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Published in: Social Choice and Welfare 4/2016

24-10-2016 | Original Paper

Aggregation of Paretian preferences for independent individual uncertainties

Authors: Antoine Billot, Vassili Vergopoulos

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare | Issue 4/2016

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Abstract

This paper considers situations of social choice where the resolution of the uncertainty affecting each individual is independent of the resolution of the uncertainty affecting all other individuals. Individuals as well as society itself have Subjective Expected Utility preferences, and society conforms to a set of Pareto-like requirements. In this case, the social utility function must be a convex combination of individual utility functions, thereby extending the logic of Harsanyi’s (JPE 63:309–321, 1955) seminal aggregation theorem. Moreover, the social probabilistic beliefs must be the independent product of individual probabilistic beliefs.

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Metadata
Title
Aggregation of Paretian preferences for independent individual uncertainties
Authors
Antoine Billot
Vassili Vergopoulos
Publication date
24-10-2016
Publisher
Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Published in
Social Choice and Welfare / Issue 4/2016
Print ISSN: 0176-1714
Electronic ISSN: 1432-217X
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-016-1001-0

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