Skip to main content
Top

2017 | OriginalPaper | Chapter

Verantwortung, Freiheit und Wille

Author : Julius Schälike

Published in: Handbuch Verantwortung

Publisher: Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden

Activate our intelligent search to find suitable subject content or patents.

search-config
loading …

Zusammenfassung

Der Artikel behandelt die kausale Rolle des Willens im Blick auf moralische Verantwortung. Untersucht wird, welche Bedeutung in diesem Kontext Handlungsfreiheit und Willensfreiheit haben, wie sie sich zueinander und zu alternativen Möglichkeiten verhalten und ob sie mit dem Determinismus vereinbar sind.

Dont have a licence yet? Then find out more about our products and how to get one now:

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

  • über 102.000 Bücher
  • über 537 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

  • Automobil + Motoren
  • Bauwesen + Immobilien
  • Business IT + Informatik
  • Elektrotechnik + Elektronik
  • Energie + Nachhaltigkeit
  • Finance + Banking
  • Management + Führung
  • Marketing + Vertrieb
  • Maschinenbau + Werkstoffe
  • Versicherung + Risiko

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

  • über 67.000 Bücher
  • über 340 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

  • Bauwesen + Immobilien
  • Business IT + Informatik
  • Finance + Banking
  • Management + Führung
  • Marketing + Vertrieb
  • Versicherung + Risiko




Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Literature
go back to reference Austin, John Leslie. 1970. Ifs and cans. In Philosophical papers, Hrsg. James Opie Urmson und Goffrey James Warnock, 205–232. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Austin, John Leslie. 1970. Ifs and cans. In Philosophical papers, Hrsg. James Opie Urmson und Goffrey James Warnock, 205–232. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
go back to reference Bieri, Peter. 2001. Das Handwerk der Freiheit. Über die Entdeckung des eigenen Willens. München: Hanser. Bieri, Peter. 2001. Das Handwerk der Freiheit. Über die Entdeckung des eigenen Willens. München: Hanser.
go back to reference Broad, Charlie Dunbar. 1952. Ethics and the history of philosophy. Selected essays. London: Routledge. Broad, Charlie Dunbar. 1952. Ethics and the history of philosophy. Selected essays. London: Routledge.
go back to reference Chisholm, Roderick Milton. 1964. Human freedom and the self. The Lindley lecture. Kansas: Department of Philosophy, University of Kansas. Chisholm, Roderick Milton. 1964. Human freedom and the self. The Lindley lecture. Kansas: Department of Philosophy, University of Kansas.
go back to reference Clarke, Randolph. 2003. Libertarian accounts of free will. Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press.CrossRef Clarke, Randolph. 2003. Libertarian accounts of free will. Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press.CrossRef
go back to reference Dennett, Daniel Clement. 1984. Elbow room. The varieties of free will worth wanting. Oxford: MIT. Dennett, Daniel Clement. 1984. Elbow room. The varieties of free will worth wanting. Oxford: MIT.
go back to reference Fischer, John Martin. 1994. The metaphysics of free will. An essay on control. Oxford: Blackwell. Fischer, John Martin. 1994. The metaphysics of free will. An essay on control. Oxford: Blackwell.
go back to reference Fischer, John Martin. 1999. Recent work on moral responsibility. Ethics 1:93–139.CrossRef Fischer, John Martin. 1999. Recent work on moral responsibility. Ethics 1:93–139.CrossRef
go back to reference Fischer, John Martin, und Mark Ravizza. 1998. Responsibility and control. A theory of moral responsibility. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRef Fischer, John Martin, und Mark Ravizza. 1998. Responsibility and control. A theory of moral responsibility. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRef
go back to reference Frankfurt, Harry Gordon. 1969. Alternate possibilities and moral responsibility. The Journal of Philosophy 23(1969): 829–839.CrossRef Frankfurt, Harry Gordon. 1969. Alternate possibilities and moral responsibility. The Journal of Philosophy 23(1969): 829–839.CrossRef
go back to reference Frankfurt, Harry Gordon. 1971. Freedom of the will and the concept of a person. The Journal of Philosophy 1:5–20.CrossRef Frankfurt, Harry Gordon. 1971. Freedom of the will and the concept of a person. The Journal of Philosophy 1:5–20.CrossRef
go back to reference Frankfurt, Harry Gordon. 1999. The faintest passion. In Necessity, volition, and love, 95–108. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Frankfurt, Harry Gordon. 1999. The faintest passion. In Necessity, volition, and love, 95–108. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
go back to reference Guckes, Barbara. 2003. Ist Freiheit eine Illusion? Eine metaphysische Untersuchung. Paderborn: Mentis. Guckes, Barbara. 2003. Ist Freiheit eine Illusion? Eine metaphysische Untersuchung. Paderborn: Mentis.
go back to reference Hunt, David P. 2000. Moral responsibility and unavoidable action. Philosophical Studies 2: 195–227.CrossRef Hunt, David P. 2000. Moral responsibility and unavoidable action. Philosophical Studies 2: 195–227.CrossRef
go back to reference Kane, Robert. 1996. The significance of free will. Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press. Kane, Robert. 1996. The significance of free will. Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press.
go back to reference Keil, Geert. 2013. Willensfreiheit, 2. Erweiterte Aufl. Berlin/New York: de Gruyter. Keil, Geert. 2013. Willensfreiheit, 2. Erweiterte Aufl. Berlin/New York: de Gruyter.
go back to reference Lewis, David. 1997. Finkish dispositions. The Philosophical Quarterly 187(1997): 143–158.CrossRef Lewis, David. 1997. Finkish dispositions. The Philosophical Quarterly 187(1997): 143–158.CrossRef
go back to reference Locke, John. 1995. In An essay concerning human understanding, Hrsg. Peter Harold Nidditch. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Locke, John. 1995. In An essay concerning human understanding, Hrsg. Peter Harold Nidditch. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
go back to reference Mele, Alfred Remen. 1995. Autonomous agents. From self-control to autonomy. Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press. Mele, Alfred Remen. 1995. Autonomous agents. From self-control to autonomy. Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press.
go back to reference Mele, Alfred Remen, und David Robb. 1998. Rescuing Frankfurt-style cases. Philosophical Review 1(1998): 97–112.CrossRef Mele, Alfred Remen, und David Robb. 1998. Rescuing Frankfurt-style cases. Philosophical Review 1(1998): 97–112.CrossRef
go back to reference Moore, George Edward. 1912. Ethics. The Home University Library of modern knowledge Nr. 54. London: Williams and Norgate. Moore, George Edward. 1912. Ethics. The Home University Library of modern knowledge Nr. 54. London: Williams and Norgate.
go back to reference O’Connor, Timothy. 2000. Persons and causes. The metaphysics of free will. Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press. O’Connor, Timothy. 2000. Persons and causes. The metaphysics of free will. Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press.
go back to reference Pereboom, Derk. 2001. Living without free will. Cambridge studies in philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRef Pereboom, Derk. 2001. Living without free will. Cambridge studies in philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRef
go back to reference Schälike, Julius. 2010. Spielräume und Spuren des Willens. Eine Theorie der Freiheit und der moralischen Verantwortung. Paderborn: Mentis. Schälike, Julius. 2010. Spielräume und Spuren des Willens. Eine Theorie der Freiheit und der moralischen Verantwortung. Paderborn: Mentis.
go back to reference Seebaß, Gottfried. 2006. Handlung und Freiheit. Philosophische Aufsätze. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck. Seebaß, Gottfried. 2006. Handlung und Freiheit. Philosophische Aufsätze. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck.
go back to reference Strawson, Peter Frederick. 1962. Freedom and resentment. Proceedings of the British Academy 48(1962): 187–211. Strawson, Peter Frederick. 1962. Freedom and resentment. Proceedings of the British Academy 48(1962): 187–211.
go back to reference Strawson, Galen. 1986. Freedom and belief. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Strawson, Galen. 1986. Freedom and belief. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
go back to reference Strawson, Galen. 1994. The impossibility of moral responsibility. Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition 1(2): 5–24.CrossRef Strawson, Galen. 1994. The impossibility of moral responsibility. Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition 1(2): 5–24.CrossRef
go back to reference Tugendhat, Ernst. 1987. Der Begriff der Willensfreiheit. In Konrad Cramer, Hans Friedrich Fulda, Rolf-Peter Horstmann und Ulrich Pothast, Hrsg. Theorie der Subjektivität, 373–393. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. Tugendhat, Ernst. 1987. Der Begriff der Willensfreiheit. In Konrad Cramer, Hans Friedrich Fulda, Rolf-Peter Horstmann und Ulrich Pothast, Hrsg. Theorie der Subjektivität, 373–393. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.
go back to reference van Inwagen, Peter. 1983. An essay on free will. Oxford: Oxford University Press. van Inwagen, Peter. 1983. An essay on free will. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
go back to reference van Inwagen, Peter. 2002. Free will remains a mystery. In The Oxford handbook of free will, Hrsg. Robert Kane, 158–177. Oxford: Oxford University Press. van Inwagen, Peter. 2002. Free will remains a mystery. In The Oxford handbook of free will, Hrsg. Robert Kane, 158–177. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
go back to reference Vihvelin, Kadri. 2004. Free will demystified. A dispositional account. Philosophical Topics 1(2): 427–450.CrossRef Vihvelin, Kadri. 2004. Free will demystified. A dispositional account. Philosophical Topics 1(2): 427–450.CrossRef
go back to reference Vihvelin, Kadri. 2013. Causes, laws, and free will: Why determinism doesn’t matter. Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press.CrossRef Vihvelin, Kadri. 2013. Causes, laws, and free will: Why determinism doesn’t matter. Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press.CrossRef
go back to reference Wallace, Richard Jay. 1994/1998. Responsibility and the moral sentiments. Cambridge, MA/London: Harvard University Press. Wallace, Richard Jay. 1994/1998. Responsibility and the moral sentiments. Cambridge, MA/London: Harvard University Press.
go back to reference Watson, Gary. 1975. Free agency. The Journal of Philosophy 8(1975): 205–220.CrossRef Watson, Gary. 1975. Free agency. The Journal of Philosophy 8(1975): 205–220.CrossRef
go back to reference Watson, Gary. 1987. Free action and free will. In Agency and answerability. Selected essays, Hrsg. Gary Watson, 161–196. Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press. Watson, Gary. 1987. Free action and free will. In Agency and answerability. Selected essays, Hrsg. Gary Watson, 161–196. Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press.
go back to reference Watson, Gary. 2003. Introduction. In Free will. Oxford readings in philosophy, Hrsg. Gary Watson, 2. Aufl., 1–25. Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press. Watson, Gary. 2003. Introduction. In Free will. Oxford readings in philosophy, Hrsg. Gary Watson, 2. Aufl., 1–25. Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press.
go back to reference Wolf, Susan. 1990. Freedom within reason. Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press. Wolf, Susan. 1990. Freedom within reason. Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press.
Metadata
Title
Verantwortung, Freiheit und Wille
Author
Julius Schälike
Copyright Year
2017
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-06110-4_13

Premium Partner