The COVID-19 pandemic is arguably the most acute existential crisis humanity has faced since World War II. As of October 2023, the coronavirus has infected at least 8.6% of the global population and caused 6.9 million deaths (Worldometer,
2023). The pandemic’s economic impact was also devastating, estimated as dozens of billions of USD (Cutler & Summers,
2020; Levy & Filippini,
2021). The emotional terror the pandemic has caused, the suffering under repeated lockdowns, the loss of human capital due to school closures and the inability to travel and maintain close social relationships are other consequences societies had to and even continue to endure. Societal values—what we prioritize in life and desire as societal goals—are shaped by our natural and social environment (Schwartz,
2006). As existential security and standard of living have been rising globally (Pinker,
2018), so has societal culture changed to appreciate freedom, equality, and diversity (Welzel,
2013). This change is reportedly slow partly because rapid jumps in the quality of life are impossible on a societal level. However, the sudden and acute environmental change the pandemic brought offers a unique opportunity to study if values can also change in reverse and through what mechanisms they may do so.
Focusing on Japan as a case study, we examine these questions regarding two sets of values—emancipative and secular values—derived from Inglehart/Welzel’s revised modernization theory (Inglehart & Welzel,
2005). Emancipative values emphasize individual freedom and equality of opportunity, while secular values entail freedom from traditional sources of authority such as religion, nation, family, and group norms (Welzel,
2013). According to the revised modernization theory, these values reflect the level of existential security in a society, which makes them suitable for the current investigation. Despite their prominence in the political science and sociological literature, these social indicators have not yet been studied in the context of the pandemic.
By analyzing nationally representative data from three large surveys and investigating whether the pandemic affected societal values in Japan, we assess the validity of competing views about the stability and change of cultural values. The first survey was conducted shortly before the pandemic, the two following surveys during the pandemic, with a longitudinal follow-up of the same respondents. The investigation is guided by the following research question: Has the existential insecurity associated with the COVID-19 pandemic caused a shift to more traditional (less emancipative and less secular) values in Japan?
The stated question is important for the social sciences as well as policymakers due to the substantive role of these values in political processes and societal well-being. Emancipative values specifically have been featured as the key cultural component underpinning democratic development, as they manifest societal support for individual freedoms and equality, spurring demand for universal and impartial democratic institutions (Welzel,
2013,
2020). Secular values are related to emancipative values as they enable the liberation of individuals from sacred institutions and thus coevolve with emancipation in other domains (Alexander et al.,
2016). Cultures that value freedom, equality, and diversity allow more of their members to contribute to society and to realize their potential, thus enhancing psychological health, pro-social behavior, institutional quality, creativity, and economic performance (Akaliyski,
2023; Inglehart et al.,
2008; Welzel,
2013). These values have been equated to an “assertive” civic political culture that has an equivalent impact on democratic development across the globe, including East Asia (Dalton & Welzel,
2015).
1.1 Previous Research and Gaps in the Literature
Findings from recent empirical studies on the pandemic’s impact on values are mixed, which may reflect methodological and/or true between-country differences. Two panel studies examine values and attitudes most similar to those we study. A 24-country study, including Japan, finds that the pandemic has resulted in a stronger emphasis on freedom, emancipation, post-materialism and lower support for patriarchy and law and order (Lampert et al.,
2021). A Dutch study using European Values Survey data, which contains many survey items identical in wording to those we examine, also finds that some values such as gender equality, immigration permissiveness, and social trust continue to increase during the pandemic (Reeskens et al.,
2021). Values they consider stable—so-called ‘easy’ issues—such as religiosity and national pride, however, remained unchanged, while traditional moral permissiveness, post-materialism, and support for strong leaders decreased.
Most other studies either document a conservative change in values during the pandemic or an individual-level relationship between psychological distress (e.g., fear of COVID-19, existential insecurity) and conservative values. For example, a steep increase in interest in religion throughout the globe has been reported (Bentzen,
2021). In the US, studies document a reversal to traditional gender roles and stereotypes (Rosenfeld & Tomiyama,
2021), including gendered parenting roles (Mize et al.,
2021), and an association between pathogen threat and conservatism among Democrats (but not Republicans) (Samore et al.,
2021), as well as between pathogen threat and conservative ideological self-placement and partisan preference (O’Shea et al.,
2021) and right-wing authoritarian traits (Pazhoohi & Kingstone,
2021). A study from US, Germany, and Singapore reports increased traditional gender norms (Reichelt et al.,
2020). Another study shows that experimentally activating Polish and American participants’ thoughts about the COVID-19 pandemic results in stronger social conservative values and support for conservative presidential candidates (Karwowski et al.,
2020). We are aware of only one study from the US which finds no change, specifically on moral foundations comprising items related to harm, fairness, authority, in-group loyalty, and purity (Vartanova et al.,
2021).
Surveys from Poland reveal an increase in authoritarianism, a desire for national cohesion, rejection of sexual dissenters (Golec de Zavala et al.,
2021), and religiosity (Boguszewski et al.,
2020). In Italy, Molteni et al. (
2021) find a revival of religiosity in terms of prayer and attendance of religious services (via the internet, radio, or TV) among individuals whose family members were infected.
Individual values also reversed to stronger conservation (emphasizing order and stability), as well as weaker openness to change (self-direction and stimulation), according to a longitudinal study from Australia (Daniel et al.,
2021) and a study of retrospective reports from France (Bonetto et al.,
2021). In both countries, these value changes were associated with worrying about the pandemic and perceived threat, respectively.
Evidence from East Asia, however, remains scarce. A small study of Chinese students from Wuhan reports an increase in altruism, cooperation, and aversion to risk and a decrease in trust during the first several weeks of lockdown (Shachat et al.,
2021). Another study shows an increase in collectivist expressions such as personal pronouns on a Chinese online social network following the onset of the pandemic (Han et al.,
2021). A third study, from South Korea, reports a change towards stronger collectivism, but, somewhat paradoxically, not weaker individualism (Na et al.,
2021).
Our literature review reveals several remaining gaps, which we intend to fill. First, most surveys were not longitudinal and did not attempt to solve the problem of comparability between the samples from before and during the pandemic, which casts concerns that the differences might be due to sampling bias, instead of actual change. In addition, most studies use convenience samples of, for example, students or self-selected volunteers, thus revealing little about the processes in the larger population. None of them tracks the longer term dynamics of change from the onset of the pandemic to its unfolding in later years. Daniel et al. (
2021) show that, in their last survey in November–December 2020, previously documented value changes have begun to reverse, thus suggesting that other studies may also document only short-lived changes in volatile attitudes, instead of deeper and lasting value changes.
Moreover, almost all evidence comes from samples that are typically overrepresented in the literature, viz. WEIRD (Western, educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic) (Henrich et al.,
2010). Numerous research indicates different psychological processes taking place in East Asia and the West (Akaliyski,
2023; Markus & Kitayama,
1991; Nisbett,
2004). The pandemic’s effects in the Japanese unique cultural environment to date remain unknown.
1.2 The COVID-19 Pandemic in Japan
To better understand the Japanese context, we provide some details on how the pandemic unfolded. Although Japan was among the first countries to register COVID-19 infections, the pandemic remained relatively well-contained in terms of the number of cases and mortality rate. In contrast to other countries where strict lockdowns were enforced, the Japanese government relied more heavily on voluntary cooperation by individuals to avoid unnecessary social contacts, practice good personal hygiene, and wear face masks (Li et al.,
2022). At the time of the second survey used in the present analyses (mid-May 2020), there were only approximately 16,400 people tested positive and 744 reported deaths (Japan Broadcasting Corporation,
2021). Nevertheless, the economic and social costs were high: GDP dropped by approximately 5% in 2020 (IMF,
2020), social life was suddenly and severely disrupted, and daily necessities such as masks and toilet paper were in short supply, similar to other countries more severely affected by the pandemic. School closures forced parents to take care of children at home, putting pressure excessively on working mothers.
Crucially for the current study, the pandemic increased psychological distress, associated with pandemic-related factors such as medical issues, difficulties in daily life, unavailability of groceries, and adjustment to new modes of work (Nagasu et al.,
2021). Severe psychological distress increased by 2 percentage points to reach 11.5% of the Japanese population between the end of February, when Japan registered the first infection cases, and early April, when it experienced the first serious wave of infections, enforced an entry ban and prepared to declare a state of emergency in several prefectures (Kikuchi et al.,
2020). In September 2020, the national prevalence of severe psychological distress was 10% and was associated with a mix of pandemic-related and socio-demographic factors such as fear of COVID-19, younger age, lower income, providing caregiving to family members and experience of domestic violence (Yoshioka et al.,
2021).
Noteworthy, not all parts of the country were affected with the same severity. At the time of our first survey, several prefectures (Japan's 47 administrative units) were in a state of emergency due to substantially higher infection rates (see supplementary Appendix E) and the risk of overburdening the medical facilities. These were large urban areas such as Greater Tokyo (Kanto region), Greater Osaka (Kansai region), as well as Hokkaido.
1.3 Theoretical Framework
Emancipative and secular values are derived from Inglehart’s revised modernization theory and Welzel and Inglehart’s human development theory (Inglehart,
2008; Welzel et al.,
2003). These theoretical approaches stem from the classic modernization theory which depicts development as an isomorphic process: countries at the same stage of modernization share similar features in terms of institutions, economic structure, and societal culture. The classic modernization theory can be traced back to early sociologists such as Karl Marx and Émile Durkheim who were concerned with the way industrialization and modernization increase societal complexity and profoundly transform societies (Eisenstadt,
2000). Later works in this theoretical tradition include Talcott Parsons’ (
1964) concept of “evolutionary universals in society”, and Bell’s postindustrial society theory (Bell,
1976).
Embedded within this broad intellectual tradition, Inglehart and Welzel’s revised modernization theory, which we draw upon, specifically focuses on the value changes taking place as societies develop socio-economically and increase their sense of existential security. The theory is revised in the sense that it analyzes contemporary societal changes but it also considers the importance of historical legacies. Their theory of value change is based on the understanding of human nature originating in European Enlightenment philosophy, according to which
“Virtually everyone aspires to freedom and autonomy” (Inglehart,
2008, p. 131).
However, these aspirations are supposedly restricted by the necessity to satisfy more pressing needs such as physical security and survival (Inglehart,
2008; see also psychological theory by Maslow,
1954). With socio-economic development, a larger share of the population satisfies these basic needs and both emancipative and secular values are expected to increase as individuals break free from traditional norms (Welzel,
2013). This pattern of cultural change is argued to occur across the globe, including in non-Western societies, such as Japan (Welzel,
2012). Instead of directly linking development to emancipative and secular values, Inglehart (
2008, p. 132) argues that such values reflect
“the general sense of security prevailing in one’s society”, a proposition referred to as
scarcity hypothesis. Economic prosperity is a major such source of existential security, but existential
insecurity may come from various sources such violent conflict, environmental disaster, or indeed a deadly pandemic.
Although the revised modernization theory is primarily occupied with studying societal-level value change, some of their insights are also applied to the study of processes within societies. For example, the so-called Cultural Backlash theory (Norris & Inglehart,
2019) suggests that individuals feeling left behind from the process of globalization are inclined to revert to traditional values. The current study is primarily interested in how the pandemic has affected Japanese society’s values as a whole, but we also explore the mechanisms of this change by shifting attention to smaller units of analysis, i.e., prefectures and individuals. If the mechanism of value change is indeed through one’s subjective experience of existential (in)security, as the revised modernization theory claims, we would expect changes at each of these three levels of analysis—national, prefecture, and individual—as long as there is variation in the way these units of analysis experienced the pandemic.
This study also relates to prominent theoretical debates on cultural change. According to Inglehart (
2008), values do not adjust immediately to changing circumstances; they reflect the conditions in the pre-adult years and hardly change afterwards (
socialization hypothesis). This perspective is supported also by the so-called
settled disposition model, which examines cultural change through the lenses of intergenerational replacement and limited adaptation of individuals in their post-formative years (Kiley & Vaisey,
2020; Vaisey & Kiley,
2021). However, Tormos (
2019) challenges this model by finding substantial value changes within the lifetime of individuals in Western societies, thus lending credibility to the alternative
active updating model. Most studies we discussed in our literature review also consider the possibility of active adaptation of values to a rapidly changing environment (e.g., Daniel et al,
2021; Molteni et. al,
2021), although others state that this depends on the type of values or attitudes, some of which more stable than others (Reeskens et al,
2021).
In sum, the literature largely agrees that values reflect the level of existential insecurity (scarcity hypothesis), but continues debating whether change occurs mainly between generations (socialization hypothesis and settled disposition model) or also within individuals’ adult life (active updating model).
1.4 Hypotheses
Based on the revised modernization theory’s scarcity hypothesis, which emphasizes existential security as a source of value change, and the active updating model, which allows this change to happen fast, we expect that the immediate experience of the pandemic has caused values to shift towards a lower emphasis on freedom, equality, and secularity. Moreover, we expect that the stronger the psychological distress (as a proxy for existential insecurity) caused by the pandemic, the more values will reverse to traditionalism, meaning weaker support for individual and sexual liberties and gender equality, and stronger religiosity, nationalism, and family values. Based on this proposition, we formulate three more specific hypotheses as follows.
Since the pandemic is global in nature and virtually the whole Japanese population was aware of the entailed threat, regardless of their personal circumstances, we expect that:
As noted earlier, some Japanese regions were more seriously affected than others. Particularly, at the time of our first survey during the pandemic, a state of emergency was announced in eight prefectures where the situation was most critical and the number of infections varied widely between prefectures (supplementary Appendix E). Therefore, we expect that:
Furthermore, regardless of the area of residence, individuals experienced the pandemic differently. Even if equally affected in terms of objective measures such as losing a job or having to work from home, not everyone necessarily experienced it subjectively in the same way, and we expect values to change as a reaction to personally perceived distress. Therefore, our third hypothesis is the following: