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2020 | OriginalPaper | Chapter

3. To Reward or Not to Reward: A Cross-Jurisdictional Comparison of the Reasons Why Securities Regulators Have Adopted or Rejected Policies to Pay Whistleblowers

Author : Janet Austin

Published in: Corporate Whistleblowing Regulation

Publisher: Springer Singapore

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Abstract

The idea that securities regulators should reward persons who ‘blow the whistle’ on fraudulent or corrupt conduct is starting to gain some traction around the world. Spurred on by the apparent success of the whistleblower award program administered by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in the United States, other countries have considered whether or not their securities regulators should adopt similar program. This article examines the reasons behind the introduction of the SEC program as well as the approach in three other jurisdictions, being Canada, Australia and the UK, all of which have considered whether to introduce such a regime. This analysis demonstrates that whether an award program for whistleblowers was adopted, and the form of the program, depended upon a number of factors. Such factors include whether or not the regulator itself supported the introduction of the program, the political landscape generally and opposition from business. Although empirical evidence about the costs and benefits of such programs contributed to the debate, it was not determinative because such empirical evidence is currently inconclusive. As such, there is a pressing need for more empirical evidence to fully assess the costs and benefits of such programs.

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Footnotes
1
See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 11-203 § 922(a), 121 Stat 1894 (2010).
 
2
Ibid. The Act inserted a new § 21F into the Securities Exchange Act 1934 (Pub. L. 73–291, 48 Stat. 881, enacted June 6, 1934, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq.). The whistleblower awards program established by the SEC became effective on August 12, 2011, see SEC Rule 17 CFR Parts 240 and 249 [Release No. 34-64545; File No. S7-33-10] Implementation of the Whistleblower Provisions of Section 21F of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (August 12, 2011).
 
3
White (2016).
 
4
Securities and Exchange Commission (2018, p. 1).
 
5
Ontario Securities Commission (2016b).
 
6
The maximum whistleblower award under the OSC program is set at C$1.5 million if the aggregate amount of monetary sanctions and/or voluntary payments is equal to or greater than C$10 million. However if the OSC actually collects the monetary sanctions and/or voluntary payments in an amount equal to or greater than C$10 million, than the maximum award is increased to C$5 million. See ibid. and Ontario Securities Commission (2016c, para 18).
 
7
Ontario Securities Commission Policy 15-601 (2016c, Parts 3.2 and 3.3).
 
8
Ontario Securities Commission Policy 15-601 (2016c, Part 4).
 
9
Ontario Securities Commission Policy 15-601 (2016c, Part 5).
 
10
Although the effect of such a program may provide compensation for losses persons may have suffered in retaliation for blowing the whistle, this is usually not the principle reason for their introduction.
 
11
Baer (2017).
 
12
For example, on 12 May 2014 the SEC issued a Final Order making an individual ineligible for whistleblower claims due to repeated, frivolous claims. https://​www.​sec.​gov/​about/​offices/​owb/​orders/​owb-multiple-final-051214.​pdf. Accessed 4 July 2018. It seems the individual made 196 applications for awards, including 21 in one day according to Ensign (2014). In the SEC 2017 Annual Report to Congress it was reported that unusually large numbers of tips came from two individuals in 2016 and 2017 which were left out of the tables and statistics suggesting they might have had a similar problem in those years, see Securities and Exchange Commission (2017, p. 23, footnote 51).
 
13
See for example US Chamber of Commerce (2011).
 
14
False Claims Act 1863 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733. See also Vaughn (2012, p. 127).
 
15
Ibid.
 
16
Also Faunce et al. (2014, p. 382).
 
17
Pitzer (1972).
 
18
Patent Act of 1842, ch 263 5, 5 Stat. 543, 544 (1842). This carried a penalty of US$100, half of which went to the government and the other half to the individual. This provision remains, although the penalty has increased to US$500 for every offence. See False Marking 35 USC ss 292 (2006). To succeed the relator must show that the item was marked as patented or patent pending, that the marking was false and that the marking party intended to deceive the public. Nichols v. Newell, 1853 U.S. App. LEXIS 737, (C.C.D. Mass. November 01, 1853). The third requirement of intent and the court’s tendency to limit the penalty to $500 rather than $500 per item falsely marked has limited the effectiveness of the Patent office reward scheme. See Winston (2009).
 
19
19 USCS § 1619 The Customs bounty program requires the individual to detect, seize and report the vessel, baggage etc. or to provide original information so compensation cannot be given for information if the investigation was already underway or for mere testimony. See Ferziger and Currell (1999).
 
20
26 USCS § 7623 Senate Committee Report on The Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2010, p. 111.
 
21
See West et al. (2012), Brady (2012) and Rapp (2012).
 
22
See section 21A(e) of the Securities Exchange Act 1934 (Pub. L. 73–291, 48 Stat. 881, enacted June 6, 1934, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq.) which was added by the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988 (ITSEA), Pub. L. No. 100-704. See also Office of Inspector General report Assessment of the SEC’s Bounty Program’, Report No. 474 (March 29, 2010) p. 1.
 
23
Assessment of the SEC’s Bounty Program, Report No. 474 (March 29, 2010) p. 1.
 
24
Sarbanes Oxley Act 2002 Pub. L. No. 107-204 § 806, 116 Stat. 745 (2002). See generally Dworkin (2007).
 
25
Sarbanes Oxley Act, ibid., § 301.
 
26
Sarbanes Oxley Act, ibid., § 806.
 
27
Ibid and Sarbanes Oxley Act, ibid., § 1514A (b). See generally King (2011).
 
28
See Dyck et al. (2010). Baer (2017, p. 2226) suggests that this is because anti-retaliation law can only go so far in that back pay and the threat of lawsuits cannot protect employees from subtle stigma and discrimination.
 
29
Dworkin (2007), King (2011) and Rapp (2007).
 
30
For a description of the Madoff Scandal, see Langevoort (2009).
 
31
Baer (2017).
 
32
Ontario Securities Commission (2015c, pp. 37–38).
 
33
Shapiro (2009, p. 10).
 
34
Ibid., p. 19.
 
35
U.S. Department of the Treasury Fact Sheet (2009).
 
36
Ibid.
 
37
Rapp (2012, p. 89) notes that there was relatively little debate of the whistleblower provisions in Congressional hearings in relation to the Dodd Frank Act.
 
38
Securities and Exchange Commission (3 November 2010).
 
39
Securities and Exchange Commission (2010, p. 104).
 
40
Dyck et al. (2010).
 
41
Securities and Exchange Commission (2010, p. 109).
 
42
Baloria et al. (2017, p. 1306).
 
43
Securities and Exchange Commission (2011, p. 229).
 
44
Securities and Exchange Commission (2011) citing a study by Heyes and Kapur (2009).
 
45
Securities and Exchange Commission (2011, p. 231). This is in addition to the provisions included in the proposed rules (see Securities and Exchange Commission 2010) that require that in determining the amount of the award the SEC will consider whether or not the whistleblower substantially and unreasonably delayed reporting the violations in assessing the amount of the award and will view the fact that a whistleblower intentionally interfered with his or her company’s compliance system as a negative factor, see Securities and Exchange Commission (2011, p. 125).
 
46
Securities and Exchange Commission (2011, p. 1).
 
47
Wyatt (2011).
 
48
See Casey (2011) and Paredes (2011).
 
49
In May 2011, prior to the finalization of the rules by the SEC, Congressman Michael Grimm (R-NY) introduced a draft bill called the Whistleblower Improvement Act but it died in Congress. This would have required internal reporting before being eligible for a bounty and eliminating the minimum amount for a bounty, see Rapp (2012, pp. 101–102). In September 2016, House Financial Services Committee Chairman Jeb Hensarling (R-Texas) introduced a bill for the Financial Choice Act, which would, among other things, allow respondents to remove proceedings from the SEC’s administrative court to federal court. H.R. Rep. No. 114-883, pt. 1, at 137. Although the bill died in Congress in 2017, it appears that Representative Hansarling may reintroduce it. In February 2017, he issued a memorandum outlining changes planned to the introduced version of the Act, one of which would prohibit “co-conspirators” from receiving an award under the SEC’s whistleblower bounty program.
 
50
Lipton (2012). As to the benefits to trial lawyers see Ebersole (2011, pp. 146–147).
 
51
Although some of the provinces are moving towards a semi-national regulator to be called the Capital Markets Regulatory Authority. See http://​ccmr-ocrmc.​ca/​. Accessed 14 June 2018.
 
52
Ontario Securities Commission (2017, p. 1).
 
53
Ontario Securities Commission (2016b, c). See also The Economist (2016).
 
54
Section 30 of the Exchequer Court Act, R.S.C. 1927, c. 34 gave the Exchequer Court jurisdiction over qui tam suits suggesting that Canadians had the right to bring them. However, Common Law in Canada seems to have given preference to the Crown prerogative to prosecute effectively ending qui tam suits by the 1880s. For more on qui tam in Canada see Pitzer (1972) and for Crown Prerogative see Tingle (1994).
 
55
In 2014, the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) introduced a program under which whistleblowers are entitled to between 5 and 15% of the federal tax collected where the tax collected exceeds C$100,000.
 
56
Franken (2017).
 
57
See for example Halpern et al. (2016), Sukdeo (2009) and Puri (2012).
 
58
See Coffee (2007).
 
59
Ontario Securities Committee (2015a, p. 1).
 
60
Franken (2017). Canadians are consistently in the top three groups of foreign nationals contacting the SEC under its whistleblower award program. See for example Securities and Exchange Commission (2012, Appendix C), Securities and Exchange Commission (2013, Appendix D) and Securities and Exchange Commission (2014, Appendix C).
 
61
Franken (2017).
 
62
Ontario Securities Committee (2015a).
 
63
Ontario Securities Committee (2015a, p. 1).
 
64
Ontario Securities Committee (2015a, p. 5). This credit for co-operation program provides for various levels of leniency depending upon factors such as when the conduct is reported, type of conduct and the organizations response to the misconduct, see Ontario Securities Commission (2014). The reward program is structured such that, if the OSC first hears of the misconduct by a whistleblower rather than the organization, the organization would be ineligible for credit for co-operation.
 
65
Ontario Securities Committee (2015a, p. 24 at footnote 27).
 
66
Ontario Securities Committee (2015, p. 24). See National Whistleblowers Center (2010).
 
67
Ontario Securities Commission (2015b).
 
68
Ontario Securities Commission (2015b, pp. 19–21).
 
69
Ibid., pp. 95–145.
 
70
Ontario Securities Commission (2016a).
 
71
An Act to Implement Budget Measures and to Enact or Amend Various Statutes SO 2016 c 5. This inserted a new Part XXI.2 into the Ontario Securities Act RSO 1990.
 
72
Ontario Securities Commission (2016c, para 16).
 
73
Ibid. para 25(2)–(3).
 
74
See generally Chap. 4 and Archibald et al. (2017, para 7–30).
 
75
Franken (2017).
 
76
Ontario Securities Commission (2019).
 
77
Autorité des marchés financiers (AMF) (2016a).
 
78
Ibid.
 
79
Autorité des marchés financiers (AMF) (2016b, p. 1).
 
80
Ibid., p. 3.
 
81
Ibid., p. 14.
 
82
Ibid.
 
83
Ibid., pp. 10–13.
 
84
Autorité des marchés financiers (AMF) (2016a).
 
85
Ibid.
 
86
Autorité des marchés financiers (2016c).
 
87
See s571 of Bill 141 An Act mainly to improve the regulation of the financial sector, the protection of deposits of money and the operation of financial institutions. http://​www.​assnat.​qc.​ca/​en/​travaux-parlementaires/​projets-loi/​projet-loi-141-41-1.​html. Accessed 15 June 2018.
 
88
Alberta Securities Commission (2017).
 
89
Shecter (2017) and Southwick (2017).
 
90
A request by the author to the ASC under Freedom of Information and Protection Privacy Act (Alberta) for this information was unsuccessful, the ASC relying on, inter alia, section 46 of the Securities Act (Alberta) which relates to research received from other securities regulators.
 
91
Ibid.
 
92
Alberta Securities Commission (2018).
 
93
See for example Giovannetti and Cryderman (2016).
 
94
Alberta Securities Commission (2017).
 
95
Competition and Markets Authority (2014).
 
96
Faunce et al. (2014, p. 386).
 
97
This has led to some criticism of the scheme because of the lack information for potential whistleblowers and the lack of oversight of the scheme. Through Freedom of Information requests it has been reported that the HMRC paid out £421, 460 in 2016/2017 and £460, 433 in 2015/2016. Hodgson (2017a, b).
 
98
UK Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards Fifth Report (2013).
 
99
Ibid., para 784.
 
100
Ibid., para 779.
 
101
Ibid., para 803.
 
102
Ibid., para 802.
 
103
Bank of England Prudential Regulation Authority and Financial Conduct Authority (2014).
 
104
Ibid. Part of the justification for this position was the paper from the Department of Business Innovation and Skills (BIS) (2014). This was a report from a survey of respondents to whistleblowing issues generally, including the issue of financial rewards. The 78 respondents ranged from individuals, business representatives, businesses, trade unions and 11 of which are unclassified. The report states that the majority were not in favour of financial rewards but the report does not detail which of the respondents were in favour and which were against and who this majority comprised. Furthermore the PRA and FCA’s note cites this BIS document as showing that the Government does not believe that financial incentives should form part of the whistleblowing framework.” However citing this report as evidence is somewhat circular as this BIS report itself states that “the Government did not consider the evidence base strong enough to introduce this sort of system into the UK framework” but went on to say that that it would be interested to read the evidence from the PRA and FCA’s note.
 
105
Ibid.
 
106
See n. 138 below. William Shepherd, a corporate defence attorney with Holland and Knight who apparently helped organize the U.S. meetings with British regulators was quoted as saying that the UK not introduce bounties because “They want to create culture of internally inspired ethics instead of gotcha,” and were “What they're concerned about is creating the whole industry of whistleblowers and folks running around trying to drum up these cases” (Fisher 2014).
 
107
A request made by the author under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (UK) for further information in relation to this report was denied based upon a number of legislative provisions.
 
108
Ibid.
 
109
Financial Conduct Authority (2015).
 
110
Bank of England Prudential Regulation Authority and Financial Conduct Authority (2014) which stated, at p. 6, that the FCA said that it expected reports from whistleblowers to the FCA would continue to increase, noting that the number of whistleblowing cases rose by 55% from 2011 to 2012, by a further 42% from 2012 to 2013 and that it expected that it would increase by another 30% in 2014 to reach around 1200 reports.
 
111
Financial Conduct Authority (2016, p. 3) and Financial Conduct Authority (2017, p. 36). Financial Conduct Authority (2018, p. 20). See also Fantato (2017) which states that in 2016 only 13% of reports to the FCA directly contributed to enforcement action or were of significant value to the regulator.
 
112
This involved the insertion of Pt 9.4AAA into the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). See Brand et al. (2013) and Allan (2006).
 
113
Treasury Options Paper (2009, p. v).
 
114
Ibid.
 
115
Brand et al. (2013, p. 295).
 
116
Senate Economics References Committee (2014, xvii–xix).
 
117
Ibid.
 
118
Ibid., xxv.
 
119
Ibid., xxvi.
 
120
Australian Government (2014, p. 9). See also Brand (2016).
 
121
Knott (2016) and Beech (2016).
 
122
Parliamentary Joint Committee of Corporations and Financial Services (2017).
 
123
Australian Government (2016a). See also Australian Government (2016b, p. 11).
 
124
Parliamentary Joint Committee of Corporations and Financial Services (2017, p. 131) and Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2017, pp. 25–16).
 
125
Ibid.
 
126
Parliamentary Joint Committee of Corporations and Financial Services (2017, p. 138).
 
127
Ibid. Xvii–xviii.
 
128
Treasury Laws Amendment (Enhancing Whistleblower Protections) Act 2019 (Cth).
 
129
Autorité des marchés financiers (2016b).
 
130
Ibid., p. 14.
 
131
Ibid.
 
132
Ibid.
 
133
Ebersole (2011, pp. 140–141).
 
134
Dayton (2015). In this study Dayton found that SEC enforcement actions in which a whistleblower is present has increased since 2011. These are types of action which involve multiple people there is likely to be a whistleblower, being issuer reporting and disclosure, offering fraud and market manipulation.
 
135
See Austin (2017a, p. 144).
 
136
For arguments against the SEC whistleblower bounty program, see generally Ebersole (2011).
 
137
Dyck et al. (2010).
 
138
The SEC pointed to the increase in tips and payouts at the IRS after it introduced its award program, see Shapiro (2009, p. 19). The OSC pointed to the increase in tips and payouts to the SEC after it introduced its award scheme, see Ontario Securities Commission (2015a, p. 4).
 
139
Ontario Securities Commission (2015a, p. 24) which cited National Whistleblowers Center (2010) and Securities and Exchange Commission (2011) citing a study by Heyes and Kapur (2009).
 
140
Autorité des marchés financiers (2016b, pp. 1–2, 14).
 
141
Ebersole (2011, pp. 137–138).
 
142
Ebersole (2011, pp. 137–138).
 
143
Bowen, Cal and Rajopal found that companies with weak internal compliance programs are more likely to be subject to whistleblowing but that such whistleblowing was justified (Bowen et al. 2010).
 
144
Baloria et al. (2017).
 
145
Ibid.
 
146
Ibid.
 
147
Stigler (1971).
 
148
See further Armour et al. (2016, pp. 560–561).
 
149
See generally Austin (2017b).
 
150
See for example Ontario Securities Act RSO 1990 c 5, s 143.
 
151
For a discussion of possible motivations by whistleblowers and countervailing incentives to blow the whistle see Rapp (2012, pp. 109–118) and Feldman and Lobel (2010).
 
152
See Dyck et al. (2010). Berger, Perreault and Wainberg also found that there was a higher likelihood that a fraud would be reported when there was a financial reward, although also found that there was a higher likelihood of reporting being delayed if the value of the fraud fell below the threshold for a financial incentive, see Berger et al. (2017). Feldman and Lobel found that the highest level of reporting occurs when there is both a duty and high reward and the least reporting occurs when there is a low reward. Although they did also find that were there is a low level of moral outrage about the conduct, the introduction of small bounties may actually decrease the rate it is reported, see Feldman and Lobel (2010). However, interviews conducted by Kesselheim, Suddert and Mello of 17 federal qui tam cases against the pharmaceutical manufacturers found that all said that the financial bounty had not motivated their participation in the qui tam lawsuit. Motivations were four non-mutually exclusive themes being integrity, altruism or public safety, justice and self-preservation (Kesselheim et al. 2010).
 
153
Tips to the SEC have increased by over 75% since the program became operational and have increased each year from the time it was introduced. The SEC received 3001 tips in 2012, see Securities and Exchange Commission (2012, p. 4). In 2013 the SEC received 3238, see Securities and Exchange Commission (2013, p. 1). In 2014 the SEC received 3620 tips, see Securities and Exchange Commission (2014, p. 3). In 2015 the SEC received 3923, see Securities and Exchange Commission (2015, p. 21). In 2016 the SEC received 4218 tips, see Securities and Exchange Commission (2016, p. 23). In 2017 the SEC received 4484 tips, see Securities and Exchange Commission (2017, p. 23). In 2018 the SEC received 5200 tips, see Securities and Exchange Commission (2018, p. 6). The SEC also has said that the program has been of tremendous value to the SEC’s enforcement efforts by assisting the SEC uncover and stop fraudulent investment schemes and allowing hundreds of millions of dollars to be returned to investors, see Securities and Exchange Commission (2017, p. 1).
 
154
In 2014 the FCA received 1040 reports from whistleblowers, 1340 in 2015, 1014 in 2016, 900 in 2017 and 1106 in 2018. See Bank of England Prudential Regulation Authority and Financial Conduct Authority (2014, p. 6), Financial Conduct Authority (2016, p. 3, 2017, p. 36, 2018, p. 20).
 
155
See Call et al. (2018). This seems to corroborate statements made by the SEC that the quality of those tips have been high which has enabled it to bring enforcement actions much quicker and save on resources which it would have to have otherwise spend on investigations and prosecutions. The program has also resulted in information as to the whereabouts of investors’ funds and that this has enabled it to obtain orders to freeze assets and thereby stop investor funds from being dissipated by the fraudsters. See comments by Jane Norberg, Head of the SEC Office of the Whistleblower, Ontario Securities Commission (2015c, p. 19).
 
156
The 83% of SEC whistleblowers who were current or former employees reported that they raised their concerns internally first, see Securities and Exchange Commission (2018, p. 17).
 
157
In the Kesselheim study, 18 out of the 22 insiders interviewed tried first to fix the problem internally by talking to their superiors, filing an internal complaint or both. Kesselheim et al. (2010, p. 1834).
 
158
Bowen et al. (2010).
 
159
See 12 SEC (12 May 2014) Final Order. https://​www.​sec.​gov/​about/​offices/​owb/​orders/​owb-multiple-final-051214.​pdf. Accessed 4 July 2018, and SEC 2017 Annual Report to Congress: Whistleblower Program, p. 23.
 
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Metadata
Title
To Reward or Not to Reward: A Cross-Jurisdictional Comparison of the Reasons Why Securities Regulators Have Adopted or Rejected Policies to Pay Whistleblowers
Author
Janet Austin
Copyright Year
2020
Publisher
Springer Singapore
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-0259-0_3