Skip to main content
Disciplines
Automotive Business IT + Informatics Construction + Real Estate Electrical Engineering + Electronics Energy + Sustainability Insurance + Risk Finance + Banking Management + Leadership Marketing + Sales Mechanical Engineering + Materials
Events
DE
EN
Books
Journals
Topic Page
Marketing
Start single access now
Access for companies
EXTENDED SEARCH
Log in
Top
Published in:
Introduction: The Politics of Changing Hearts and Minds Read chapter Read first chapter

2018 | OriginalPaper | Chapter

5. After Fordism: The Politics of Industrial Conflict Patterns in the Global South

Author : Fulya Apaydin

Published in: Technology, Institutions and Labor

Publisher: Springer International Publishing

Log in

Activate our intelligent search to find suitable subject content or patents.

search-config
loading …

Abstract

This chapter situates the findings from Turkey and Argentina in a broader sample and presents findings on how federalism has a prolonging impact on labor mobilization in developing countries. Based on panel data analysis, it shows that federal systems are more conducive to prolonged labor mobilization in contrast to their unitary counterparts. The discussion documents empirical support for this argument based on a sample of 37 middle and lower-middle income countries (including Turkey and Argentina in the sample) for the period between 1990 and 2012. These findings offer important clues to further unpack how the organization of government influences labor responses to industrial upgrading in Turkey and Argentina.

Dont have a licence yet? Then find out more about our products and how to get one now:

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

  • über 102.000 Bücher
  • über 537 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

  • Automobil + Motoren
  • Bauwesen + Immobilien
  • Business IT + Informatik
  • Elektrotechnik + Elektronik
  • Energie + Nachhaltigkeit
  • Finance + Banking
  • Management + Führung
  • Marketing + Vertrieb
  • Maschinenbau + Werkstoffe
  • Versicherung + Risiko

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

inform now

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

  • über 67.000 Bücher
  • über 340 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

  • Bauwesen + Immobilien
  • Business IT + Informatik
  • Finance + Banking
  • Management + Führung
  • Marketing + Vertrieb
  • Versicherung + Risiko




Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

inform now

Springer Professional "Technik"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Technik" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

  • über 67.000 Bücher
  • über 390 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

  • Automobil + Motoren
  • Bauwesen + Immobilien
  • Business IT + Informatik
  • Elektrotechnik + Elektronik
  • Energie + Nachhaltigkeit
  • Maschinenbau + Werkstoffe




 

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

inform now
previous chapter A Persistent Refusal: Córdoba’s Contentious Workers in Federal Argentina
next chapter Conclusion: Technological Change, Institutions and Labor in Developing Contexts
Appendix
Available only for authorised users
Footnotes
1
According to existing approaches, strike duration is classified as long if the median duration is longer than 20 days. Strikes with an average duration of five days or less are classified as short (Baah and Reilly 2009, 461–462).
 
2
A revolutionary episode is “a period of rupture within an established political order that involves a mass siege of an established government by its own population with the aims of displacing the incumbent regime and substantially altering the political or social order, irrespective of whether oppositions actually succeed in displacing incumbent regimes” (Beissinger 2014, 10–11).
 
3
These countries are Argentina, Belarus, Brazil, Botswana, Chile, Costa Rica, Algeria, Ecuador, Egypt, Guyana, Hungary, Indonesia, India, Jamaica, Sri Lanka, Morocco, Mexico, Mauritius, Malaysia, Namibia, Nigeria, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Papua New Guinea, Romania, El Salvador, Suriname, Swaziland, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, South Africa, Zambia.
 
4
For an overview of how POLCON V is calculated, see the codebook available for download at http://​www-management.​wharton.​upenn.​edu/​henisz/​.
 
5
Unemployment rate is an ILO estimate and refers to the percentage of unemployed who are available and actively seeking for employment within the total labor force. The data is taken from the World Bank and covers the period between 1990 and 2012.
 
6
Inflation is measured as the yearly percentage increase in the consumer price index (calculated as the annual percentage change in the cost to the average consumer of acquiring a basket of goods and services in a given year). The data is taken from the World Bank and covers the period between 1990 and 2012.
 
7
Crisis Dummy: This is coded as 1 if the country-year is experiencing a major economic crisis and 0 if otherwise. It is calculated based on information included in the Reinhardt and Rogoff (2011) database on economic crises and World Bank/IMF indicators on banking crises (Laeven and Valencia 2012).
 
8
Share of FDI as a percentage of GDP is calculated by dividing total flow of FDI investments in USD by GDP in USD for a given country/year. The data is taken from the World Bank and covers the period between 1990 and 2012.
 
9
GDP/Capita is calculated by dividing gross domestic product by the mid-year population, and is in current USD. The data is taken from the World Bank and covers the period between 1990 and 2012.
 
10
Political System: Countries are coded as presidential (0) or parliamentary (1) for a given year based on information in Beck et al.’s (2001) database on political institutions at the World Bank.
 
11
Electoral System: The data on whether electoral rules in a given country/year follow majoritarian and/or proportional representation are taken from Beck et al.’s (2001) database on political institutions at the World Bank.
 
12
ILO Conventions: In order to control for institutional framework that regulates labor rights, I coded the number of relevant ILO conventions that have been ratified and in force in a given year for each country based on the information available on ILO NATLEX database. A greater commitment to protecting labor rights may prolong worker protests and increase the average number of workdays lost per worker.
 
13
Latin America Dummy: I also control for regional effects by including a Latin America dummy in the sample, given the longer history of contentious labor mobilization and concentration of federal systems in South America.
 
14
On the optimum number of counts when modeling using negative binomial regression models, see Hilbe 2007.
 
15
For a discussion of multiple varieties of populist legacies in Mexico in comparative perspective, see Gibson 1997; Knight 1998; Murillo 2001; Snyder 2001. For an overview of populism and populist legacies in Brazil see French 1989; Perruci and Sanderson 1989; Panizza 2000.
 
16
In terms of training, technicians, engineers, and managers in auto-parts producers were the ones who were exposed to new techniques, and the blue-collars were not embedded in a network of coordinated vocational education schemes (Carrillo 2004, 150).
 
Literature
Acemoglu, D., and J. Robinson. 2013. Why Nations Fail? New York: Crown Business.
Ahlquist, J., and A. Prakash. 2008. The Influence of Foreign Direct Investment on Contracting Confidence in Developing Countries. Regulation & Governance 2 (3): 316–339.CrossRef
Aleman, J. 2009. The Politics of Tripartite Cooperation in New Democracies: A Multi-level Analysis. International Political Science Review 30 (2): 141–162.CrossRef
Anner, Mark. 2011. Solidarity Transformed: Labor Responses to Globalization and Crisis in Latin America. Ithaca: ILR Press, an Imprint of Cornell University Press.
Apaydin, F. 2017. Uneasy Discipline: Training Workers After Fordism in Turkey and Argentina. Studies in Political Economy 98 (2): 151–174.CrossRef
Armbruster, R. 1998. Cross-Border Labor Organizing in Garment and Automobile Industries: The Phillips van Heusen and Ford Cuautitlan Cases. Journal of World Systems Research 4: 20–51.CrossRef
Ashenfelter, O., and G. Johnson. 1969. Bargaining Theory, Trade Unions and Industrial Strike Activity. The American Economic Review 59 (1): 35–49.
Atzeni, M. 2009. Searching for Injustice and Finding Solidarity? A Contribution to the Mobilisation Theory Debate. Industrial Relations Journal 40: 5–16.CrossRef
Baah, A.Y., and B. Reilly. 2009. An Empirical Analysis of Strike Durations in Ghana from 1980 to 2004. Labour 23 (3): 459–479.CrossRef
Bafumi, J., and A. Gelman. 2006. Fitting Multi-Level Models When Predictors and Group Effects Correlate. Paper Presented at the 2006 Midwest Political Science Association Meeting, Chicago.
Beck, N., and J. Katz. 1996. Nuisance vs. Substance: Specifying and Estimating Time-Series Cross Section Models. Political Analysis 6 (1): 1–36.CrossRef
———. 2011. Modeling Dynamics in Time Series Cross-Section Political Economy Data. Annual Review of Political Science 14: 331–352.CrossRef
Beck, T., G. Clarke, A. Groff, P. Keefer, and P. Walsh. 2001. New Tools in Comparative Political Economy: The Database of Political Institutions. World Bank Economic Review 15 (1): 165–176.CrossRef
Beissinger, M.R. 2014. The Changing Face of Revolution, 1900–2012.Paper Presented at the Comparative Workshop on Mass Protests, London School of Economics, June 13–14.
Bell, A., and K. Jones. 2015. Explaining Fixed Effects: Random Effects Modeling of Times Series Cross Sectional and Panel Data. Political Science Research and Methods 3 (1): 133–153.CrossRef
Bellin, E. 2013. Drivers of Democracy: Lessons from Tunisia. Brandeis University Crown Center for Middle East Studies, Middle East Brief, No. 75.
Berman, S. 2007. Lessons from Europe. Journal of Democracy 18 (January): 28–41.CrossRef
Berman, C. 2015. The Durability of Revolutionary Protest Coalitions? Bridging Revolutionary Mobilization and Post-Revolutionary Politics. Paper presented at Middle East Studies Association Meeting, Boulder.
Biglaiser, G., and J. Staats. 2010. Do Political Institutions Affect Foreign Direct Investment? A Survey of U.S. Corporations in Latin America. Political Research Quarterly 63 (3): 508–522.CrossRef
Birchfield, V., and M. Crepaz. 1998. The Impact of Constitutional Structures and Collective and Competitive Veto Points on Income Inequality in Industrialized Democracies. European Journal of Political Research 34: 175–200.
Blanton, R., and S. Blanton. 2012. Labor Rights and Foreign Direct Investment: Is There a Race to the Bottom? International Interactions 38 (3): 267–294.CrossRef
Breusch, T., M.B. Ward, H.T.M. Nguyen, and T. Kompas. 2011. FEVD: Just IV or Just Mistaken? Political Analysis 19 (2): 165–169.CrossRef
Brym, R., L.B. Bauer, and M. McIvor. 2013. Is Industrial Unrest Reviving in Canada? Strike Duration in the Early Twenty-First Century. Canadian Review of Sociology/Revue canadienne de sociologie 50 (2): 227–238.CrossRef
Cai, H., and D. Treisman. 2004. State Corroding Federalism. Journal of Public Economics 88: 819–843.CrossRef
Campolieti, M., R. Hebdon, and D. Hyatt. 2005. Strike Incidence and Strike Duration: Some New Evidence from Ontario. ILR Review 58 (4): 610–630.CrossRef
Card, D. 1990. Strikes and Wages: A Test of an Asymmetric Information Model. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 105 (3): 625–659.CrossRef
Carrillo, J. 1995. Flexible Production in the Auto Sector: Industrial Reorganization at Ford Mexico. World Development 23 (1): 87–101.CrossRef
———. 2004. Transnational Strategies and Regional Development: The Case of GM and Delphi in Mexico. Industry & Innovation 11: 127–153.CrossRef
Cebolla-Boado, H., and L. Ortiz. 2014. Extra-Representational Types of Political Participation and Models of Trade Unionism: ACross-Country Comparison. Socio-Economic Review 12: 747–778.CrossRef
Cohen, Youssef. 1989. The Manipulation of Consent: The State and Working-Class Consciousness in Brazil. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
Collier, R.B. 1999. Paths Toward Democracy. New York: Cambridge University Press.CrossRef
Collier, R.B., and D. Collier. 1991. Shaping the Political Arena. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.
Connel, C., and S. Cohn. 1995. Learning from Other People’s Actions: Environmental Variations and Diffusion in French Coal Mining Strikes. American Journal of Sociology 101: 366–403.CrossRef
Cook, Maria Lorena. 1998. Toward Flexible Industrial Relations? Neo-Liberalism, Democracy, and Labor Reform in Latin America. Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society 37 (3): 311–336.
Crepaz, M.M.L. 1996. Consensus vs. Majoritarian Democracy: Political Institutions and Their Impact on Macroeconomic Performance and Industrial Disputes. Comparative Political Studies 29: 4–26.CrossRef
Crowley, S. 2004. Explaining Labor Weakness in Post-Communist Europe: Historical Legacies and Comparative Perspective. East European Politics & Societies 18 (3): 394–429.CrossRef
Dinardo, J., and K.F. Hallock. 2002. When Unions “Mattered”: The Impact of Strikes on Financial Markets, 1925–1937. ILR Review 55 (2): 219–233.
Dribbusch, H. 2007. Industrial Action in a Low-Strike Country: Strikes in Germany 1968–2005. In Strikes Around the World, ed. S. van der Velden, H. Dribbusch, D. Lyddon, and K. Vandaele, 1968–2005. Amsterdam: Aksant Publishers.
Etchemendy, S. 2011. Models of Economic Liberalization: Business, Workers, and Compensation in Latin America, Spain and Portugal. New York: Cambridge University Press.CrossRef
Falleti, T.G. 2010. Decentralization and Subnational Politics in Latin America. New York: Cambridge University Press.CrossRef
Flynn, F.J. 2000. No News Is Good News: The Relationship Between Media Attention and Strike Duration. Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society 39 (1): 139–160.
French, J.D. 1989. Industrial Workers and the Birth of the Populist Republic in Brazil, 1945–1946. Latin American Perspectives 16: 5–27.CrossRef
Gehlbach, S., and E. Malesky. 2010. The Contribution of Veto-players to Economic Reform. Journal of Politics 72 (4): 957–975.CrossRef
Gibson, E.L. 1997. The Populist Road to Market Reform: Policy and Electoral Coalitions in Mexico and Argentina. World Politics 49: 339–370.CrossRef
Greene, W. 2011. Fixed Effects Vector Decomposition: A Magical Solution to the Problem of Time-Invariant Variables in Fixed Effects Models? Political Analysis 19 (2): 135–146.CrossRef
Gunderson, M., and A. Melino. 1990. The Effects of Public Policy on Strike Duration. Journal of Labor Economics 8 (3): 295–316.CrossRef
Hall, P.A., and D. Soskice. 2001. Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRef
Harrison, A., and M. Stewart. 1989. Cyclical Fluctuations in Strike Durations. American Economic Review 79 (4): 827–841.
Hausman, J., B.H. Hall, and Z. Griliches. 1984. Econometric Models for Count Data with an Application to the Patents-R&D Relationship. Econometrica 52 (4): 909–938.CrossRef
Henisz, W. 2000. The Institutional Environment for Economic Growth. Economics and Politics 12 (1): 1–31.CrossRef
Hilbe, J.M. 2007. Negative Binomial Regression. New York: Cambridge University Press.CrossRef
Hurst, W. 2004. Understanding Contentious Collective Action by Chinese Laid-Off Workers: The Importance of Regional Political Economy. Studies in Comparative International Development 39: 94–120.CrossRef
Jensen, N. 2003. Democratic Governance and Multinational Corporations: Political Regimes and Inflows of Foreign Direct Investment. International Organization 57 (3): 587–616.CrossRef
Jensen, N., and F. McGillivray. 2005. Federal Institutions and Multinational Investors: Federalism, Government Credibility, and Foreign Direct Investment. International Interactions 31 (4): 303–325.CrossRef
Kennan, J. 1980. Pareto Optimality and the Economics of Strike Duration. Journal of Labor Research 1 (1): 77–94.CrossRef
Kennan, J., and R. Wilson. 1989. Strategic Bargaining Models and Interpretation of Strike Data. Journal of Applied Econometrics 4 (S1): S87–S130.CrossRef
Kim, W., and J. Gandhi. 2010. Coopting Workers Under Dictatorship. The Journal of Politics 72 (03): 646–658.CrossRef
Knight, A. 1998. Populism and Neopopulism in Latin America, Especially Mexico. Journal of Latin American Studies 30: 223–248.CrossRef
Kopinak, K., ed. 2005. The Social Costs of Industrial Growth in Northern Mexico. Boulder: Lynne Reiner.
Krueger, A., and A. Mas. 2004. Strikes, Scabs, and Tread Separations: Labor Strife and the Production of Defective Bridgestone/Firestone Tires. Journal of Political Economy 112: 253–289.CrossRef
Kus, B., and I. Ozel. 2010. United We Restrain, Divided We Rule: Neoliberal Reforms and Labor Unions in Turkey and Mexico.European Journal of Turkish Studies. Social Sciences on Contemporary Turkey 11,October 21. http://​ejts.​revues.​org/​4291.
Laeven, L., and F. Valencia. 2012. Systemic Banking Crises: A New Database. IMF Working Paper WP/08/224.
Lee, Y. 2003. Lean Production Systems, Labor Unions, and Greenfield Locations of the Korean New Auto Assembly Plants and Their Suppliers. Economic Geography 79 (3): 321–339.CrossRef
Lee, H., G. Biglaiser, and J. Staats. 2014. The Effects of Political Risk on Different Entry Modes of Foreign Direct Investment. International Interactions 40 (5): 683–710.CrossRef
Li, Q., and A. Resnick. 2003. Reversal of Fortunes: Democracy, Property Rights and Foreign Direct Investment Inflows in Developing Countries. International Organization 57 (1): 175–211.CrossRef
Martin, S.B. 2006. Global Sourcing Dynamics, Inequality, and ‘Decent Work’ in Auto Parts: Mexico Through the Brazilian Looking Glass, Working Paper Series, No. 2006–08, Graduate Program in International Affairs. NYC: The New School.
McHugh, R. 1991. Productivity Effects of Strikes in Struck and Nonstruck Industries. Industrial and Labor Relations Review 44 (4): 722–732.CrossRef
Murillo, M.V.. 2001. Labor Unions, Partisan Coalitions, and Market Reforms in Latin America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRef
Murillo, M.V., and L. Ronconi. 2004. Teachers’ Strikes in Argentina: Partisan Alignments and Public-Sector Labor Relations. Studies in Comparative International Development 39 (1): 77–98.CrossRef
Nichols, T., and N. Sugur. 2004. Global Management, Local Labor: Turkish Workers and Modern Industry. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.CrossRef
Ondrich, J.I., and J.F. Schnell. 1993. Strike Duration and the Degree of Disagreement. Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society 32 (3): 412–431.
Ortiz, L. 1999. Unions’ Responses to Teamwork: Differences at National and Workplace Levels. European Journal of Industrial Relations 5 (1): 49–69.CrossRef
Owoye, O. 1992. Incomes Policies, Inflation and Strikes in Nigeria, 1950–1985: An Empirical Investigation. Applied Economics 24 (6): 587–592.CrossRef
Panizza, F. 2000. Neopopulism and Its Limits in Collor’s Brazil. Bulletin of Latin American Research. 19: 177–192.CrossRef
Papke, L.E., and J.M. Wooldridge. 2008. Panel Data Methods for Fractional Response Variables with an Application to Test Pass Rates. Journal of Econometrics 145 (1–2): 121–133.CrossRef
Perruci, G., and S.E. Sanderson. 1989. Presidential Succession, Economic Crisis and Populist Resurgence in Brazil. Studies in Comparative International Development 24: 30–50.CrossRef
Perulli, P. 1993. Towards a Regionalization of Industrial Relations. International Journal of Urban And Regional Research 17 (1): 98–113.CrossRef
Pinto, P.M., and S.M. Pinto. 2008. The Politics of Investment Partisanship and the Sectoral Allocation of Foreign Direct Investment. Economics and Politics 20: 216–254.CrossRef
Plümper, T., and V.E. Troeger. 2007. Efficient Estimation of Time-Invariant and Rarely Changing Variables in Finite Sample Panel Analyses with Unit Fixed Effects. Political Analysis 15 (2): 124–139.CrossRef
———. 2011. Fixed-Effects Vector Decomposition: Properties, Reliability, and Instruments. Political Analysis 19 (2): 147–164.CrossRef
Przeworski, A., and J. Sprague. 1986. Paper Stones: A History of Electoral Socialism. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Reder, M.W., and G.R. Neumann. 1980. Conflict and Contract: The Case of Strikes. Journal of Political Economy 88 (5): 867–886.CrossRef
Reinhardt, C., and K. Rogoff. 2011. From Financial Crash to Debt Crisis. American Economic Review 101 (5): 1676–1706.CrossRef
Robertson, G.B. 2007. Strikes and Labor Organization in Hybrid Regimes. American Political Science Review 101 (4): 781–798.CrossRef
Robertson, G.B., and E. Teitelbaum. 2011. Foreign Direct Investment, Regime Type, and Labor Protest in Developing Countries. American Journal of Political Science 55 (3): 665–677.CrossRef
Rohlfing, I. 2008. What You See and What You Get: Pitfalls and Principles of Nested Analysis in Comparative Research. Comparative Political Studies 41 (11): 1492–1514.CrossRef
Rubin, B.A., and B.T. Smith. 1991. Strike Durations in the United States. Sociological Quarterly 32 (1): 85–101.CrossRef
Rueschemeyer, D., E. Huber Stephens, and J. Stephens. 1992. Capitalist Development and Democracy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Rutherford, T.D., and M.S. Gertler. 2002. Labour in ‘Lean’ Times: Geography, Scale and the National Trajectories of Workplace Change. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 27: 195–212.CrossRef
Schneider, B.R. 2013. Hierarchical Capitalism in Latin America: Business, Labor, and the Challenges of Equitable Development. New York: Cambridge University Press.CrossRef
Schneider, B.R., and S. Karcher. 2010. Complementarities and Continuities in the Political Economy of Labor Markets in Latin America. Socio-Economic Review 8 (4): 623–651.CrossRef
Schrank, A. 2011. Co-producing Workplace Transformation: The Dominican Republic in Comparative Perspective. Socio-Economic Review 9: 419–445.CrossRef
Shorter, E., and C. Tilly. 1974. Strikes in France. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Snyder, R. 2001. Politics After Neoliberalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRef
Streeck, W., and K. Thelen. 2005. Beyond Continuity: Institutional Change in Advanced Political Economies. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Teitelbaum, E. 2007. In the Grip of a Green Giant: How the Rural Sector Tamed Organized Labor in India. Comparative Political Studies 40 (6): 638–664.CrossRef
Thelen, K. 2012. Varieties of Capitalism: Trajectories of Liberalization and the New Politics of Social Solidarity. Annual Review of Political Science. 15: 137–159.CrossRef
Tilly, C. 2004. Contention and Democracy in Europe, 1650–2000. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Tsebelis, G. 1995. Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism and Multipartyism. British Journal of Political Science 25 (03): 289–325.CrossRef
———. 2002. Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work. Princeton: Princeton University Press.CrossRef
Tuman, J.P. 1994. Organized Labor Under Military Rule: The Nigerian Labor Movement, 1985–1992. Studies in Comparative International Development 29 (3): 26–44.CrossRef
Vernby, K. 2007. Strikes Are More Common in Countries with Majoritarian Electoral Systems. Public Choice 132: 65–84.CrossRef
Ward, P.M., and V.I. Rodriguez. 1999. New-Federalism, Intra-Governmental Relations and Co-governance in Mexico. Journal of Latin American Studies 31: 673–710.CrossRef
Wibbels, E. 2000. Federalism and the Politics of Macroeconomic Policy and Performance. American Journal of Political Science 44 (4): 687–702.CrossRef
Winship, C., and R.D. Mare. 1992. Models for Sample Selection Bias. Annual Review of Sociology 18: 327–350.CrossRef
Wooldridge, J. 2010. Correlated Random Effects Models with Unbalanced Panels, Working Paper.
———. 2013. Correlated Random Effects Models with Unbalanced Panels. Lecture Notes. IZA Summer School in Labor Economics. May 13–19.
Metadata
Title
After Fordism: The Politics of Industrial Conflict Patterns in the Global South
Author
Fulya Apaydin
Copyright Year
2018
Book
Technology, Institutions and Labor

Print ISBN: 978-3-319-77103-8

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-319-77104-5

Copyright Year: 2018

DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-77104-5_5