2.1 Skillful coping
Dreyfus’s “skillful coping” view is based on his reading of the early Heidegger of Being and Time (1927), and has later found expression in the account of skill development, which he worked out with his brother Stuart Dreyfus (1980a), and in subsequent papers—some of which are bundled in the book Skillful Coping (2014)—that further elaborated this account and defended it against some objections. The main idea is that in practical activity and skillful coping, we do not rely on rules or mental representations, at least when we gain a sufficiently high degree of expertise and mastery.
In
Being and Time (1927), Heidegger already made a distinction between two modes of experiencing a tool: when we use a tool, the tool withdraws, we do not notice it. It is ready-to-hand. Under other circumstances, for instance when something goes wrong, it might become present-at-hand. But the “default” mode, we may say, is ready-to-hand. For example, when I use my computer to write this paper, I do not notice the computer; but when the operating system crashes, the technology becomes present-at-hand. Moreover, in our skillful coping, we do not usually need mental representations. In
Phenomenology of Perception (1962), Merleau-Ponty already emphasized embodiment and what Dreyfus interprets as a critique of mental representation (Dreyfus
2002a). He explains that Merleau-Ponty’s terms ‘the intentional arc’ and ‘getting a maximal grip’ imply that skill, as a tight connection between the agent and the world, is not stored in the form of representations in the mind, but instead as an embodied tendency to respond (Dreyfus
2002a, 367); we are already set to respond, so to speak (373). Influenced by Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, Dreyfus, in turn, argued that our knowledge of handling things involves a know-how that is not explicit. We are absorbed in what we do, perhaps even in a state of “flow”, and we respond to the situation: ‘According to Merleau-Ponty, in absorbed, skillful coping, I don’t need a mental representation of my goal. Rather, acting is experienced as a steady flow of skillful activity in response to one’s sense of the situation.’ (Dreyfus
2002a, 378).
Against representationalism and Cartesianism in philosophy of mind and action, Dreyfus argued that the phenomenology of, and knowledge involved in, practical activity and skill acquisition is not based on rules or mental representations, but involves a coping that, especially when one is an expert, is based on implicit know-how and intuition. Our activity may be goal directed, but we do not think about the goal. Deliberation only comes in when coping is blocked (Dreyfus
2002a, 381), or indeed when we learn a new skill. We need rules when we are novices, but experts can do without them: rules are for beginners (Dreyfus and Dreyfus
1980a). As we move through stages of skill development, we rely on concrete experience rather than abstract principles. In the paper written with his brother Stuart they give the examples of language learning, chess playing, and flying an airplane, which entail performances and responses without the application of rules or principles: ‘The expert pilot, having finally reached this non-analytical stage of performance, responds intuitively and appropriately to his current situation.’ (Dreyfus and Dreyfus
1980, 12). Moreover, experts can have the experience that they are intensely absorbed in what they do. Here there is no longer self-monitoring at all:
‘masterful performance only takes place when the expert, who no longer needs principles, can cease to pay conscious attention to his performance and can let all the mental energy previously used in monitoring his performance go into producing almost instantaneously the appropriate perspective and its associated action.’ (Dreyfus and Dreyfus
1980, 14).
Other terms that qualify this experience are ‘holistic’ and ‘integrated’. Elsewhere Dreyfus argued that bodily skills such as swimming requires a kind of unification and integration, and cannot be reduced to rules and a sequences of movements learned by beginners:
‘Even though bodily skills, for example, are sometimes learned by following rules which dictate a sequence of simple movements, when the performer becomes proficient the simple movements are left behind and a single unified, flexible, purposive pattern of behavior is all that remains. It makes no sense to attempt to capture a skill by using a representation of the original elements used by beginners, since these elements are not integrated into the final skill.’ (Dreyfus
1980, 9).
In contrast to computers, which need to recognize an object to manipulate it, Dreyfus argued, humans do it in a more gestalt-like manner and instead can ‘manipulate an object in order to recognize it’—in other words, they cope with the object (Dreyfus
1967, 21).
Against McDowell, Dreyfus argued that experience is not inherently conceptual and that we have to overcome the myth of the mental (Dreyfus
2005). While it is plausible that, as Rietveld has argued, both McDowell and Dreyfus share the view that our engagements with the world are situated and are each in their own way committed to phenomenology—a view McDowell reached through Wittgenstein (Rietveld
2010, 185); Dreyfus mainly through Heidegger—Dreyfus did not share the former’s strong emphasis on the rational and conceptual. Perception is not conceptual “all the way out”, as McDowell agued; instead, Dreyfus focused on nonconceptual embodied coping (Dreyfus
2005, 47). Against cognitivism and against representing things from ‘a detached theoretical perspective’ (49), he argued that our everyday coping does not require our minds to impose meaning onto the world: ‘We need to consider the possibility that embodied beings like us take as input energy from the physical universe and process it in such a way as to open them to a world organized in terms of their needs, interests, and bodily capacities without their minds needing to impose a meaning on a meaningless Given.’ (Dreyfus
2005, 49). Instead, in our everyday coping, the world is already meaningful for us.
Moreover, whereas McDowell interprets Aristotle’s account of practical wisdom (
phronesis) in terms of responding to reasons, Dreyfus, using Heidegger, argued that practical wisdom is more like seeing what to do in a particular situation; it is about being ‘responsive to the specific situation’ (Dreyfus
2005, 51). Or more precisely: both thinkers share the interpretation of Aristotle’s concept of practical wisdom in terms of responding to specific situations (Rietveld
2010, 189), but they have a different view of the role of reasons and concepts in this responding. According to McDowell, we respond to reasons and rationality ‘permeates’ even unreflective action (McDowell
2007, 368) and concepts are ‘operative’ in unreflective action (372); they show themselves in the activity. It is rationality in action (see also Rietveld
2010, 193). According to Dreyfus, by contrast, reasons are ‘retroactive rationalizations’ (Dreyfus
2005, 51) and unreflective action is not about rationality. Dreyfus repeated that when we learn a skill, we may use rules as a kind of aid first, but like the training wheels of children who learn to ride a bicycle, when we become experts we can leave them out and we switch to ‘a more involved and situated way of coping.’ (52).
Dreyfus’s point was not that mental representation, goal directedness, reasons, etc. play no role at all in human experience; the point was that they do not usually play a role when we decide as experts; they may play a role at earlier stages (Dreyfus
2002b, 413). He thus stressed that some central cases of intelligent behavior—indeed most of our everyday coping—do not require mental representations (414). He rejected the view that we can only act if we have reasons to do so; reasons play no role and rather get in the way. Instead we have to sharpen our ability to make refined discriminations (Dreyfus
2005, 52). And of course a game has rules, but these rules are not stored in the mind or not even followed; instead, the expert copes and in her coping she is sensitive to the rules of the game (53). Everyday coping is intentional, but not conceptual. We respond to what Gibson called ‘affordances’, which happens without thinking at all (56). For example, doors afford going in and out, but we do not have to think about them—let alone calculate. When we learned a skill, we masterfully respond to specific situations. This gives us a familiarity with the world and openness to the world, which is not a totality of objects or of states of affairs. Instead we know how, and our skill opens a world. Our conceptual capacities grow ‘out of our nonconceptual ones’ (61).
In ‘The Return of the Myth of the Mental’ (Dreyfus
2007a), Dreyfus continued his arguments against McDowell, this time against the claim that in mature human beings, embodied coping is permeated with mindedness. Dreyfus stressed again the non-conceptual and non-mental content of skillful coping and performing. We can monitor our performances while performing, but this actually degrades the performance itself, especially since it disrupts the mindless absorbed coping. Of course we can step back and reflect, but also that kind of conceptual intentionality is based on a ground-floor of motor intentionality, and there is still involved coping going on in the background. Luckily we are only ‘part-time rational animals’ (Dreyfus
2007a, 354); we can exercise our freedom as humans not so much by thinking rationally, but rather by opening ourselves ‘to being bound’—entering our involved coping (355). In this coping there is no thinking subject (358); rather, the world may afford or solicit:
‘According to Merleau-Ponty, at the most basic level of being in the world, what does the grasping is not the mind but the body with its nonconceptual coping skills, and what is grasped are not unified, propositional structures that one can observe and entertain in thought, but more or less indeterminate solicitations to act.’ (Dreyfus
2007a, 359).
To use one of Dreyfus’s examples: when we take a doorknob to open the door, we do not think about this affordance or solicitation. We respond and do all this without thinking. Again, we can step back, but only against a pervasive background (363). Yet like in his previous paper on the topic, Dreyfus acknowledges that there is still an outstanding issue: we still want to know how the conceptual world is related to, or emerges from, the non-conceptual world (364). (I will return to this issue.)
Moreover, against Searle, Dreyfus argued that social meaning and norms are not representational (Dreyfus
1999) and do not require intentional action. According to Dreyfus, our experience of our everyday involvement conflicts with the logic of constitution and reconstruction proposed by Searle (Dreyfus
2001a, 181). The problem is not that analysts construct a rational account; we can do that. But it is wrong to suppose that we give meaning to artefacts. According to Dreyfus, following Heidegger and other existential phenomenologists, meaning must not be brought into a meaningless universe; there is already a meaningful world (Dreyfus
2001a, 186). We are ‘from the start socialized into a world in which we cope with equipment’ (187). For example, to use money (Searle’s paradigmatic example), there is no need to think “this piece of paper counts as money”; we just use it and already see it as valuable if we grew up with it (189). There is already a meaningful world. There is already a cultural style, which we already pick up as a baby. There is already something binding on us, and we learn it without having to be conscious about the rules (195–196). Elsewhere Dreyfus wrote that there is a background to which we respond: a background of practices, which does not consist of representations at all (Dreyfus
1980b, 9). (I will soon say more about this.)
2.2 Technology
Whether or not Dreyfus’s model of skill acquisition is a sound interpretation of Heidegger (for a discussion see Breivik
2007), it is an attractive model for understanding the everyday use and handling of technologies. Technology can be a tool we use, or (as we can add using postphenomenology—see the next section) it can be a medium through which we handle objects. In both cases, following Dreyfus we can say that skillful coping is involved—at least when we are expert users. There is no need to think about the technology; if we are experts there is even no need to think at all. We respond skillfully to the situation. Through technology the world offers affordances and solicitations, without any need for representation by means of concepts. Many examples Dreyfus uses are technological, such as using a doorknob or driving a car: the expert driver does not need to think about rules on how to shift the gears; if the driver is sufficiently skilled, there is a bodily response appropriate to the situation. Thus, apart from everything else it may be (e.g. a significant contribution to epistemology, philosophy of mind, etc.), Dreyfus’s account of skillful coping is to be seen as a contribution to thinking about technology, to the extent that it enables us to say more about the kind of knowledge and experience involved in the use of everyday technologies such as hammers, cars, and doorknobs. It seems especially suitable to think about the handling of tools and equipment.
Sometimes Dreyfus explicitly addressed the question how we use tools. Drawing on Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and Polanyi, he argued that how we use a tool differs from explicit experience and representational knowledge of an object. Taking up Merleau-Ponty’s example of the blind man’s stick, he writes:
‘A blind man who runs his hand along the stick he uses to grope his way will be aware of its objective characteristics. When he is using it, however, he is not aware of its objective traits nor of the pressure in the palm of his hand. Rather, the stick has become, like his body, a transparent access to objects.’ (Dreyfus
1967, 27).
According to Dreyfus, this use has nothing to do with making calculations or with following rules or principles. It is an embodied kind of coping, a learning of skill: I first happen to touch something and then I repeat it, correct it, and so on. I consciously intervene to improve my performance. But there is not first a knowledge of rules. Whereas the skilled performance may be described (from the outside, by science—for instance to build a robot) in terms of rules, ‘these rules need in no way be involved in producing the performance.’ (Dreyfus
1967, 29). Hence—and luckily, we may add—we can dwell in the world without having to formalize everything (31).
Does this mean that experts use no rules at all? I propose to distinguish between a ‘strong view’ and a ‘weak view’. According to the strong view, experts qua experts use no rules at all when they do what they are good at. Perhaps they use rules when they learn something new, but normally they do not need rules. According to the weaker view, experts use both rules and implicit knowledge, depending on the situation. Dreyfus seems to have held the strong view. For the use of technologies, it means that expert users of technology use it without rules and that everyday coping with and through technology happens without the use of concepts.
This strong view also implies that even the attribution of situation-specific aspects (in and by thinking) is excluded. In this response to McDowell (
2007b), who, as we have seen, emphasizes the role of concepts and rationality even in unreflective action, Dreyfus also uses the example of using tools—now taking up Heidegger’s example of the hammer. Dreyfus argues that we do not even need a situation-specific concept:
‘Indeed, in our everyday coping, which he (Heidegger) calls ‘‘pressing into possibilities”, we don’t deal with objects with general properties like weight, nor with situation-specific aspects like too heavy. Rather, when everything is going well and we are absorbed in our coping, the equipment we are using “withdraws” (where, as we shall see, this does not mean becomes implicit). Then there is no place for a demonstrative concept pointing out our equipment as anything. We do not attribute a general property or even a situation-specific aspect to it; we just cope.’ (Dreyfus
2007b, 371–372).
Thus, according to Dreyfus, our everyday coping is not permeated by conceptuality at all. When we look at the phenomenology of tool use, we usually see absorbed coping. In absorbed coping, when performance is at its peak, there is no monitoring going on; there is ‘flow’ (Dreyfus
2007b, 373). He uses again the example of a tool: ‘I don’t see the doorknob as a doorknob when I’m absorbed in using it’ (375). There is a direct response to the situation, no concept or thinking. Conceptual mindedness, Dreyfus suggests, is only possible against the background of non-conceptual, absorbed coping (376–377).
These examples show that technology, in the form of tools or equipment, is important for Dreyfus; it is part of our (life) world. The already-meaningful world is a world in which we cope with equipment: we are socialized into a world ‘in which we cope with equipment’ (Dreyfus
2001a, 187). In this sense, Dreyfus already has a philosophy of technology, or rather this work, the philosophy of skilled coping, is entangled with the philosophy of technology. For thinking about technologies today, his view has great potential. It seems suitable to be connected to other approaches in contemporary philosophy of technology such as postphenomenology (see the next section) that also emphasizes how technology is part of the lifeworld.
However, if we want to develop his account of skilled coping into a wider scoped philosophy of technology, we need more reflection on technology. Not all technology is ‘tool’ or ‘equipment’, or is something we handle and which disappears from view in our use and handling; there are more phenomena and experiences we can associate with technology. And, related: it is striking that Dreyfus’s examples of everyday artefacts—at least in his work on skilled coping—are all old technologies; what does his account mean for contemporary technologies and media such as the internet and smartphones? Surprisingly, Dreyfus was far more pessimistic about contemporary technologies than one would expect from his account of skillful coping. To put it somewhat simplistically: he did not have a problem with hammers, but he did have a problem with the internet. Can this discrimination be justified, or is it a bias—one not dissimilar to the bias Heidegger had against modern technologies? And can it be justified on the basis of Dreyfus’s own theory of skillful coping?