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Constitutional Political Economy

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21-06-2021 | Original Paper

Term-limit evasions and the non-compliance cycle

Author: Zachary Elkins

Published in: Constitutional Political Economy | Issue 3/2021

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Abstract

Executive term limits are evidently under stress in many jurisdictions. One mode in which they are evaded is through the formal revision or abrogation of a constitution. Such a process accelerates a pernicious cycle in which constitutional non-compliance begets constitutional instability, which in turn begets subsequent non-compliance. Such a non-compliance cycle is a core problem in law, and one that deserves more careful examination in various domains. This essay unearths original historical evidence of term-limit provisions and executive tenure in an effort to illuminate and evaluate the phenomenon. A background concern is that of international (and domestic) approaches to term-limit evasion. One intellectual response is that of militant democracy. The logic of that approach would imply the entrenchment and protection of term limits, which would presumably disrupt the cycle of non-compliance.

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In at least one analysis (Fig. 1), I include countries in all of the Americas south of the United States. Otherwise, the analysis is restricted to those that evolved from Spanish or Portuguese rule, plus Haiti.

I bracket the idea of assembly-confidence executives, whose flexible departure date presents a solution to fixed-term Presidents, and limits on such. True, some prime ministers are subject to term limits, but they represent an uncommon species.

Pardon the analogy, which is a function of writing during a pandemic.

Marsteintredet and Uggla (2019) have produced an excellent data set on term limit and term length in Latin America, which is not based exclusively on written constitutions. A comparison of discrepancies between their dataset and that of the Comparative Constitutions Project reveals very few substantive differences.

There may be more than this universe of 271 Constitutions and their 610 amendments, but if there are, they have not come to light in the 15 years that our project has operated. Subtraction of these quantities reminds us that 26 Constitutional texts have been lost to history, or at least to our discovery process.

Those interested in origin stories should note that our data suggests that the first occurrence of an executive term limit was in the short-lived French constitution of 1795, which forbade successive terms but allowed non-successive ones. Three years later, the Swiss constitution adopted the same provision as did the constitution of Gran Colombia in 1822.

“Semi-legal” since the hand-picked constituent assembly seems to have acted outside of its instructions from the legislature (see the telling memo from U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull to the newly installed U.S. Ambassador, May 1, 1933 (Foreign Relations of the United States 1952)).

Note that Marsteintredet (2019) describes a set of historical term-limit patterns based on an alternative set of constitutional measures.

I note here that Alexander Baturo (2019) has a useful typology of kinds of continuismo, which distinguishes between extensions, avoidance, and removals.

I introduce a new term with some reluctance, since I share Sartori’s aversion to concept proliferation; yet, I am not sure that a relevant one exists.

Article 21 replaced article 6 of the prior constitution, adding the words in bold: “All citizens, male and female, have equal rights and duties, and are equal before the law without any discrimination.”

An anonymous reviewer notes that some scholars prefer to reserve streitbare and wehrhafte for the German context, and argue that the meaning is stretched when applied outside of a post-fascist context.

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Title: Term-limit evasions and the non-compliance cycle
Author: Zachary Elkins
Publication date: 21-06-2021
Publisher: Springer US
Published in: Constitutional Political Economy / Issue 3/2021
Print ISSN: 1043-4062
Electronic ISSN: 1572-9966
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10602-021-09332-y

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