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Published in:
Introduction to the Series “Game Equilibrium Models” Read chapter Read first chapter

1991 | OriginalPaper | Chapter

Wage Bargaining as a Strategic Game

Author : Hans Haller

Published in: Game Equilibrium Models III

Publisher: Springer Berlin Heidelberg

Included in: Professional Book Archive

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Wage bargaining between “capital” and “labor” is analyzed as an alternating offer game, where disagreement leads to surplus sharing according to the contractual status quo or to a strike.

previous chapter Original or Fake — A Bargaining Game with Incomplete Information
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Metadata
Title
Wage Bargaining as a Strategic Game
Author
Hans Haller
Copyright Year
1991
Publisher
Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Book
Game Equilibrium Models III

Print ISBN: 978-3-642-08110-1

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-662-07367-4

Copyright Year: 1991

DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-07367-4_11

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