Skip to main content
Disciplines
Automotive Business IT + Informatics Construction + Real Estate Electrical Engineering + Electronics Energy + Sustainability Insurance + Risk Finance + Banking Management + Leadership Marketing + Sales Mechanical Engineering + Materials
Events
DE
EN
Books
Journals
Topic Page
Marketing
Start single access now
Access for companies
EXTENDED SEARCH
Log in
Top
Constitutional Political Economy
Published in: Constitutional Political Economy 3/2008

01-09-2008 | Original Paper

Why incoherent preferences do not justify paternalism

Author: Robert Sugden

Published in: Constitutional Political Economy | Issue 3/2008

Log in

Activate our intelligent search to find suitable subject content or patents.

search-config
loading …

Abstract

A variety of recent arguments emerging from behavioural economics claim to undermine the credibility, and even the conceptual coherence, of the economist’s traditional rejection of paternalism. Indeed, some suggest that the incoherent nature of preferences inevitably implies a form of paternalism, since some basis for officiating between expressed preferences is required, and some preferences will be over-ridden in favour of others. This paper reviews and contests these arguments. It argues that markets operate according to a normatively defensible and non-paternalistic principle of mutual advantage, and that this principle does not require preferences to be coherent.
previous article Constitutional interests in the face of innovations: how much do we need to know about risk preferences?
next article Regulation and revenue

Dont have a licence yet? Then find out more about our products and how to get one now:

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

  • über 102.000 Bücher
  • über 537 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

  • Automobil + Motoren
  • Bauwesen + Immobilien
  • Business IT + Informatik
  • Elektrotechnik + Elektronik
  • Energie + Nachhaltigkeit
  • Finance + Banking
  • Management + Führung
  • Marketing + Vertrieb
  • Maschinenbau + Werkstoffe
  • Versicherung + Risiko

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

inform now

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

  • über 67.000 Bücher
  • über 340 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

  • Bauwesen + Immobilien
  • Business IT + Informatik
  • Finance + Banking
  • Management + Führung
  • Marketing + Vertrieb
  • Versicherung + Risiko




Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

inform now
Literature
Bernheim, D., & Rangel, A. (2007). Toward choice-theoretic foundations for behavioral welfare economics. Discussion paper, Resources for the Future, Washington, D.C.
Buchanan, J. M. (1968). The demand and supply of public goods. Chicago: Rand McNally.
Camerer, C., Issacharoff, S., Loewenstein, G., O’Donaghue, T., & Rabin, M. (2003). Regulation for conservatives: Behavioral economics and the case for ‘asymmetric paternalism’. University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 151, 1211–1254.CrossRef
Hayek, F. A. (1945). The use of knowledge in society. American Economic Review, 35, 519–530. Page references to the reprinted version in Friedrich Hayek. (1948). Individualism and economic order. Chicago University Press.
Nagel, T. (1986). The view from nowhere. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Savage, L. J. (1954). The foundations of statistics. New York: Wiley.
Schelling, T. (1978). Egonomics, or the art of self-management. American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 74, 1–11.
Scitovsky, T. (1976). The joyless economy: The psychology of human satisfaction. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Sugden, R. (2004). The opportunity criterion: Consumer sovereignty without the assumption of coherent preferences. American Economic Review, 94(September 2004), 1014–1033.CrossRef
Sugden, R. (2007). The value of opportunities over time when preferences are unstable. Social Choice and Welfare, 29, 665–682.CrossRef
Sunstein, C., & Thaler, R. (2003a). Libertarian paternalism. American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 93(2), 175–179.
Sunstein, C., & Thaler, R. (2003b). Libertarian paternalism is not an oxymoron. University of Chicago Law Review, 70, 1159–1202.CrossRef
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1991). Loss aversion in riskless choice: A reference-dependent model. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106, 1039–1061.CrossRef
Wicksell, K. (1896/1958). A new principle of just taxation. In R. Musgrave & A. Peacock (Eds.), Classics in the theory of public finance. London: Macmillan. Original publication in German.
Metadata
Title
Why incoherent preferences do not justify paternalism
Author
Robert Sugden
Publication date
01-09-2008
Publisher
Springer US
Published in
Constitutional Political Economy / Issue 3/2008
Print ISSN: 1043-4062
Electronic ISSN: 1572-9966
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10602-008-9043-7

Other articles of this Issue 3/2008

Constitutional Political Economy 3/2008 Go to the issue

Original Paper

Social Market Economy: origins, meanings and interpretations

Original Paper

Deliberation, learning, and institutional change: the evolution of institutions in judicial settings

Original Paper

Constitutional interests in the face of innovations: how much do we need to know about risk preferences?

Editorial

Editorial introduction

Original Paper

Same players, different game: how better rules make better politics

Original Paper

Regulation and revenue

Premium Partner

    Image Credits