2004 | OriginalPaper | Chapter
Secret-Key Zero-Knowlegde and Non-interactive Verifiable Exponentiation
Authors : Ronald Cramer, Ivan Damgård
Published in: Theory of Cryptography
Publisher: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Included in: Professional Book Archive
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We consider a new model for non-interactive zero-knowledge where security is not based on a common reference string, but where prover and verifier are assumed to possess appropriately correlated secret keys. We present efficient proofs for equality of discrete logarithms in this model with unconditional soundness and zero-knowledge. This has immediate applications to non-interactive verification of undeniable signatures and pseudorandom function values. Another application is the following: a set of l servers, of which less than l/2 are corrupt, hold shares of a secret integer s. A client C specifies g in some finite group G, and the servers want to allow the client to compute gs non-interactively, i.e., by sending information to C only once. This has immediate applications in threshold cryptography. Using our proof system, the problem can be solved as efficiently as the fastest previous solutions that either required interaction or had to rely on the random oracle model for a proof of security. The price we pay is the need to establish the secret key material once and for all. We present an alternative solution to the problem that is also non-interactive and where clients need no secret keys. This comes at the expense of more communication and the assumption that less than l/3 of the servers are corrupt.