The Geopolitics of Iran

This chapter seeks to place Iran’s recent foreign policies in the Cold War and beyond in the broader context of the country’s experiences in international affairs. Modern Iran emerged around 1501, when Esma‘il I, a youthful prince descended from Muslim, Georgian, Turkish, and Byzantine royalty and nobility, proclaimed himself shah and re-established a Persian state after a hiatus of nine centuries. From that time onward, ensuring Iran’s security and at times its survival repeatedly impelled its leaders to seek support from imposing external allies or patrons who could help the new state to resist the threats, demands, and assaults of powerful and often threatening neighbors. From the late fifteenth to the early eighteenth century, the Ottoman Empire was by far the most dangerous international opponent of Iran. In response, Esma‘il and his successors turned to European powers and Russia for assistance. From the late eighteenth century, expansionist Russia represented the greatest threat to both Iran and the Ottoman Empire, prompting both states to seek the protection of the British Empire. In practice, for much of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, this often meant that Britain and Russia effectively colluded in dividing Iran into spheres of influence. This pattern recurred when Britain and the Soviet Union were allied against Adolf Hitler’s Germany during World War II, a conflict that also brought the United States into direct involvement in Iran’s affairs. As British power in Iran declined, the United States stepped in, organizing a coup that cemented the hold on power of Shah Reza Mohammad Pahlavi and effectively replacing Britain as Iran’s foremost international ally and patron. Following the Shah’s overthrow in 1979 and the Islamic Revolution, which left the nation locked in bitter antagonism with the United States and vulnerable to attack by neighboring Iraq, Iran was initially somewhat friendless. From 1980 to 1988, it was locked in a bitter, stalemated war with Iraq, in which up to one million Iranians died or were seriously wounded. Facing continued hostility from the United States and also from Israel and Saudi Arabia, together with threats to its nuclear program, in the early twenty-first century Iran turned for security to post-Soviet Russia. As China’s reach expanded dramatically in these years, stretching well into Central Asia and beyond, Iran’s leaders also believed it profitable to align their country with the ambitious and increasingly influential new global superpower. The history of Iran’s involvement with major external powers nonetheless suggests that the purported new triple alliance will soon find itself navigating treacherous territory and troubled waters.

Iran’s post-1979 non-allied posture is rooted in its modern history which saw the shrinking of its territory and weakened its independence. Retaining and preserving Iran’s independence preoccupied Iran’s post-1979 elites and leaders and made its way into Iran’s post-revolution foreign policy as a main theme. The presumption about international alliances was such that they can potentially weaken Iran’s independence. In 2015, however, Iran signed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with the P5+1 (six world powers) on the one hand and embarked on a strategic cooperation with Russia in the Middle East on the other. Both engagements portray, among other things, a shift in Iran’s strategic conduct and thinking. This chapter is aimed at explaining the rationale behind Iran’s traditional mistrust with international powers and why and how it was crossed. The question is two-fold: why was Iran’s non-alliance posture so strong after the 1979 period and why was it crossed in the international front through the JCPOA and through the strategic partnership with Russia on the regional level, both in 2015. The hypothetical answer is that because of systematic pressure as well as geopolitical necessities in the region, Iran’s balancing act via the non-alliance posture went through a shift, incorporating engagement as a new way of balancing international actors.

The recent political history of the Islamic Republic of Iran displays six important features, which are still driving the country’s decision-making system: (1) the cultural legacy of the Persian civilization; (2) the attempts to construct a constitutional monarchy (1905–1911) and the declaration of Shiism as the state religion in 1907; (3) the difficult relations of the autocratic Pahlavi monarchy with clerics, and the regime’s difficult relations with the US; (4) the fact that Iran was and still is a nexus of international interests, namely from US, UK, and Russian perspectives; (5) the 1979 revolution, which built on the ‘steam cooker pan’ legacy of inequalities, strengthened the reputation of clerics, alongside a political system dominated by the Shiite theocratic principle Vilayat-i-faqih; and (6) the extreme national hardship imposed by international sanctions (since 1979) and the Iraq invasion (1980–1988). Bearing these six characteristics in mind, this chapter aims to shed light on the political consequences of refuting secularism and building a political system dominated by theological beliefs and a hegemonic clergy. We argue that the political system of Iran presents an apparent theocratic hybridization, combining democratic and religious representation. In terms of methodology, this study presents a theoretical-inductive and non-partisan perspective, combining qualitative, semi-structured interviews, and non-participant observation. This chapter is organized in the following sections: (1) Abstract; (2) Introduction; (3) The Conflictual Narratives on Iran; (4) The Construction of the Political Iran; (5) The Apparent Hybridity of the Iranian Political System; (6) Conclusion; (7) Bibliography.

For the past decade, the globalized world has been struggling to adapt to an abnormal degree of uncertainty. Amidst a global pandemic, contemporary international relations are increasingly resembling trying to play roulette at a casino in the middle of an earthquake—all bets are off. For many years, different authors have consistently predicted the collapse of the post-revolutionary Iranian regime—and have consistently failed. One could say that the demise of the Iranian regime has become the most unexpected event that can be expected in the Middle East. By applying the concept of antifragility first developed by Nassim Taleb, the present chapter proposes that this event, although repeatedly forecast, has not occurred because Iran has become an antifragile State: a country with the ability to positively leverage a complex set of circumstances amidst excruciating uncertainty. Recalling that Iran was designated a State sponsoring international terrorism, later described as a “rogue State” bent on developing nuclear weapons and part of an “axis of evil”, the present chapter discusses how the regime devised a whole-of-society strategy leveraging the Iranian armed forces whereby three elements—ideology, ingenuity and asymmetry—are deployed in a variable geometry. Firstly, the issue will be framed in the context of recent events, followed by an assessment of U.S. foreign policy and the “rogue State” discourse. Secondly, the chapter elaborates further on the idea of a whole-of-society strategy focusing on the three elements of Iran’s antifragility toolbox with special consideration given to the role played by Iranian armed forces. Finally, a set of conclusions is proposed in view of the most recent geopolitical developments.

While two of the largest International Financial Institutions (IFIs) in the world, namely, the Islamic Development Bank and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, still finance or are planning to finance infrastructure projects in Iran, other two of the largest IFIs, namely, the World Bank Group and the Asian Development Bank (ADB), have been vetoing any financing or participation of Iran in its governance, respectively, under the manifest influence of the United States (U.S.). Besides, the European Investment Bank, the so-called bank of the European Union, managed to resist strong pressures from France, Germany and the United Kingdom back in 2018 to create a special purpose vehicle that could allow the EU to circumvent U.S. sanctions and continue financing projects in Iran. It is interesting to note that international relations were once very different. In fact, Teheran was one of the three candidate cities to host the headquarters of the ADB back in the 1960s. We will discuss in this chapter the role played by IFIs in Iran, and vice-versa. We will frame the discussion in the theoretical frameworks of financial statecraft (Steil and Litan in Financial statecraft: The role of financial markets in American Foreign Policy. Council of Foreign Relations and the Brookings Institution, New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 2006) and of soft power (Nye in Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 616: 94–109, 2008; Nye in Foreign Affairs 88 (4) (July–August): 160–163, 2009). Furthermore, we will show how, despite the U.S. sanctions, the Iranian economy still manages to obtain financing from IFIs. Finally, we will also debate the relevance of the IFIs in the context of the external financing of the Iranian economy. Looking forward, we will draw scenarios for the future relationship of Iran with the IFIs.

The United States has played a key role in the geostrategic and foreign policy calculations of the Islamic Republic since its establishment after the 1979 revolution in Iran. Even though diplomatic relations severed after the hostage crisis later that year, the Cold War-like rivalry between Tehran and Washington became an omnipresent factor in Iran’s policy-making calculus. The primary reason for the high level of importance given to the U.S. can be attributed to the Islamic Republic’s quest for recognition and legitimacy at the regional and global levels. This chapter delves into understanding the U.S. role in Iran’s geostrategic and foreign policy decision-making process through three different angles. First, the U.S.’ structural role in Iran’s foreign policy calculations is assessed under the broader framework of Iran’s geostrategy in the post-revolution period. The chapter then presents an analysis of the areas in which the geostrategic interests of both countries aligned in regional developments. This section examines the Iran–US cooperation in helping form democratic governments in Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2005), as well as the fight against terrorism in the Levant region (since 2011). Lastly, this chapter examines the process that led to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, which, for the first time, allowed for direct diplomatic engagements between Iran and the United States since the 1979 revolution. Moreover, the Nuclear Deal is used to examine the changing role of the U.S. in Iran’s geostrategic calculations during the 2013–2021 period. The concluding section of the chapter looks at the trends in, and the trajectory of, Iran–U.S. relations in 2021 and onward.

This chapter investigates the concept of “Strategic stability in Iran’s foreign policy conducts and national security strategies in the Middle East. The author argues that in the course of time and during previous decades Iran’s understanding of strategic stability has changed and evolved as a result of its perception of the strategic postures of other great powers, especially toward the United States, and their allies in the region. In this respect, the threats emanating from the extension of rival states, political ideologies, and terrorism have affected Iran’s understanding of strategic stability. Dealing with these threats, Iran has always strived to increase its relative security in the context of an active regional presence to preempt any strategic instability for the state. To this aim and before the 1979 Islamic revolution, Iran perceived strategic stability rather in making coalition and close cooperation with the Western bloc and its regional allies. At present, however, and given the changing circumstances, achieving strategic stability is focused on relying on independent national strategies, strengthening regional cooperation, and boosting regional multilateralism. Conceptually, the two factors of “geographical centrality” and “identical values” have been significant in shaping Iran’s perspective in this regard. The author concludes that the dynamism of regional politics such as the continued crises in Afghanistan and Iraq, followed by the Arab Spring developments, especially the Syrian crisis and emergence of Daesh (ISIS), and in the latest development coming to power of President Trump in the U.S. and the conduct of the so-called “maximum pressure” policy, has further centered Iran’s sense of strategic stability on the concepts of containment and deterrence through increased regional presence, taking advantage of its geopolitical centrality and soft power for eradicating the new emerged national security threats. In this regard, a concept such as self-reliance has become more significant in Iran’s understanding of strategic stability, consequently leading Iran to become a more security and economic “inward looking” state. This state of affairs is likely to continue during the Joe Biden presidency, unless Iran’s sense of strategic insecurity from the U.S.’ aims and intentions in weakening Iran’s regional status is removed by some constructive actions on the U.S. side.

Despite Biden’s victory in the 2020 U.S. election and his initial strive to see the JCPOA salvaged, the maximum pressure campaign against the Islamic Republic still de facto and de jure remains in place. With both Iran and the U.S. asserting intransigent positions towards each other and refusing to make the first step, the future of the JCPOA and the economic sanctions associated with the deal looks vague to say the least. For the time being, it is hard to expect that the “maximum pressure” campaign designed by Trump’s administration will experience any significant change in the near future even with Biden willing to reconcile with Tehran. In this context it is important to assess just how efficient this sanction policy towards Iran is and whether it is likely to bear any fruit in the near future. This chapter attempts to analyze the prospects of current pressure campaign employed by the U.S. against Iran, arguing that the maintained sanction policies are not very likely to win any significant concessions from Tehran.

The chapter addresses the rise of partnerships of China in the Middle East, with a focus on Sino-Iranian relations. The People’s Republic of China and the Islamic Republic of Iran share similar views regarding the international order and in terms of means for development, translated into practical, mainly economic aspects that have brought them into close cooperation over the past decades. Through the connection with Iran, Chinese leaders are seizing the opportunity to further China’s economic and strategic interests in the Middle East. However, there are challenges of balancing those interests with China’s responsibilities as a growing global power. China goes beyond energy interests, expanding the security and political dimension of its relation with Iran, which the chapter points out, offering explanations behind these actions. Yet divergent, the Sino-Iranian interests converge enough to cement a growing relationship, analyzed in the chapter.

The current study relies on a descriptive method based on factual analysis and description of facts on the ground. Concomitantly, the chapter uses the qualitative method that runs through the primary data concerning the Iran–China relations, providing an informative outline based upon such an analysis.

The chapter outcomes are as follows: first, it explains the Chinese reasons for involvement in the Middle East and Iran’s increasing interest to look East/Far Asia. Second, we estimate that China is creating new leverages in relation to Iran and the broader Middle East via the framework of comprehensive partnerships. Third, we note the limits of Iran–China relations. Forth, the wide-ranging implications of the partnership are influenced by a global context, notably the U.S.’s relations to the Middle East. This study highlights the characteristics of a relationship that is in the making, producing a first-hand analysis.

Finally, the study is limited to the available data up to early 2021. COVID-19 pandemic and other events are still unfolding and might alter/adjust the course of events.

One of the varieties of the Iranian–Russian interactions is that the current ties between the two players are out of proportion with their historical relations. The Collapse of the Soviet Union, pushing Russia out of Iran’s neighborhood, not only relieved Iran from this historic fear but also opened a quite new chapter for more balanced bilateral relations based on mutual respect. The three decades of relations indicate that Iran has never pursued geopolitical or ideological ambitions in Central Asia and South Caucasus at the expense of Russian interests. Furthermore, Iran has geographically and politically been the closest partner for the Russian growing involvement in the Middle East, despite other regional players’ reluctance. However, since the pillars of this cooperation have been consistently based on countering regional crises or common enemies rather than defining long-term common interests, and various joint security and economic projects have been politically motivated, the two players have never had this opportunity to experience a sustainably strategic partnership.

The beginning of the EU–Iran relations dates back to the “critical dialogue” between the two parties, started by the European Council in 1992. Since then, the EU consistently put efforts to withstand the adverse effects of controversy regarding Iran. Yet after 2005, EU foreign policy gradually gave up its positive engagement with Iran and followed US lead in forcing Iran by diplomatic escalation to solve the nuclear dispute. Between 2010 and 2015 the EU played a crucial role in bringing US and Iran to reach an agreement: the “Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action” (JCPoA). D. Trump’s pullout from the JCPoA and the “Maximum Pressure” campaign however forced the EU to tolerate the agreement being deprived of its security function. Iran in turn started revoking its JCPoA obligations. This chapter attempts to deconstruct EU’s Iran policy, and Iran’s responses to it, through the theoretical lens of Kennan’s “containment strategy” and Donnelly’s notion of “heterarchy” and relating these to the Regional Security Complex Theory. The conclusion of this research states that despite the rising interconnectedness of the Levant, Maghreb and Gulf MENA region subcomplexes, the EU applies a controlled hierarchical type of containment strategy in the first two subcomplexes whereas a limited heterarchical type in the third and thus also towards Iran.

Iran’s foreign relations with the European Union (EU) have always been accompanied by many vacillating. The JCPOA was a sign of Iran’s desire to starting détente in international relations. The agreement opened a new chapter in relations between the two sides. The post-JCPOA sphere created the conditions for Iran and the EU to revive ties based on mutual interests and needs. But with the beginning of Donald Trump’s presidency and the withdrawal of the United States from the agreement, one obstacle after another became apparent. It will argue that the change in Iranian posture vis-à-vis the deal was brought about by a shift in perception about the European ability to keep the agreement alive. Iran is geostrategically and prestigiously important for the EU Common Foreign Security Policy (EU/CFSP). The present article, after examining the importance of the geopolitical variable, seeks to explain the Iran–EU relations in four areas: economic, energy, regional matters, and nuclear dossier. One of the most important issues in EU–Iran relations, is the necessity of making balance in foreign policy versus China, Russia, and United States. They need more to more.

In a move that escalated the longstanding dispute between Iran and UAE over the sovereignty of the three islands of Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb, and Abu Musa, in April 2020, the IRGC Navy Commander Admiral Alireza Tangsiri announced that under the direct order of the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, the islands of the Persian Gulf in the Iranian territory are to be converted into residential properties. While addressing the strategic importance of these three islands, the present research sets out to investigate and test the factors that led to Iran’s current political decision through a survey answered by 94 Iranian academic, political, and military experts. In addition, this research investigates the consequences of this strategic decision which could affect the political, military, and economic situation of the Persian Gulf. Therefore, our main argument is that although Iran’s primary purpose for turning the three islands into residential areas is to settle the disputes over sovereignty as well as to preserve its territorial integrity, the latter aims to increase its domination over the Persian Gulf and extend its influence in the region. The result of our analysis demonstrates that the geopolitical factors are the most important drivers that led to this strategic decision.

Relations between Iran and Iraq as two Muslim countries with a Shia majority have always been at the center of both political and academic debates. While the relations of the two countries were extremely overshadowed and exacerbated due to the Iran and Iraq war in 1980–1988, the U.S. military invasion of Iraq and the collapse of Saddam Hussein’s regime in 2003 provided a new opportunity for reviving Iran’s strategic relations with Iraq. Therefore, they sought to expand their relations in religious, political, economic, technology, and security spheres. One of the most important dimensions of Iran and Iraq’s political convergence has been projected in “Arbaeen Pilgrimage.” It also demonstrates the importance of Shia nations’ integration. Aiming to understand how Arbaeen pilgrimage led to Iran and Iraq political convergence, the present study draws on a unique survey with the participation of political and tourism experts as the respondents to the survey questionnaire. Findings of the research demonstrated that Arbaeen pilgrimage is a religious and politically led movement leading to Iran and Iraq political convergence and empowerment of Shia nations who represent the Shia geopolitics.

Since the 1979 Islamic revolution Iran and Israel has become severe rivals. Intensity of hostility between the two states largely defines degree of stability/instability in the region. To understand the complexity of the existing Iran–Israeli confrontation the authors will look at several major factors which largely form agenda of the two states’ hostility: transformation of the Middle East security system; Israeli–Palestinian conflict and Palestinian issue; Iran’s increased influence in the Lebanon and Syria; how they use enemy image of each other in their policies; the nuclear issue and U.S. regional policies. The authors argue that despite existing hostility and ideological animosity between Iran and Israel, pragmatism dominates conduct of their policies toward each other and doesn’t allow above-mentioned factors to drive the two states into a large-scale conflict.

Over the past decades, relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia, representing the Shia and Sunni factions respectively have transformed multiple times. With their historic rivalry rooted in the Shia-Sunni schism, religion has inevitably been incorporated into their regimes to maintain domestic stability and regional influence. In recent years, with the ascension of Saudi Arabia’s Mohammad bin Salman (MBS) as the Crown Prince, the Kingdom’s policies have re-oriented towards a more interventionist and military approach, and tensions between the two countries have escalated, most notably culminating in the attack on the Saudi embassy in Iran in response to the execution of Sheikh Nimr, a prominent Shia cleric critical of the Saudi Arabian government. Prior to this execution order, Iran’s policies towards Saudi Arabia had been moderate due to attempts on both sides to initiate dialogue and open a pathway for peace. Now, as both countries face increasing international pressure to grant socio-political liberties and rein in aggressive foreign policy tactics, it is now apt that both sides would have to reconsider reconciliation to maintain the fragile state of the balance of powers in the region. This chapter discusses the geopolitical importance of each country, beginning by investigating how their struggle for religious hegemony, strategic role, and their attempts to use power have made it possible for them to emerge as a collective power. The chapter then delves into the historical use of religion in both countries and its development into a soft power tool to engage societal development, particularly in its use for regime stability and fulfilling geopolitical purposes. This chapter further explores the different broad-based approaches that each country has adopted in using and transforming religion. Taking into account the history of their domestic and regional relations, the chapter characterises both the Saudi and Iranian regimes in order to suggest a constructive pathway towards peace that would extend beyond their borders to the international level, emphasising the concept of religious soft power as it transforms alongside state policy-making, and referencing in particular each side’s proxy conflicts in Yemen, Israel, Lebanon, and Syria, as both countries struggle for regional dominance.

This chapter is about Iran’s foreign policy responses to political and security developments in Afghanistan, from the Soviet intervention in 1979 until February 2020, when an agreement was signed between the U.S. and Taliban officials. The study is structured along four periods corresponding to key changes in the Afghan political order and consequent political rearrangement of forces In Kabul. It identifies the rationale behind Teheran’s foreign policy choices to face changes in the political regime in Afghanistan. The chapter discusses the reasons why Iran struggles to increase political influence in Afghanistan, and the strategic options followed by Tehran to reach its goals. For each period, the study addresses the relations that Tehran kept with three different groups of Afghan players: the authorities, the opposition groups (political and military), and the foreign powers with a vested interest in the outcome of the conflict and with an active involvement therein. Iran is considered a rational and pragmatic actor whose relations with Afghanistan aimed, first and foremost, at ensuring its security and preserving the country’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and national unity. Teheran has promoted a politically stable Afghanistan with a Government that does not run against its interests and does not threaten its national security and has adapted its alliance policies according to the political forces prevailing in Kabul, irrespectively of their ethnic and political background, often against the interests of the Afghan Shia communities. Iran’s policies are fundamentally driven to limiting its opponents’ influence over the Afghan elites and reduce the threat they may pose to Iran’s national security. Iran has neither a hegemonic ambition in Afghanistan nor wants to export a political ideology throughout the region by following a sectarian approach and using its perceived leverage upon Shia groups. As an ultimate ratio, Iran’s exercise of influence reaching out to the elites of all ethnic parties aims at preserving its security.

This chapter traces the evolution and significance of the presence of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the Horn of Africa. Compared to other areas of Iran’s neighbourhood, Tehran’s power projection in this African subregion has largely remained under-researched. Yet, lately, foreign powers’ renewed interest in the Horn following the latter’s growing geostrategic relevance has contributed to reviving the academic debate related to it. By adopting a complex realist theoretical framework, the aim of this chapter is to explore the reasons why the Horn of Africa is a very coveted spot for many foreign powers, including Iran; which objectives have driven Tehran’s policies in that area; and how its élites have tried to pursue them over the past decades. To do so, after a brief overview of the Horn’s inherent value, the chapter first presents the core dimensions of the strategy Iran has devised to meet its interests there. Then, it moves onto the empirical research proper, consisting in a chronological, in-depth analysis of Iran’s actions in the Horn region, across the four main dimensions which constitute its Horn strategy: political support, military interactions, economic relations, and, to a lesser degree than in other African regions, ideological and soft power penetration. The empirical analysis reveals the complex web of global, regional, and domestic factors behind Iran’s Horn policies and the impossibility to separate the dynamics of Iran’s reach towards the Horn from those of its regional and extra-regional competitors.

Relations between Iran and Turkey have long been defined by mutual suspicion and competition, despite a 312-mile border that has remained unchanged since 1639, and the main reasons are due to geopolitics and ideology. On the one hand, in many ways, Turkey and Iran are mirror images of each other. They share geography, culture, religion, and a long history of conflict and cooperation. They both straddle multiple geopolitical regions. On the other hand, the two countries also symbolize two opposite poles in the Islamic world. One is trying to be the leader of Sunni Islam and even the whole Islamic world and the other one is the de-facto leader of Shiite Islam. However, after the Justice and Development Party (JDP in English and AKP in Turkish) came to power since 2002, the relations of Turkey and Iran developed into a high level. Turkey has provided Iran with important support at its most vulnerable time, for example, the Nuclear Issue, Syrian Issue, Economic Sanctions, and etc. Although Turkey and Iran will not become allies, there is a potential that the two countries, together with Russia, are establishing a triangle nexus which will coordinate key issues in the Greater Middle East. This chapter aims to use the theory of Eurasianism to analyze Turkey-Iran relations. The main content will cover the following aspects: Turkey and Iran’s role in Eurasianism; the historical relations of Turkey and Iran with the focus on geopolitics; Turkey-Iran Relations during AKP period; Prospects of Turkey-Iran relations within the framework of Eurasianism and New Geopolitics.

This final chapter argues that following the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war the Caucasus has become fertile ground for the geopolitical ambitions of middle powers who are racing to fill the void of a post-U.S. regional order. The conflict has suddenly shifted regional equilibria, pushing Iran, Turkey, and Russia to compete for influence. The newly emerging balance of power is rendered more fragile by the intervention of extra-regional players such as Pakistan and Israel, as well as by China’s vested interests in strategic infrastructures in the Caucasus. This chapter finds that Iran, unprepared for a military and political proxy war in the Caucasus, has opted to retreat from the region. Iran’s strategy is best viewed as deliberate damage control: Tehran had the most to lose from the entrenchment of a hot conflict on its borders. Iran’s strategy has been effective in achieving most of the country’s fundamental security objectives but has resulted in a significant set-back in its regional influence. This research relies on a descriptive method based on a combination of historical analysis and media analysis. It draws on Iranian and international sources to provide a comprehensive overview of various regional and global interests at play in the conflict and uses secondary literature and think-tanks reports to reconstruct the conflict dynamic at play on the ground in Nagorno-Karabakh. This study finds that Iran has followed a coherent strategy throughout the Nagorno-Karabakh war which is consistent with their position on the conflicted territory since 1994, and which prioritises immediate security concerns over long-term political aims. The study was limited to publicly available data. Iran’s leadership choices are inferred through their public statements; although official’s rhetoric has been analysed and triangulated with other sources, limited accessibility of policymakers reduces certainty of results. Finally, the current chapter presents a comprehensive view of the strategic importance of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, highlighting the connection between global geopolitical dynamics, national interests, and the historical and humanitarian reality of the conflict.