Russia, China and the West in the Post-Cold War Era

This chapter provides the analytical framework for the book’s major arguments. It begins by laying out the liberal theoretical motivations behind Western post-Cold War policies. It then explains the consequences of policies such as “liberal hegemony” and neoliberal economic prescriptions. It assesses that these policies had unintentional negative consequences both internationally and within liberal democracies themselves. It argues that “liberal universalism” is a failed concept based on an incorrect assumption that non-Western states would liberalize and adopt Western forms of governance. With the rising material capability of non-Western states possessing different identities and sets of interests, policies such as democracy promotion or the continued assumption of the dominance of liberalism as a universal normative framework will increasingly face challenges. Increasingly, the rise of “civilizational states” is manifesting at the forefront of international politics, such as in the cases of Russia and China. Domestic and international backlashes share similar anti-liberal rhetoric. To address these challenges, political pluralism and pragmatic internationalism as an international code of conduct can avoid costly wars such as the ongoing war in Ukraine. Domestically, the preservation of democracy needs to be prioritized to ensure the continued strength and prosperity of the West.

This chapter assesses the management of the liberal international order from World War II until the present day and trends in global democracy. It argues that liberal hegemony as a foreign policy was not successful due to issues related to universalism and national particularism. U.S. interventionism abroad was destabilizing and contributed to the souring of relations with non-Western powers such as Russia and China. Neoliberal economic policy prescriptions also had unintended consequences and exacerbated populism and political polarization. Internationally, civilizational nationalism and nationalism more broadly have become increasingly noticeable in political discourse as nations aim to enforce their uniqueness in a hyper-globalized world. The rise of China and Russia today influences global norms by presenting alternative normative frameworks to liberal universalism.

This chapter describes the evolution of Russian-Western relations after the Cold War and Russia’s search for a post-Cold War national identity. The chapter serves as an important example of how liberal universalism reached a wall with a country such as Russia, who views itself as a great power from a different civilizational background with different developmental needs and priorities. Different visions of the post-Cold War order, zero-sum competition, security dilemmas, and threat perceptions ensured the perpetuation of the fundamental lack of trust between Russia and the West. The American strategy of “liberal hegemony” was rebuked by Russia, and Russia’s increasing authoritarianism and rule-breaking were heavily criticized by the West. Both were in fact forces feeding the other. As Russia grew more assertive materially, it asserted itself normatively through soft power strategies. Russia challenges and de-constructs liberal normative hegemony and has a receptive audience among anti-globalist factions and parts of the Global South. The Ukraine crisis was the culminating moment in the deterioration of Russian-Western relations and serves as a prime example of norms, interests, and identity clashes in twenty-first-century international relations.

China did not politically liberalize as it experienced rapid economic growth. While it participated in and benefited from the liberal international order, China engaged in “zero-sum” behaviors such as unfair trading practices and seizing islands in the South China Sea. However, contrary to popular belief, China’s rise does not have to represent an autocratic challenge to the international order as its aims are not to spread autocracy around the world. China does however have an effect on global norms as countries begin to side with its foreign policy in multilateral fora due to its increasing ties with the Global South. In addition, China represents a model that did not imitate the Western political model but still experienced economic success and represents a powerful, non-Western civilizational tradition. China emphasizes the importance of national identity and nationalism. China is creating the space for a multipolar world open to multiple civilizational poles with unique forms of governance. Putin and Xi today are united in their aversion to U.S. unipolarity and share the goal toward a multipolar future. Escalation between China and the United States is occurring daily and could eventually lead to war unless more pragmatism and pluralism in international relations are employed.

This chapter argues that the binary structure of the Euro-Atlantic space, defined by either belonging to Euro-Atlantic institutions or remaining outside of them, is constraining. It places “in-between” states in a position of extreme insecurity, particularly considering the recent fall of a land empire in the region, an occurrence which has historically been accompanied by years of ethnic and political conflict. Ukraine’s inner divisions made it particularly susceptible to foreign influence. Ukraine’s identity as a nation was divided between those that sought a singular vision for the future of Ukraine based on an identity completely separate from Russia, and those that sought a more pluralist arrangement based on their geographic and cultural affinities with Russia. Now, the Global South refuses to take sides in a war framed as one between “democracy and autocracy” or in “defense of the liberal international order.” The limits of liberal universalism have been made very apparent in the crisis in Ukraine. A European security structure taking the interests of all parties into consideration into newly formed agreements would have prevented war and mitigated the effects of the aftermath of the fall of the empire.

Democracy is homegrown and its consolidation and success heavily depend on institutional legacy. The “universalization” concept of the liberal normative framework has reached its limits today. The global rise of civilizational nationalism is directly correlated with “universalization” processes. The rise of non-liberal powers such as China and Russia does not represent a danger to global democracy. It does however affect global norms. “Regime type” in different nations is unrelated to the rise of Russian and Chinese influence. Problems with democracy come from within, and the West is solely responsible for its own democratic backsliding. Framing the war in Ukraine or the issues over Taiwan as a fight between democracy and autocracy creates global divisions and undermines the legitimacy of different national identities and interests outside of liberal normativity. As such, the Global South has no interest in taking sides. The world is witnessing the rise of a more multi-civilizational, multicultural, and pluri-political future. This type of world requires more pragmatism to manage interests, values, and norms in the twenty-first century.