: separation and equivalence results. In: TCC 2014, pp. 591–615. Springer (2014).
22.
Huang Z., Lai J., Chen W., Au M.H., Peng Z., Li J.: Simulation-based selective opening security for receivers under chosen-ciphertext attacks. Des. Codes Cryptogr. 87(6), 1345–1371 (2019).MathSciNetCrossRefMATH
23.
Huang Z., Liu S., Mao X., Chen K.: Non-malleability under selective opening attacks: Implication and separation. In: ACNS 2015, pp. 87–104. Springer (2015).
24.
Huang Z., Liu S., Qin B.: Sender-equivocable encryption schemes secure against chosen-ciphertext attacks revisited. In: PKC 2013, pp. 369–385. Springer (2013).
25.
Jia D., Libert B.: SO-CCA secure PKE from pairing based all-but-many lossy trapdoor functions. Des. Codes Cryptogr. 89(5), 895–923 (2021).MathSciNetCrossRefMATH
26.
Jia D., Liu Y., Li B.: IBE with tight security against selective opening and chosen-ciphertext attacks. Des. Codes Cryptogr. 88, 1371–1400 (2020).MathSciNetCrossRefMATH
27.
Jia D., Lu X., Li B.: Receiver selective opening security from indistinguishability obfuscation. In: INDOCRYPT 2016, pp. 393–410. Springer (2016).
28.
Jia D., Lu X., Li B.: Constructions secure against receiver selective opening and chosen ciphertext attacks. In: CT-RSA 2017, pp. 417–431. Springer (2017).
29.
Kitagawa F., Tanaka K.: Key dependent message security and receiver selective opening security for identity-based encryption. In: PKC 2018, pp. 32–61. Springer (2018).
30.
Lai J., Deng R.H., Liu S., Weng J., Zhao Y.: Identity-based encryption secure against selective opening chosen-ciphertext attack. In: EUROCRYPT 2014, pp. 77–92. Springer (2014).
31.
Lai J., Yang R., Huang Z., Weng J.: Simulation-based bi-selective opening security for public key encryption. In: ASIACRYPT 2021, pp. 456–482. Springer (2021).
32.
Libert B., Sakzad A., Stehlé D., Steinfeld R.: All-but-many lossy trapdoor functions and selective opening chosen-ciphertext security from LWE. In: CRYPTO 2017, pp. 332–364. Springer (2017).
33.
Liu S., Paterson K.G.: Simulation-based selective opening CCA security for PKE from key encapsulation mechanisms. In: PKC 2015, pp. 3–26. Springer (2015).
34.
Lu Y., Hara K., Tanaka K.: Receiver selective opening CCA secure public key encryption from various assumptions. In: Provable and Practical Security 2020, pp. 213–233. Springer (2020).
35.
Lyu L., Liu S., Han S., Gu D.: Tightly SIM-SO-CCA secure public key encryption from standard assumptions. In: PKC 2018, pp. 62–92. Springer (2018).
36.
Naor M., Yung M.: Public-key cryptosystems provably secure against chosen ciphertext attacks. In: STOC 1990, pp. 427–437. Citeseer (1990).
37.
Peikert C., Shiehian S.: Noninteractive zero knowledge for np from (plain) learning with errors. In: CRYPTO 2019, pp. 89–114. Springer (2019).
38.
Sahai A.: Non-malleable non-interactive zero knowledge and adaptive chosen-ciphertext security. In: FOCS 1999, pp. 543–553. IEEE (1999).
39.
40.
Waters B.: Dual system encryption: realizing fully secure IBE and HIBE under simple assumptions. In: CRYPTO 2009, pp. 619–636. Springer (2009).
41.
Yang P., Kitagawa T., Hanaoka G., Zhang R., Matsuura K., Imai H.: Applying Fujisaki-Okamoto to identity-based encryption. In: Applied Algebra. Algebraic Algorithms and Error-Correcting Codes - AAECC 2006, pp. 183–192. Springer, Berlin (2006).
42.
Yang R., Lai J., Huang Z., Au M.H., Xu Q., Susilo W.: Possibility and impossibility results for receiver selective opening secure PKE in the multi-challenge setting. In: ASIACRYPT 2020, pp. 191–220. Springer (2020).
Metadata
Title
Receiver selective opening security for identity-based encryption in the multi-challenge setting
Authors
Zhengan Huang
Junzuo Lai
Gongxian Zeng
Xin Mu
Publication date
17-11-2022
Publisher
Springer US
Published in
Designs, Codes and Cryptography / Issue 4/2023
Print ISSN: 0925-1022
Electronic ISSN: 1573-7586
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10623-022-01147-8

Other articles of this Issue 4/2023

Designs, Codes and Cryptography 4/2023 Go to the issue

OriginalPaper

Characterizations and constructions of plateaued functions on finite abelian groups

OriginalPaper

Eggs in finite projective spaces and unitals in translation planes

OriginalPaper

On inverses of permutation polynomials of the form over

OriginalPaper

Perfect LRCs and k-optimal LRCs

OriginalPaper

Self-dual bent sequences for complex Hadamard matrices

OriginalPaper

Incremental symmetric puncturable encryption with support for unbounded number of punctures

Premium Partner

    Image Credits