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2012 | OriginalPaper | Chapter

The Role of Multiple Large Shareholders in Public Listed Firms: An Overview

Author : Ana Paula Matias Gama

Published in: Corporate Governance

Publisher: Springer Berlin Heidelberg

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Abstract

A key issue in corporate governance is whether large owners contribute to resolving agency problems or exacerbate them. This paper surveys how large shareholders interact among themselves and how the composition of the controlling group, as well as the type of shareholders, can affect both monitoring and the level of private benefit extraction and, consequently, firm value. Recent studies on ownership structure of listed firms reveal that family firms are the most common form of ownership. We therefore also analyse potential agency conflicts that can emerge between families and other large shareholders by examining the governance roles of the structures of multiple large shareholder.

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During the last decade, financial institutions in Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development countries increased their total assets as a percentage of gross domestic product by 143 %, while the proportion of equity holdings in their portfolios more than doubled (Li et al. 2006).

Empirical evidence on tunnelling by family and other large blockholders is documented for Bulgaria by Atanasov (2005), for China by Gao and Kling (2008), for France by Boubaker and Sami (2011), for Hong Kong by Cheung et al. (2006), for India by Bertrand et al. (2002), for Japan by Weinstein and Yafeh (1998), for Russia and the US by Atanasov et al. (2006), for South Korea by Bae et al. (2002), and for Sweden by Bergstrom and Rydqvist (1990).

Several other studies provide evidence on whether earnings management influences share price. For example, Perry and Williams (1994) analyse earnings manipulation in the year preceding the public announcement of a management buyout and conclude that management manipulates discretionary accruals to understate earnings in the hope of decreasing the share price. Others demonstrate that the vehicle used for earnings management is transactions with related firms. For instance, Gordon and Henry (2005) show that in the US absolute adjusted abnormal accruals, a proxy for earnings management, is positively correlated with certain related-party transactions.

Yet a number of studies argue that multiple blockholders are unlikely to emerge (e.g., Winton 1993; Zwiebel 1995).

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Title: The Role of Multiple Large Shareholders in Public Listed Firms: An Overview
Author: Ana Paula Matias Gama
Publisher: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Book: Corporate Governance
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-31578-7

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-642-31579-4

Copyright Year: 2012
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-31579-4_3