The making of public Islam: piety, agency, and commodification on the landscape of the Indonesian public sphere

Da‘wa is derived from the Arabic root da‘a, to call, which generally refers to the proselytizing that is incumbent upon every Muslim.

Halqa, literally meaning “circle,” is a forum for the study of Islamic sciences, in which an ustadh, a teacher or preacher, gives lessons based on certain books and his participants sit around him to hear and scrutinize his lessons. It is distinct from daura, literally meaning “turn,” which is a type of workshop held for a period ranging from one week to one month, during which its participants gather and stay in one place and follow all the designed programs.

On the Rabitat, see Schulze (1990: 215-216) and Kepel (2002: 46).

On the definition and discussion of religious orthodoxy, see Hassan (2007).

For this term, see Cook (2001).

On the concept of risk society see Beck (1992).

Interview with Misbach Malim, the head of secretariat bureau of DDII, February 2003.

I use the term santri and abangan in reference to the concept introduced by the American anthropologist Clifford Geertz, who divides Javanese society—the majority of Indonesian Muslims—into santri, abangan, and priyayi. In a simple way, the term santri is applied to puritanical Muslims committed to a more or less normative profession of the faith, as opposed to the abangan, nominal Muslims, who felt comfortable with local customs influenced by Animism, Hinduism, and Buddhism. See Geertz (1960). Despite some criticisms, I consider this concept still relevant to understand Indonesian Islam. The opposing concepts santri and abangan can be used to look at two competing extremes in the religious understanding and praxis of Indonesians. Although the current of Islamization has increasingly forced Indonesians to identify themselves as santri and its religios symbols, resistences against the on-going penetration of an orthodox version of Islam that is puritan, inflexible, anti-feminist, intolerant of other cultures and faith, rejecting of local culture and opposed to mysticism continue to take place. As Ricklefs (2008) points out, between these two extremes we can see multiple combinations and permutations of them.

The passing of this bill reinforced the existence of the Islamic courts within the Indonesian legal system. Previously, it ranked the second class court after the public, military, and administrative courts.

Observation in Paramadina’s executive Islamic class, September 2006, and interviews with M. Rahmat and Bambang Isnanto, participants of the class, September 2006.

These include Dawam Rahardjo, Utomo Dananjaya, Abdul Latief, and Fahmi Idris, all of whom came from the HMI, Indonesian Muslim Student Association, background.

See Darut Tauhid’s Profile; for the updates see www.​cybermq.​com.

Ibid; see also http://​www.​ahadnet.​com.

For the profile of Amanah, see www.​amanah.​or.​id.

For the profile of Annida,see www.​ummigroup.​co.​id/​annida.

These include (1) to introduce Muslim teen girls into Islamic values and provide readers with religious insights; (2) to highlight the image of quality Islamic media and serve as the means for young, creative talents to express themselves; (3) to provide standards of good conduct for Muslim teen girls; (4) to facilitate the need of Muslim teen girls for good and healthy entertainment; and (5) to contribute to the development of Indonesian literature, especially Islamic literature.

On complex hybridity of Indonesian Muslim youth cultures, see Nilan (2006: 91–110).

For the online version of this magazine, see www.​ummigroup.​co.​id/​annida.

Television was introduced to Indonesia in 1962, and the state television foundation TVRI was placed under direct control of the President. Towards the late 1980s TVRI monopoly ended with the introduction of commercial television. The dissolution of the Ministry of Information by Abdurrachman Wahid spurred television potential for expanding its public role in civil society (see Kitley 2003: 97–114).