2 Model and properties
Let
A be a finite or infinite
set of alternatives and let
\(\mathcal {A}\) denote the set of its nonempty subsets.
11 A
choice correspondence is a map
\(F: \mathcal {A}\rightarrow \mathcal {A}\) such that
\(F(X) \subseteq X\) for every
\(X \in \mathcal {A}\). A choice correspondence
F induces a binary relation
\(R_F \subseteq \mathcal {A}\times \mathcal {A}\) (hence, on sets rather than single alternatives) by
$$\begin{aligned} (X,Y)\in R_F \Leftrightarrow \text{ there } \text{ exist } Z\in \mathcal {A}\hbox { with } X=F(Z)\hbox { and } Y \subseteq Z, \end{aligned}$$
for all
\(X,Y \in \mathcal {A}\). In this case we say that
X is revealed preferred to Y by
F, and call
\(R_F\) the
revealed preference relation of F. Observe that
\(R_F\) is reflexive, i.e.,
\((X,X) \in R_F\) for all
\(X\in \mathcal {A}\).
Later on, we also use the following definitions and notations. A binary relation R on a set \(\Omega \) is transitive if \((\omega ^1,\omega ^2), (\omega ^2,\omega ^3) \in R\) implies \((\omega ^1,\omega ^3) \in R\) for all distinct \(\omega ^1,\omega ^2,\omega ^3 \in \Omega \). The binary relation R has a cycle of length n, where \(n \in \mathbb {N}\setminus \{1\}\), if there are distinct \(\omega ^1,\ldots ,\omega ^n \in \Omega \) such that \((\omega ^i,\omega ^{i+1}) \in R\) for all \(i\in \{1,\ldots ,n-1\}\) and \((\omega ^n,\omega ^1)\in R\); R is acyclic if, for every \(n \in \mathbb {N}\setminus \{1\}\), it has no cycle of length n.
For a choice correspondence F, we use the notation \(F^n(X)\) as shorthand for \(F \circ \, \cdots \, \circ \, F(X)\), that is, the n-fold composition of F with itself.
In the sequel, we denote a generic choice correspondence by F and consequently, its revealed preference relation by \(R_F\).
We now introduce four properties of choice correspondences that we study in this paper. The first property is the standard notion of revealed preference adapted to the present context. As we will show in the next section, this condition is equivalent to the condition called ‘set-rationalizability’ in Brandt and Harrenstein (
2011). It also appears in Alva (
2018).
Weak axiom of revealed preference (WARP) For all distinct \(X, Y\in \mathcal {A}\), if \((X,Y)\in R_F\), then \((Y,X)\not \in R_F\).
In conformity with the literature, in the revealed preference relation, WARP excludes cycles of length two
12 but does not exclude longer cycles
13. For completeness, we provide the following example of a choice correspondence satisfying WARP, which contains a cycle of length three, but cycles of arbitrary length can be easily constructed in similar examples.
The other three properties are the announced extensions of the IIA condition for choice functions to choice correspondences. The first extension has first been proposed by Nash (cf. Shubik
1982), and occurs also in Chernoff (
1954) and Arrow (
1959).
Independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) For all \(X,Y\in \mathcal {A}\) such that \(Y\subseteq X\), if \(F(X)\cap Y\ne \emptyset \), then \(F(Y) = F(X) \cap Y\).
The second extension requires the following. Given a set
X, if
F(
X) is the set chosen, then from every subset of
X that has a nonempty intersection with
F(
X), only alternatives in
F(
X) are chosen. This property appears as condition W2 in Schwartz (
1976).
Weak independence of irrelevant alternatives (WIIA) For all \(X,Y\in \mathcal {A}\) such that \(Y\subseteq X\), if \( F(X)\cap Y\ne \emptyset \), then \(F(Y)\subseteq F(X)\).
The third extension requires that, given a set
X, if
F(
X) is the set chosen, then from every subset of
X that contains
F(
X), exactly the alternatives of
F(
X) are chosen. It appears as Postulate 5* in Chernoff (
1954), as condition O in Aizerman and Malishevski (
1981) (see also Aizerman
1985), as the ‘strong superset property’ in Bordes (
1979), and as the ‘outcast’ property in Aizerman and Aleskerov (
1995). More recently, the property also appears as ‘irrelevance of rejected items’ in Alva (
2018), and in Brandt and Harrenstein (
2011)—see the next section.
Restricted independence of irrelevant alternatives (RIIA) For all \(X,Y\in \mathcal {A}\) such that \(Y \subseteq X\), if \(F(X) \subseteq Y\), then \(F(Y)=F(X)\).
Obviously, IIA implies both WIIA and RIIA. The last two conditions are independent: see Examples
3.9 and
3.10.
3 WARP, IIA, WIIA, and RIIA
In this section, we study the four properties introduced in Sect.
2, and focus on the relations between WARP on the one hand and IIA, WIIA, and RIIA, on the other.
3.1 WARP and RIIA
The first result in this subsection is the (non-novel) observation that WARP and RIIA are equivalent. Since for single-valued choice functions, the conditions of IIA and WARP are equivalent (in a domain closed under intersection such as ours), in this respect RIIA can be seen as the appropriate extension of IIA for choice functions to choice correspondences.
Brandt and Harrenstein (
2011) show (their Lemma 1) that RIIA is equivalent to the following condition.
Condition \(\hat{\alpha }\) For all \(X,Y \in \mathcal {A}\), if \(F(X \cup Y) \subseteq X \cap Y\), then \(F(X\cup Y) = F(X)\).
Condition
\(\hat{\alpha }\) is a set-valued version of the Chernoff property, which is Postulate 4 in Chernoff (
1954) and appears as Property
\(\alpha \) in Sen (
1971). See also Moulin (
1985;
1988) for studies of this property.
Brandt and Harrenstein (
2011) then prove (their Theorem 2) that, in turn, Condition
\(\hat{\alpha }\) is equivalent to the following condition.
Set-rationalizability There exists a binary relation
R on
\(\mathcal {A}\), with strict part
P,
15 such that for all
\(X,Z \in \mathcal {A}\),
$$\begin{aligned} X = F(Z) \text{ if } \text{ and } \text{ only } \text{ if } YPX\hbox { for no }Y \subseteq Z. \end{aligned}$$
Thus, it follows from Theorem
3.1 that the set-rationalizability condition of Brandt and Harrenstein (
2011) is equivalent to WARP.
A simple consequence of Theorem
3.1 is that if
F satisfies WARP then it is a projection, i.e.,
\(F^2 = F \circ F = F\).
16
Corollary
3.2 has also been established in Brandt and Harrenstein (
2011).
The converse of Corollary
3.2 is not true, as is shown by the following example.
3.2 IIA
As mentioned, for single-valued choice, IIA is equivalent to WARP as long as the domain of choice sets is closed under nonempty intersection. For choice correspondences, since IIA implies RIIA, Theorem
3.1 and Corollary
3.2 imply the following lemma, of which a direct proof is also straightforward.
The following example confirms that the converse of this lemma does not hold.
Preference axiom (PA) For all distinct \(X,Y,Z\in \mathcal {A}\) such that \(X\cap Y\subseteq Z\subseteq X\), if \((X,Y)\in R_F\), then \((Z,Y)\in R_F\).
This axiom implies that, if X and Y are disjoint, then every nonempty subset of X is revealed preferred to Y—this would be natural in case the choice correspondence picks those alternatives (from some set Z containing both X and Y) that are maximal according to some criterion. Under this interpretation, at least any subset of X that contains the intersection of X and Y, i.e., the ‘maximal’ alternatives of Y, should still be revealed preferred to Y, and this is exactly what PA says.
We now have the following characterization of IIA.
In Example
3.5,
F satisfies WARP but not IIA. Hence it follows from Theorem
3.6 that
F does not satisfy PA either. This can also be easily established directly. E.g., in Example
3.5, let
\(X=\{a,b,c\}\),
\(Y=\{b\}\), and
\(Z = \{a,b\}\), then
\((X,Y) \in R_F\) but
\((Z,Y) \notin R_F\).
The next example shows that PA does not imply IIA or WARP.
For (single-valued) choice functions on a collection of choice sets that is closed under nonempty intersection, IIA or, equivalently, WARP does not necessarily imply acyclicity of the revealed preference relation.
17 For choice correspondences (including choice functions) on the collection of all nonempty subsets of a set of alternatives, IIA implies WARP (Theorem
3.6) and, moreover, transitivity and acyclicity of the revealed preference relation, as the next result shows.
The converse of Theorem
3.8 does not hold: the revealed preference relation
\(R_F\) of the choice correspondence
F in Example
3.7 is transitive and acyclic, but
F does not satisfy IIA.
3.3 WIIA
We first show by two examples that WIIA and WARP (or RIIA) are logically independent.
If we add the condition that F be a projection, then WIIA implies WARP.
The converse of Theorem
3.11 does not hold. If
F satisfies WARP then by Corollary
3.2 it is a projection, but Example
3.10 shows that WIIA does not have to hold.
The following result shows that if F satisfies WIIA, then so does every n-fold composition of F with itself. As a corollary, we will obtain that for a finite set of alternatives A, WIIA implies that \(F^{|A|-1}\) satisfies WARP.
If A is finite, then there exists \(n \in \mathbb {N}\) with \(n \le |A|-1\) such that \(F^\ell = F^n\) for all \(\ell \ge n\). In that case, we have the following corollary.
If A is infinite, then an n as in the finite case does not necessarily exist. However, we may define \(F^\infty \) by \(F^\infty (X) = \cap _{n \in \mathbb {N}} F^n(X)\) for every \(X \in \mathcal {A}\), assuming that this set is nonempty for every \(X \in \mathcal {A}\). The following example shows that the last condition is not necessarily satisfied if F satisfies WIIA.
We have already seen (Examples
3.9 and
3.10) that WIIA and WARP are logically independent. The same is true for WIIA and PA. In Example
3.9,
F satisfies WIIA but not PA. The following example shows that PA does not imply WIIA.
4 Strong sets
In this section, we introduce so-called strong sets. We show that any IIA choice correspondence induces a collection of such strong sets, which is a partition of
A, such that the revealed preference relation restricted to these strong sets is complete and acyclic (Theorem
4.6). Conversely, each partition of
A ordered by a binary relation with these properties, defines a unique IIA choice correspondence (Corollary
4.9). Moreover, we show how such strong sets may be constructed (Lemma
4.8, Remark
4.10).
A set \(S\in \mathcal {A}\) is a strong set if the following holds: for every choice set where some alternatives that are also in S, are chosen, all the available alternatives of S are chosen, and only these. Formally, we have the following definition.
Before going into the formalities, we describe how these strong sets are generated by an IIA choice correspondence
F, for the case where
A is finite. Construct the sequence of sets starting with
\(S_1=F(A)\), next
\(S_2=F(A \setminus S_1)\), next
\(S_3=F(A \setminus (S_1 \cup S_2))\), etc. Then for a choice set
\(X \in \mathcal {A}\), take the first set in this sequence with which
X has a nonempty intersection: then
F(
X) is equal to this intersection. In this case, the sets thus constructed are exactly all the strong sets; we formally show this in Lemma
4.8 below.
For the case where
A is infinite, we can define a sequence of sets in the same way, and all these will be strong sets, but we may not find all strong sets: see Remark
4.10 below.
We now first show that strong sets are pairwise disjoint, and next that \(R_{\mathcal {S}_F}\) is complete and acyclic if F satisfies IIA.
The next technical lemma is needed in the proof of the theorem below.
The converse of Theorem
4.6 does not hold. The following example describes a choice correspondence
F of which the strong sets partition
A, and are completely and acyclically ordered by
\(R_F\), but which does not satisfy IIA.
As mentioned above, if the set A of all alternatives is finite, then the collection of strong sets of an IIA choice correspondence is easily constructed, as follows. Let \(S_0 = \emptyset \) and, recursively, \(S_i = F(A \setminus \cup _{j=0}^{i-1} S_j)\) for every \(i=1,2,\ldots \) Clearly, if A is finite then there is an \(\ell \ge 1\) such that \(S_i = S_\ell \) for all \(i > \ell \). In that case, \(\{S_1,\ldots ,S_\ell \}\) is a partition of A. We have:
A converse of Lemma
4.8, for general sets
A, is the following corollary, which says that every ‘well-ordered’ partition of
\(\mathcal {A}\) induces a unique IIA choice correspondence.
We conclude with a remark about the construction of all strong sets.
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