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Argumentation
Published in: Argumentation 1/2019

17-07-2018

The Thesis of the Effectiveness of Quasi-logical Arguments

Author: Iva Svačinová

Published in: Argumentation | Issue 1/2019

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Abstract

The article focuses on the new rhetoric category of quasi-logical arguments, defined as arguments similar to logical or mathematical demonstrations, and therefore having an effect on the audience. Connecting the similarity of arguments to formal demonstrations with the claim of effect on audience is conceived in this article as the thesis of effectiveness of quasi-logical arguments. The components of the thesis are reconstructed and analyzed, and their precise definitions are proposed. The analysis shows that the category of quasi-logical arguments is ambiguously defined and currently includes three different concepts based on a different understanding of similarity. Subsequently, it is showed that based on Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s works, the explanation of quasi-logical arguments’ effect on an audience can be offered in terms of socially shared standards of community or in terms of individual processing of arguments. It is shown that these explanations can be in conflict each other regarding the assumption of the addressee’s acquaintance with formal principles.
previous article Plausible Argumentation in Eikotic Arguments: The Ancient Weak Versus Strong Man Example
next article Populism and Informal Fallacies: An Analysis of Right-Wing Populist Rhetoric in Election Campaigns

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Footnotes
1
The term “the new rhetoric” is used here in reference to Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s theoretical approach to argumentation, the term “The New Rhetoric” refers to their seminal book (1969).
 
2
The publication of the book was preceded by several studies in which the new rhetoric’s approach to argumentation was formed (cf. Perelman 1954, 1955; Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1951, 1957). In 1958, the book was published in French as Traité de l'argumentation: La nouvelle rhétorique, in 1966 it was translated into Italian. However, it gained its publicity with its translation into English in 1969.
 
3
With regards to different standards of precision and exactness, it seems suitable to add that already Aristotle made similar remarks in his Nicomachean Ethics: ἡ μὲν οὖν μέθοδος τούτων ἐφίεται, πολιτική τις οὖσα. λέγοιτο δ᾽ ἂν ἱκανῶς, εἰ κατὰ τὴν ὑποκειμένην ὕλην διασαφηθείη: τὸ γὰρ ἀκριβὲς οὐχ ὁμοίως ἐν ἅπασι τοῖς λόγοι ἐπιζητητέον, ὥσπερ οὐδ᾽ ἐν τοῖς δημιουργουμένοις. This then being its aim, our investigation is in a sense the study of Politics. Now our treatment of this science will be adequate, if it achieves that amount of precision which belongs to its subject matter. The same exactness must not be expected in all departments of philosophy alike, any more than in all the products of the arts and crafts. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book 1, 1094b 10–14). I wish to thank my anonymous reviewer for this point.
 
4
For theoretical elaboration of difference between logical and rhetorical perspective see Wenzel (1990, 1992).
 
5
Haynes points out that rather than “quasi-logical arguments”, it would be more appropriate to use the more general term “quasi-formal arguments”, given that the category includes the arguments imitating logical and mathematical demonstrations. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s terminology, in which both quasi-logical and quasi-mathematical arguments fall under the general category of quasi-logical arguments, is somewhat confusing in this respect (cf. Haynes 1981, p. 221).
 
6
It is interesting that in Perelman’s other works presenting quasi-logical arguments, considerations dealing with the possibility of differing audience’s scheme perception is rather missing (cf. Perelman 1982, Ch. 6, 7, 1979, pp. 19–21).
 
7
The new rhetoric considers dissociations, in which the unified elements are also separated as argument scheme types (cf. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969, p. 190; van Rees 2008).
 
8
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca distinguish between two types of audience: universal and particular. The universal audience is the “whole of mankind, or at least, of all normal, adult persons” (1969, p. 30), particular audiences are people or groups with specific sums of beliefs or value preferences: to persuade the universal audience, it is necessary to choose factual premises. A discourse centered on values alone can never reach a universal audience—concrete values can never be considered binding for all human beings in all circumstances (cf. Gross and Dearin 2003, p. 36). Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s original criterion for distinguishing between universal and particular audiences is therefore the character of audience starting points, not the audience’s ability to recognize the schemes.
 
9
In another place, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca conceive: “In most cases, (…), we are simultaneously aware of more than just one way of conceiving the structure of an argument” (1969, p. 187).
 
10
In this sense, the property ‘to be quasi-logical’ can never be considered a property dependent on an argument’s superficial features.
 
11
Both examples occur in The New Rhetoric (cf. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969, p. 222) and The realm of rhetoric (cf. Perelman 1982, p. 68) as illustrations of arguments utilizing similarity with logical principle of symmetry.
 
12
It is obvious that logical implication (→) should be interpreted in this case as normative shift: e.g. ‘should arise the commitment’ etc.
 
13
All examples occur in The New Rhetoric (cf. 1969, pp. 221, 222, 224). Example (4) is also utilized by Perelman in The realm of rhetoric (cf. 1982, p. 68).
 
14
In 1982, in The realm of rhetoric, Perelman introduces the typology of argument schemes including quasi-logical arguments. This typology is the shortened version presented in The New Rhetoric: he presents identical quasi-logical argument types, but rather limited descriptions of them and a smaller number of examples. Some rather limited descriptions of particular quasi-logical schemes can also be found in Perelman’s The New Rhetoric and the Humanities (cf. 1979, pp. 19–21). For this reason, I refer primarily to the original typology presented in The New Rhetoric (1969).
 
15
In order to identify the formal principles, I used primarily the authors’ reference to these principles in the introductory part of chapters of The New Rhetoric, if they were available—as was the case in §50, 51, 53, 54, 56. I also took their formulations in The realm of rhetoric (Perelman 1982, Ch. 7) into consideration. If these references were not directly available or it was not sufficiently obvious which principle is referenced, I also investigated the specific explanations for individual variants and the structure of individual examples (§46, 55, 57, 58, 59).
 
16
It is notable that Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca understand as an implementation of the quasi-logical scheme even cases in which only a premise/thesis is in the particular layout resembling a formal principle. For instance, authors present as a case of arguments of reciprocity the following statement, which they present as a Judeo-Christian ethical maxim (cf. 1969, p. 222): “Therefore all things whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them.” The proposition is not supported by a reason in their illustration and it seems appropriate to interpret it as an attempt to submit a standpoint, which the arguer commits to support in the case of doubt or disagreement.
 
17
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca can be considered in this respect as a specific audience, thanks to their education in logic and statistics (cf. Frank and Bolduc 2011, pp. 144–146). We can expect their higher sensitivity to structures that resemble formal principles. In other words, they can “find” the quasi-logical scheme even when no one else has identified it.
 
18
The plurality of audiences is only guaranteed in comparison to the theoretical concept with regard to the accepted starting points, not with regard to the reception of argument schemes.
 
19
In pragma-dialectics, argument schemes are defined by unique argument principles and specific sum of critical questions. Argument of reciprocity is defined by the reciprocal argument principle. According to pragma-dialecticians, “This principle particularly applies to people (and countries), and implies that one person should act towards another person in the same way the other person act towards him.” (van Eemeren et al. 2007, p. 139). Three critical questions are connected with the scheme: Should people in the same situation be treated equally in this case? Do the compared things show sufficient similarities to justify the proposed equal treatment? Are there any relevant differences between the compared things that stand in the way? (van Eemeren et al. 2007, p. 139).
 
20
The claim of effectiveness is not associated with any particular concept of similarity. Therefore, we can deal with the effect on the audience/audiences in general, independently on this distinction.
 
21
Comparison of typologies of schemes (loci) distinguished by Aristotle and Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca implemented by Warnick (cf. 2000) shows that some quasi-logical schemes do not, in fact, occur in antiquity (e.g. probability calculus—in form of statistical and numerical probability) and on the contrary, often occur in contemporary culture.
 
22
Authors explicitly admit a prestige of logical thinking in the following passage: “Doubtless, logical proof can itself be the object of the hearer’s attention: he admires its elegance, deplores its heaviness, notices its adequacy to the end that is pursued.” (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969, p. 190).
 
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Metadata
Title
The Thesis of the Effectiveness of Quasi-logical Arguments
Author
Iva Svačinová
Publication date
17-07-2018
Publisher
Springer Netherlands
Published in
Argumentation / Issue 1/2019
Print ISSN: 0920-427X
Electronic ISSN: 1572-8374
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10503-018-9464-z

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