Security and Environment in the Mediterranean

Two major events of the new twenty-first century have raised crucial questions about the future success of international efforts to prevent and combat armed violence over the entire spectrum from nuclear war to cross-border terrorism, questions that overshadow many of the individual issues described in this thoughtful, well organized book on security and the environment in the Mediterranean area. These two events, of course, were the advent of the presidency of George W. Bush, with its strong tendency to unilateralism on disarmament, security and environmental issues, and the September 11, 2001 Al Qaeda attacks on New York and Washington, which of their very nature demand a multilateral international response.

With the creation of the state of Israel in 1948 a dark cloud engulfed the region that was to add to the plethora of problems and the challenges, both domestic and international, that the Arabs were already facing. The War of 1948 is unfortunately still in progress, despite the peace process commenced in Madrid in 1991. Each time a glimmer of hope appears it is extinguished in the folds of the protracted, seemingly intractable conflict. The atmosphere remains polluted with ancient hatreds and conflicting ideologies that defy logic and the rational approach. Both Arabs and Jews are seemingly unable to break away from the grip of their historical traumas and the Western input into the conflict has not only been terribly negative and one-sided, but it has further added to the deepening sense of frustration.

The Mediterranean has been called many things in its long history: from a cradle of civilization to a cauldron of cultures, the soft underbelly of Europe, and most recently a sink of human-made pollution. In a way its future can be held to encapsulate the prospects for human society as a whole. In this preface I want to pull some of the issues together, and suggest a perspective in which these prospects can be seen and judged. I can think of few greater challenges than the risks of conflict arising from human population increase and pressure on the natural resources on which we all depend.

Dialogue between cultures, an old practice in times of peace and in periods of war, has taken a specific shape after the Second Word War, under the auspices of UNESCO, and of other international and regional organisations. This dialogue from 1949 to 1989 has been influenced by the intellectual, socio-economic and political climate which prevailed during the last forty years. It was a dialogue in a bi-polar international system with all its implications.

This book focuses on two basic concepts: security and environment, on the environmental security dimension and a human security perspective and different outcomes of global and regional environmental change on natural disasters and environmental conflict but also on efforts at environmental cooperation that have resolved or avoided conflicts from occurring in the Mediterranean eco-region (Brauch ch. 2). This chapter offers an overview of the themes and structure of the book (1.1), its key research questions to be addressed (1.2), its aim to achieve an interdisciplinary and intercultural scientific dialogue (1.3) to contribute to problem awareness, agenda-setting and an anticipatory learning (1.4), on the authors and the audience (1.5), on the editorial process (1.6) and on the contents (1.7).1

In the scientific and the political discourses on the Mediterranean area two deficits can be observed, first there has been no systematic debate on security and environment linkages involving specialists from North and South; second there have been few multi-, inter- and transdisciplinary dialogues on regional impacts of global environmental change for international politics, but none on the security impacts of these changes for the Mediterranean eco-region.1

The Mediterranean is at the crossroad of three continents: of Southern Europe, North Africa (Maghreb), and South-West Asia (Mashreq). During the Greek and Roman period this region was both culturally and politically united. Later different parts went separate ways: on the Northern shore Italy, France, and Spain had a common history with Europe; in the East Turkey, Greece, Cyprus, and parts of the former Yugoslavia were part of the Ottoman Empire; the Maghreb countries with Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia were former French colonies; Libya had a colonial history with Italy, and Egypt, Malta, Palestine with England. The more recent historical developments produced a diverse political map that contributed to different conflict cleavages. According to Dimitris K. Xenakis and Dimitris N. Chryssochoou (2001: 28):

Throughout history, the Mediterranean has been as much a laboratory for the cross-fertilisation of diverse cultures as it has been a place of open and protracted conflicts. Being a heterogeneous synthesis of various religious and ethnic groups — along the lines of a ‘heter-archy’ — as well as of unequal economic development, a plurality of political regimes, divergent perceptions of security (threats), and uneven demographic growth, Mediterranean complexity occupies a prominent position between order and disorder.

With the ending of the Cold War, longstanding civil wars such as in Mozambique and Central America finally reached peace settlements, in part through efforts by international third parties. The UN and other entities extended their traditional peacekeeping responsibilities into many more societies formerly at war. Unexpectedly during the 1990’s, despite or because of the lowering of inter-bloc tensions at the end of the Cold War, a series of new intra-state conflicts also emerged, such as in Somalia, Yugoslavia, Tajikistan, Algeria, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, Mexico, and Nepal. Although most international attention is paid to major inter-state crises or wars such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the Kashmir confrontation, by far the largest number of violent conflicts over the post-Cold War era have been intra-state in focus. Both the old and new intra-state conflicts have increasingly influenced the diplomacy, development and military policies, and budgets of many states, multilateral institutions, and non-governmental organisations outside the immediate societies affected.

During the last twelve years NATO has undergone a major adaptation process to the new Post-Cold war security realities, to continue providing security and stability to the Euro-Atlantic area. At its historic November 2002 Prague Summit NATO has pushed its transformation even further. In Prague the Alliance launched its second enlargement, it expanded its missions, enhanced its military capabilities and strengthened its partnerships. In an uncertain and fast changing security environment, NATO embodies the transatlantic link and remains the cornerstone of Euro-Atlantic security. This transatlantic alliance is a unique source of political-military capabilities to manage successfully unpredictable crises and to build new partnerships through a new cooperative approach to security, while continuing to provide for the security of its members. To do so, the Alliance has some key strategic priorities.

Centuries of foreign domination have defined the history of the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean. Across the Mediterranean came the Macedonians, Romans, Crusaders, and later, French and British colonial powers. After the end of World War II, the security in this area had been largely shaped by the rivalry between United States hegemony and Soviet ideological and political influence. A new security factor was added in 1948 by the creation of Israel with the support of the West. Four Arab-Israeli wars were fought in 1948, 1956, 1967, and 1973. In the 1956 war, the Suez Crisis, France and Britain waged a war against Egypt and occupied the Suez Canal zone. Even after the signing of peace treaties with Israel by Egypt (1979), and later by Jordan (1994), the Arab fears of Israel have remained. The continued Israeli occupation of the Syrian and Palestinian territories, and the Israeli superiority in conventional and nuclear weapons has rendered the security environment in the Mediterranean uncertain.

NATO’s Mediterranean Security Dialogue has been of great importance for Spanish foreign and security policy. For practical and geographic reasons, Spain has been devoting time and resources to establish a real dialogue between the Northern and Southern shores of the Mediterranean. Spain has also suffered the consequences of instability, economic underdevelopment and uncertainties in the area.

Less than a decade after its establishment, NATO’s Mediterranean dialogue is adapting to changing geopolitical realities. It has made modest progress in developing professional exchanges between both civilian and military officials across the Mediterranean; it has complemented parallel and more high profile initiatives by other European-based institutions. It has not been tested by a challenge such as acute instability in a North African state, rather, its dilemma is to retain sufficient support among NATO states that do not border the Mediterranean and to remain useful to its more active participants in building common approaches to security across the diverse set of Dialogue countries. Further NATO enlargement eastward, the deterioration in the Arab-Israeli zone, and the longer term impact of the war against terrorism will be the issues most likely to dampen or slow the consolidation of the NATO initiative.

For a long time the European Union’s (EU) relationship with its neighbours to the south and south east has been viewed only as a development and economic partnership. This is by no means surprising: The Mediterranean dimension has always been present in the gradually progressing process of European integration — to start with the special commercial and economic regime provisions in the Treaty of Rome in 1957 that set out the framework of relations between the newly created European Economic Community (EEC) on the one side and Morocco and Tunisia on the other side, which had then gained their full independence from French protectorate rule. However, all consecutive steps to establish and upgrade structured relations between Europe and the Mediterranean in the following three decades were based on the same objective: to cater for economic and social stability in the European Community’s southern neighbourhood, and to secure a safe and structured environment for two-way trade relations and energy supplies from the Mediterranean to the Community and its Member States.

The perception of present developments and future trends on security relevant challenges in the Mediterranean region differ according to the worldviews, mind-sets and conceptual lenses of scientists, analysts and decision-makers (Hill/Beschoff 1994). Social scientists have been influenced by different intellectual traditions or worldviews (Gabriel 1994), by scientific schools and theoretical contexts (Goertz 1994). The cultural heritage and religious factors have also influenced the macro theories (Meyers 1984, 1993, 1994, 1994a) of the analyst.

Is it possible to promote security in the Mediterranean through a process of increasing regional cooperation that builds upon the commonality in problems and opportunities more than on the mutual divides? In a comprehensive and enlightening analysis, Brauch (2001) has argued that this option is being considerably complicated by the coexistence of three kinds of thinking: pre-modern (the belated formation of nations in South-Eastern Europe along ethnic, religious or historic boundaries); modern (the forceful defence of national sovereignty against outside intrusion (e.g. criticism of human rights violations) in most Arab states, Israel and Turkey; and post-modern (concerning the emergence of transnational spaces beyond the control of the nation states, through globalisation processes). We consider this analysis as an extremely insightful diagnosis of the problematique of the Mediterranean. In this paper we wish to contribute to dealing with the task identified in Brauch’s conclusion: finding a pragmatic theoretical approach as a remedy to proceed beyond modern and pre-modern inspired fragmentation processes.

The chapter gives an account and analysis of the development of the theoretical use of the concept of “security”, from a rather narrow, state-centric and militarised one of national security, via one focusing on national and other identities, i.e. societal security, to a much wider concept, including concerns for human rights, development, gender issues, etc., labelled human security. This theoretical analysis is followed by an illustration of how the different forms of security are interlinked, i.e. how national, societal and human security problems relate to each other in the Middle East, particularly in the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians.

Debates on consequences of globalisation for security have become one of the most important issues of international relations (IR) theory and in related areas. Social science theory often follows the unfolding processes and offers descriptions and new interpretations. Explanations are rare or superficial. Predictions or normative approaches are even less frequent. This chapter addresses the links between security theory and policy and developments in economic and financial globalisation. While no normative stance is taken, the chapter includes an enumeration of sources of potential threats to security of the international system. The issues discussed below are reflected in the following partial objectives.

By now it seems a well-worn axiom that to speak honestly about the Euro-Mediterranean and the relevance of commonly agreed security issues is to enter a conceptual minefield. If one adds to this mixture a further discussion of military and environmental security, the minefield appears only to expand. Perhaps this need not be the case, though; in particular, in focusing on an examination of environmental security for the region-both in the past and future-some aspects of military security have relevance.

This chapter presents ideas for the development of asecurity partnership in the Mediterranean. First, it explains the concept cooperative security (15.2) as distinct from other concepts such as mutual security, common security or non-offensive defence (NOD). Mutual and common security describe the interdependent nature of security, emphasising that there are global dangers, in particular nuclear weapons, which constitute a clear risk to the security of all states that require cooperative approaches (15.3). Several conceptual explorations were made during the 1980’s and the beginning of the 1990’s (Palme 1982; Smoke 1991; Väyrynen 1985) that include descriptive and prescriptive elements. They may be distinguished from unilateral approaches defended by realism, although they do not abandon all realist principles and policies due to the importance they give to military means in the security domain. Common security accepts the concept of deterrence but adds the concept of reassurance to the relations among states. Regarding non-offensive defence the proponents maintain that NOD:

would provide the solution to the problems of war prevention and disarmament in a post nuclear setting by minimizing the capabilities, as well as the incentives, for waging wars of aggression without any need for a nuclear Damocles sword; and, by virtue thereof, by increasing the margin of unilateral arms builddown, facilitating arms control and disarmament (Møller 1992: xii).

With a decade-old civil war continuing in Algeria with no end in sight, and a second intifada threatening to take roots in Palestine, the Mediterranean appears incapable of breaking from the cycle of violence in which it has been entrapped for nearly half a century. The process launched to implement the 1995 Barcelona Declaration is at a standstill, having failed to bring the region anywhere near to peace, stability, and shared prosperity. As the participants in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) try to reinvigorate or re-launch the Barcelona process, they need to identify the obstacles that prevented it from moving forward so that they can devise appropriate ways for eliminating those obstacles and breathing new life into the process.

Students of international politics have long recognised that human behaviour is largely shaped by how reality is perceived, diagnosed and evaluated, and that comprehending decision-makers’ cognition of reality is crucial for understanding their behaviour (Jervis 1976). In fact, the cognitive approach to international politics is based on these premises. The difference between various cognitive schools lies in their identification of the locus of the most crucial cognitive variables. In this respect the most widely used variables have been beliefs, images, perceptions, and values.

Although not one of the great powers of the twentieth century, Turkeys geopolitical location has enabled it to play a large role in world politics (Aydin 1999: 152). It holds the key not only to the Turkish Straits, but lies along the roads from the Balkans to the Middle East, and from the Caucasus to the Persian Gulf. It is a member of NATO, most European organisations, and an associate member of the European Union (EU). Turkey’s political involvement and exposed position assign an importance hardly matched by any other medium power. This strategic importance, for the West, has soundly reverberated amidst the dust created by the systemic changes experienced since 1989. Thus, Turkey has emerged as an important actor, poised to play a leading role across a vast region extending “from eastern Europe to western China” (Aydin 1996; Gurel/Kimura 1993).

The purpose of this chapter is to analyse Israel’s concept of national security. In this framework, it will focus on Israel’s threat perception, at three levels: the threat emanating from the Arab conventional capabilities, from Moslem or Arab non-conventional capabilities, as well as from Palestinian or Shiite use of terrorism. The chapter will also make some comments on the Israeli response to the threat. On the background of the changes in Israel’s strategic environment, it will refer to recent attempts to redefine its security concept.

With this scenario, Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz started his statement to the Senate and House Armed Services Committees in support of a 57% increase for the BMD budget in FY 2002. He cited the ABM Treaty as the main reason for the U.S. failure to develop adequate countermeasures to address the growing threat posed by ballistic missile proliferation.

After taking office in 1993, the Clinton administration placed an emphasis on developing Tactical Missile Defences (TMD) to protect deployed forces and regional allies against tactical missile attacks. In doing so the strategic missile defence, under the label of National Missile Defence (NMD), was downgraded to a long-term research and development effort (Brauch ch. 20). This initiative generated a greater degree of European support, in contrast with Europe’s historically sceptical view concerning ballistic missile defence. During the election year of 1996, Clinton responded to Republican pressure on ballistic missile defences by announcing the “3 plus 3” programme for NMD (three years for R&D, after that a decision would be made to deploy the system within another three years) (BMDO 1997: 1–3). Several European governments demonstrated significant unease over the consequences of such a move that focused on (Lara 2001b: 92): The potentially detrimental impact on Western relations with Russia and China;The negative repercussions for arms control, especially for the ABM Treaty;The negative impact on deterrence and the transatlantic relationship.

Terrorism and organised crime as topics on the Mediterranean security agenda will be discussed in this chapter in three parts: The first part includes a definition of the Mediterranean and a short presentation of the multidimensional security concept (22.2), with both a long-term perspective and a short-term assessment of the consequences to the attacks of 11 September 2001 (22.3) and a discussion of the concepts of terrorism and organised crime. The second part offers a strategic appraisal of these two soft security risks in the Mediterranean, including the events of late 2001, and the war against terrorism (22.4). The third part considers the evolution of terrorism and organised crime in the Mediterranean area (22.5).

In the aftermath of the events of 11 September 2001 immigration related to Islam has been discussed as a security issue. It has been linked with terrorism and entry controls at the borders, at airports, and in the streets were tightened. But in the past both in the United States and in many European countries (e.g. in Germany, France and the United Kingdom) most terrorists have hardly been related with this specific security issue, because most of them were tourists or students with a legal residence status, and they were only marginally connected with immigration. If immigration policy cannot prevent terrorism because it aims to facilitate the entry of desired foreigners and to deter the entry of unwanted ones (illegal with few networks, asylum seekers with few chances to obtain a refugee status and poor people who can only offer their manual labour). Immigration policy may also intensify the controls in close international cooperation. However, economic interests may conflict with security issues. Thus most security concerns related to immigration are confined to the local level, while immigration policies are implemented at the national level and focus on illegal border crossing, thus stretching security in another respect (Heisler 1998– 1999).

Environmental security remains an evolving concept without a consensual definition. Little agreement exists regarding which issues constitute “threats” under the environmental security umbrella and which do not. For some, the term is limited to the role environmental degradation may play in precipitating violent conflict. For others, environmental security encompasses the toxic legacy of the Cold War left on battlefields and military bases. Still others understand environmental security as a fundamental shift from state security to individual security, where the health of a population is the object of security. It is not my intention to evaluate the merits of the alternative configurations of environmental security. Rather, this chapter seeks to illustrate the tremendous diversity of debates associated with the concept of environmental security, offer a typology for these diverse debates, and use the typology to demonstrate the conceptual and empirical relevance in the Mediterranean region of the many linkages between environmental and security concerns.

Can population growth, environmental degradation, and resource scarcity lead to civil strife? If so, how, and under what conditions? Ever since the publication of Thomas Homer-Dixon’s (1991) article “On the Threshold” and Robert Kaplan’s (1994) piece “The Coming Anarchy”, these questions have received considerable attention from scholars and practitioners interested in international security affairs.

The end of the Cold War and the rise in environmental consciousness have stimulated renewed interest in environmental security. Much of the work in this area has been conceptual. Environmental security was seen as part of a broader concept of comprehensive security or, more recently, of human security (Møller ch. 12). Environmental security was in part a slogan used explicitly to place the environment on the agenda of ‘high politics’ (Lodgaard 1992: 115). If one adopts a broad notion of security as “the assurance people have that they will continue to enjoy those things that are most important to their survival and well-being” (Soroos 1997: 236), it can plausibly be argued that serious environmental degradation can indeed threaten security. Caution should be exercised about labelling every form of pollution or human-induced scarcity as a threat to security. But if the most serious warnings about global warming turn out to be correct, mankind faces a security problem on par with great-power war. Even more traditional environmental concerns like air and water pollution kill more people than wars and armed conflicts in most years, although more gradually and not in a dramatic fashion suitable for daily news coverage. Ethically and politically it makes sense to give such issues very high priority.

Between 1950 and 2000 many conflicts occurred in the Mediterranean (Pfetsch ch. 3). While environmental reasons had not been a major cause during the 20th century, nevertheless several violent conflicts had a lasting negative impact on the environment: on flora and fauna and also for the well-being of human beings. While this book prefers a medium definition of the Mediterranean (Brauch ch. 2), this chapter includes the Persian Gulf because the Gulf War (1990–1991) resulted in major environmental damage and had political repercussions for the Mediterranean region.

For over 50 years, since the end of World War II (WWII), Egyptians have been paying the price of conflicts they were not responsible for. During the decisive battle in WWII at El-Alamein between the British Eighth Army under General Bernard Montgomery and the German-Italian troops under Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, landmines were extensively implanted in the Western Desert of Egypt. The large-scale mining process in the Egyptian desert started even before the battle of El-Alamein, when the British forces decided to establish a defensive line on Egypt’s western borders against Italian attacks launched from Libya in 1940. From September to December 1940, the fight was only between the British and the Italian troops until Rommel arrived at Tripoli with his African Corps in February 1941.

On 2 August 1990, Iraq invaded and annexed neighbouring Kuwait, declaring a comprehensive and eternal merger. This action was at once condemned by the United Nations Security Council as a breach of international peace and security (UNSC 1990a). The invasion of Kuwait by Iraq was also an immediate cause for concern to the United Nations Environment Programme (Nairobi) over the resulting destruction of the environment and disruption of social and economic structures (UNEP 1990).

Military conflicts always bring human suffering. But what do we know about their environmental consequences? What risks do they pose to human health and the recovery process, and how can the environment be integrated into reconstruction efforts? Since spring 1999, the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) has been working in areas of the world where the natural and human environment has been damaged as a direct or indirect consequence of conflict. The focus has been on investigating the environmental impacts of conflicts, recommending strategic priorities for cleanup and remediation, strengthening the capacity of authorities for environmental management and protection, as well as catalysing and mobilising international support for environmental projects. This novel response by the United Nations to conflicts was initiated by the Executive Director of UNEP, Dr. Klaus Töpfer.

Environmental concerns figured prominently in the Oslo Accords of 12 September 1993 (Massalha 1994; Jones 1999; Smith 2001). In the years following their signing significant efforts were made by the Palestinian Authority (supported by the international community) to improve the environment of the areas under its control. The Israeli Ministry of Environment and the environmental community in Israel was in sympathy with these efforts and significant cooperation took place between both sides. Since September 2000 the violence in Israel, the West Bank and Gaza has had a negative effect on the environment. Considerations related to security and short-term political considerations have dictated the course of events, and questions relating to the environment in general, and environmental cooperation between the two sides in particular, have been thrust to one side.

This chapter analyses the activities of the Working Group on the Environment (EWG) of the Middle East peace process that was launched in January 1992 in Moscow as one of the five working groups of the multilateral negotiations (Dassa Kaye 2001: 158–183) besides arms control and regional security (co-chaired by the U.S. and Russia), economic cooperation (EU), water (U.S.) and refugees (Canada).

Since ancient times, when some of the most influential civilisations in human history evolved in the lands surrounding the Mediterranean Basin, the region has been fairly densely settled, and important population centres, some of which attained a pre-eminent position as sites of commerce, culture or power, were located on or near the Mediterranean shores. Today, the Mediterranean Basin constitutes one of the few natural boundaries dividing the developed world of the North from the developing world of the South. Indeed, the most populous European countries bordering the northern littoral of the Mediterranean are among the most advanced economies of the world, while those lying to the east and south of the Mediterranean are, for the most part, medium-income countries still facing many of the problems of underdevelopment.

The Mediterranean basin is a unique feature of the Earth’s system for two reasons. Firstly, its geographical position is at the border between two climate regimes, and consequently climate and climate dependent living conditions in the area are very sensitive against even small shifts of this border. Secondly, due to the enclosed large sea, the bizarre coastal structure, and the mountain barriers, it has an extremely complex topography which gives rise to specific local climatic effects and climate gradients. Nowhere in the world is the Mediterranean climate as extended as at the border between Europe, Africa, and the Near East. It covers about 10 million km2, reaching from Portugal to south of the Caspian Sea with a core area that stretches over 46 degrees longitude. This is due to the long latitudinal extent of the Mediterranean basin with an area of about 6 million km2. Of this area, 2,496 million km2 is the surface of the sea.

The chapter presents part of the overall work of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) in the Mediterranean on the Implications of Future Climate Changes for the Mediterranean Coastal Region. It compares the main findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the regional and II site-specific studies in the Mediterranean.1 The evaluation of the methodology used in the preparation of these site-specific studies is described and analysed in detail, and the impact of the studies on national, regional, and local development policies and plans is assessed.

During the second part of the 20th century desertification was referred to in four contexts: a) in the scientific world (academic, private or public development institutes), b) in the international realm in the framework of the United Nations (UNEP, UNDP, WMO, FAO, UNESCO etc.), c) in the media (by scientific journalists), and d) in politics. Without discussing the question of the value or objectivity of these information sources, among them there is only a limited exchange.

When new deserts are forming in some areas of the world (UNEP 1984) this process is referred to as “desertification”. While for most people the term refers to a picture of inexorably shifting sands encroaching on valuable farmland (Forse 1989), an increasing number of scientists are now arguing that the image associated with “desertification” is a mirage (Mainguet ch. 36). Researchers in different disciplines have defined desertification. Whereas some researchers consider desertification to be a great danger to the sustainable development of arid and semi-arid areas, others doubt that the phenomenon occurs at all. These different opinions on desertification are mainly due to the lack of an overall concept, the dearth of information available at the global and regional levels and the different objectives and interests of the countries in the north and south.

Desertification was defined as the degradation of drylands in the dry, hyperarid, semi-arid and dry subhumid zones (Mainguet, ch. 36; Nasr, ch. 37). In this chapter land degradation is defined as the reduction or the loss of productivity of renewable natural resources in areas cultivated in rainfed or irrigated agriculture on natural steppe, grassland, dry forest, or woodland (Mainguet 1994). This degradation is detectable by climatic, biologic, édaphic, and hydrological indicators.

Desertification or degradation of the land in the arid, semi-arid and dry sub-humid areas according to the text of the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD) is the result of several factors, including climatic change and human activities (chapters 37, 38 above). Despite its many causes and effects, desertification is a well-defined process. It is triggered by changes in climatic and socio-economic conditions of the affected dryland systems that launch an irreversible positive feedback loop of land over-exploitation (Puigdefábregas/Mendizábal 1998), and a subsequent lack of sustainability in the system of population and resources. The final outcomes are land degradation and disruption of local economies.1

The Mediterranean, and especially North Africa and the Middle East, entered a phase of irreversible water deficit in the early 1970’s. Some economies — as those in the Gulf-had run out in the 1950’s. By the early 1970’s major economies such as Egypt entered its water deficit, as did the region as a whole (40.2).

The present chapter introduces the reader to the key issues and some recent initiatives on establishing and strengthening cooperation in the Mediterranean region on the management and protection of internationally shared groundwater resources. Background information is given on why the groundwaters, and in particular the internationally shared aquifers, play an important role for satisfying the increasing water demand in the region. The Mediterranean region, covered by three UN Regional Commissions, is characterised by vast differences both in the availability of natural resources and in socio-economic development. The same is true with regard to the availability of regional and national institutional instruments. The chapter then addresses the main existing instruments on the protection and management of internationally shared aquifers: the Helsinki Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes; the UNECE Guidelines on Monitoring and Assessment of Transboundary Groundwaters; and the Internationally Shared Aquifer Resources Management (ISARM) Programme, a joint initiative of UNESCO, FAO, UNECE and the International Association of Hydrologists (IAH).

Given the water scarcity in the Middle East, the Jordan River as well the West Bank Mountain Aquifer are prime examples of internationally shared water resources that hold the potential for conflict. The last century witnessed substantial tension among the co-riparian states and included skirmishes over water (Wolf/Ross 1992; Reguer 1993; Lowi 1995). Between 1950 and 1990, the U.S. government attempted to mediate a number of water disputes with limited success. By the early 1990’s, no water agreements existed between Israel and its neighbours, and the de facto water use regime was heavily disputed. During the course of the Middle East peace talks, several agreements were concluded which contain provisions on water, notably the Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty of 1994 and the Interim (Oslo B) Agreement between Israelis and Palestinians of 1995. In addition, in 1996, a trilateral Declaration of Principles for cooperation on water-related matters was signed by Israel, Jordan, and the Palestinian Authority.

During the 1980’s and more vital by the early 1990’s, repeated predictions of water wars were made, and the fear of impending violent disputes over international rivers have caught the public’s and the media’s attention. These fears have been partly rooted in historical events particularly in the Middle East, e.g. the intended diversion of the River Jordan’s headwaters by Arab states is regarded as a major cause for the war in 1967 (Naff/Matson 1984; Dombrowsky ch. 42); the filling of the Syrian Tabqa reservoir in 1975 brought Syria and Iraq to the brink of war that could only be avoided through mediation by the Arab League and the Soviet Union (Naff/Matson 1984; Beschorner 1992/93); when Ethiopia declared its intention to build reservoirs at the Blue Nile, the then Egyptian President Sadat threatened that Egypt would bomb Ethiopian construction sites (Schiffler 1998).

In the mid 1980’s, several studies, reports and articles were published predicting that transboundary water conflicts might have a high potential for escalation to “water wars” (Naff/Matson 1984; Starr/Stoll 1988; Starr 1991). Most prominent is the prediction of former Egyptian Foreign Minister and United Nations General Secretary Boutros Boutros Ghali, that water would be a source of international conflict. Homer-Dixon warned in a general neomalthusian fashion that the world is facing growing conflict over resources of all kinds as a combination of population and economic pressure on natural resources (Homer-Dixon 1994). Transboundary water conflicts were suddenly regarded by some as a new serious future security challenge. But since the mid 1990’s comprehensive research has demonstrated that water — as the only source of conflict — does not lead, or only in a very few cases has led, to violent conflicts (Beschorner 1992/93; Lowi 1995; Bächler/Böge/Klötzli/Libiszewski/Spillmann 1996; Wolf et al. 1999). The research concluded that potential conflicts on transboundary waters become violent only in interaction with other factors, turning then into a policy issue that can be easily abused.

At the first global Population Conference in Bucharest (1974), the international community focused only on the demographic explosion in the “third world”. Then, the Southern and Eastern shores of the Mediterranean had among the highest natural population growth in the world and, as a consequence, the youngest population and the lowest proportion of labour force at the national level (Zlotnik ch. 33). The international community seemed almost unanimous in noting the impossibility of conducting the necessary food and agricultural policies for the development of most countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Such policies seemed prohibitive in view of the enormous proportion of youth in their populations. In addition, numerous studies carried out in the region are classic examples of the very old question regarding distortions between population and resources.

This chapter focuses on the participation of the countries bordering the Mediterranean Sea plus Jordan and Portugal3 in world agricultural trade, with particular reference to (a) the growing dependence of the non-European Mediterranean countries on food imports, and (b) trade in the main Mediterranean products.4 These countries are very heterogeneous as regards the factors that determine the rates and patterns of their participation in world agricultural markets. Differences in the levels of development, food habits, population growth rates, agricultural resource endowments, and policy regimes determine the growth and structure of demand and production of food and agriculture products and the extent to which they give rise to trade. Developments in agriculture are significant factors in the overall economic and social development of several countries in the region, much less so for others. All but three countries (France, Turkey, Syria) are net importers of food and agriculture products. Stark differences also exist as regards their status in foreign trade of typical Mediterranean agricultural products. Stark differences also exist as regards their status in foreign trade of typical Mediterranean agricultural products.

By the time of the 1995 Barcelona Declaration the 15 EU members and twelve Mediterranean non-EU countries (MNCs) set up a Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) as the framework for a process aimed at turning the Mediterranean into an area of peace, stability, and shared prosperity. When the foreign ministers gathered in Marseilles (2000) for their fourth annual meeting, they had to admit that the EMP had made little progress and needed to be reinvigorated. This is no surprise; the surprise was that the meeting was not cancelled, and only two partners did not attend.

The Middle East and North African (MENA) region is experiencing accelerated urbanisation. With a total population of 311 million inhabitants in 19991, urban dwellers represent a majority of the population, and their share will continue to grow (figure 48.1). It is expected that in 2025 there will be 70 million additional urban dwellers. With an average growth of 5%/year during the past few years, only in a few cases has urbanisation caused serious imbalances. Based on these figures it may be argued that complex challenges are emerging, among them a high population concentration along the coast, known as littoralisation. This rapid growth has further aggravated the vulnerability of the environment and an exclusion in shanty districts which has become a source of tension and political violence, especially in the Arab world where the youth is in a majority and where freedom of speech is lacking.

In the model developed in chapter 2, four outcomes of the complex interaction of six causes of the survival hexagon and their impacts on environmental degradation, scarcity and stress were distinguished: environmentally induced migration (ch. 23 de Wenden), disasters (this chapter), crises (e.g. on water in: ch. 42–44 by Dombrowsky, Scheumann and Peichert) that might escalate to conflicts (ch. 3 Pfetsch), or be solved, prevented or avoided by cooperation (e.g. on Nile Basin Initiative, ch. 44 Peichert).1

Growing concern about the trend of increasing vegetation destruction by fire application and wildfires has led to a number of international cooperative initiatives in wildland fire science, management, and policy development. In the 1990’s a number of international and interdisciplinary fire research programmes contributed to a better understanding of the impacts of fire on ecosystems, biogeochemical cycles, atmosphere, and climate. The development and improvement of the utilisation of operational space-borne sensors for wildland fire early warning, detection, monitoring, and impact assessment has resulted in enhanced capabilities to obtain detailed and comprehensive information on the extent of wildland fires occurrence and consequences. A large number of bilateral technical cooperation projects in fire management between the industrial and developing countries have resulted in an increasing expertise in technology transfer and methodologies to address local target groups and approaches in fire management.

This book addressed two themes, first, to conceptualise security with a focus on environment and security linkages, and second, to deal with key drivers of global and regional environmental change (Tickell pref.) that may result in environmental degradation and scarcity, both contributing to environmental stress. This chapter summarises the results of parts VI to XII (ch. 24–50), while the conclusions on the first theme follow in chapter 52.

Mediterranean politics has been undergoing profound change since the end of the Cold War under the conditions of globalisation.1 These changes affected all countries and extended to include domestic, regional, trans-regional politics, and the interactions between the region and the global system. Eastern and Southern Mediterranean countries are experiencing forces of political and economic change, and political-ideological extremism, and some Northern countries are coping with the rise of forces of political secessionism. Traditional conflicts are still plaguing the Mediterranean in addition to new ones, which emerged after the end of the Cold War. The Mediterranean is also going through processes of integration and fragmentation at the same time (Brauch 2001, 2001c). Because of the different levels of development and state-building, Northern countries have been able to achieve integrative breakthroughs unmatched by Southern states. For the first time, the region is experiencing the introduction of neo-regional arrangements, the most important of which is the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) project. It is also going through a process of slow integration into the global economy through the arrangements of global trade and financial liberalisation (Sid Ahmed 2001).