Brexit

The following chapter is about coherence between European countries during centuries and first proposals how to unify whole Europe in one big project as a cultural, political, and historical community. These tendencies were strong during First World War, when Europe had to face military conflict. This chapter therefore returns to Jean Monnet, the father of Europe, who was active in integration process together with Robert Schuman, who adopted the integration proposal, today known as the Schuman declaration. Second part of submitted chapter is dedicated to Coudenhove-Kalergi’s pan-European movement, which organized first Pan European Congress with the aim to unify all European nations together to avoid war conflict. In this part, we can find also the attitude of UK towards the European organization and its reluctance to be one part of supranational organization.

This chapter describes the initial effort of Briand, who presented his proposal for the creation of the United States of Europe through memorandum. This organization had to be based on peace like the League of Nation and had to create European market, which meant criticism from the UK as a protagonist of liberalization of trade and the main reason this attempt failed. Second part of the chapter is about Anglo-French Union, which had as a goal the protection of France against defeating by Germany and it was the only possibility how to keep France in the war. This proposal of Anglo-French Union had many similarities with the previous proposal of Briand.

This chapter analyzes Churchill’s regard on European integration mainly through his political speeches, especially one in The Hague Congress and one in the University of Zurich. First part provides historical context, political ideas of Churchill, his attitude to European integration and the process of integration itself. The chapter also shows us the original plans for creating of European Union, Churchill’s support of League of Nations, and his scepticism about integration. Through his participation in the process of European integration, we can see obvious British influence and we can understand the traditional British approach to the EU.

This chapter traces the role of the United Kingdom (UK) in the European integration process, from the founding of the European Communities to its eventual membership in 1973. It considers several key factors leading to the UK’s exclusion from the European Communities in the 1950s and 1960s, including economic factors related to its coal and steel industries, its relationship with the Commonwealth, as well as diplomatic concerns within the realm of ‘high politics.’ The chapter also considers the UK’s role in creating alternative integration arrangements, namely the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and the European Economic Area (EEA). The chapter provides a historical foundation to understanding the UK’s relationship to the European Community as an ‘awkward partner,’ shedding light on its eventual exit from the EU four decades after joining.

While de Gaulle has been comprehensively studied on the EU level, this is—to a large degree—not the case for his influence on the British involvement in the European integration process. As this influence will cease to apply once the UK is no longer a member of the Union, the Brexit will cause essential challenges for the British, especially for the rural areas and for the EU-British future relations.

This research points out the main contributions of de Gaulle to the European integration process and their impact on the European-British relations from an historical perspective that can help both areas to improve their future relations as probably international partners.

The United Kingdom has always been a special case in the European integration project. The British exceptionalism manifested in various forms and ways over the history. June 23rd 2016 delivered another culmination point in the story of the stubborn European’s relations with its continental partners. The so-called Brexit referendum, which brought about victory for the supporters of the UK leaving the European Union, marks an important milestone in these relations. It has never been an easy marriage and many times threatened by the divorce. Instead of becoming ever closer, the European Union becomes ever loser and the UK is ever closer to leaving. Brexit is not only vital for the British, it is potentially destructive for the EU from the core. The UK changes its status inside from an integration-tolerant country (not a very ambitious one anyway), to integration unfriendly country, which endangers the very fundaments of the integration process. It produces externalities to be consumed by other Member States and non-members as well.

Accordingly, the main purpose of this chapter is to shed light on the positive discrimination of the UK inside the EU and its entertaining the status of a preferential membership. The referendum is seen as a game in which London tried to win even more beneficial conditions inside the EU and now, after the referendum, will try to build a status of a preferential non-membership. From this perspective, this process can be seen as an exercise in searching the limits of differentiated integration. The problem has always been there, the Brexit referendum made it crystal clear. It may serve as a wakeup call for the necessary reforms of the EU.

Based on the analysis of the existing literature about the differentiated integration, this contribution sees the June 2016 Brexit referendum as a structural problem for the EU. Following the logic of the integration evolution from one crisis to another one, it is possible to interpret the Brexit decision as an opportunity for the EU’s reforms. The reformist impulse of Brexit may enhance the European integration in two various possible ways. First, it may help to reform the EU into a more differentiated system that will allow accommodate countries willing to integrate at various speeds and extends. Secondly, once “getting rid” of the major troublemaker and marauder, that is Britain as a country opposing the further integration, the EU may accelerate now towards the “ever closer union”.

The negotiations for the British accession were successful in the early 1970s only after de Gaulle left his position as President of France. The French blockade to the British accession was removed only after the British Premier had reassured his French colleagues about the British commitment to Europe and secured concessions on specific French concerns. The enlargement of the UK, Ireland, Denmark, and Norway had become a difficult challenge for all the parties involved. The financial contribution to the European Budget was also a major issue during the negotiations. The official reason for the referendum of 1975 was that the UK citizens needed to express their opinion and decide about such an important issue linked with their individual and collective freedoms. Margaret Thatcher’s vision about European Communities covered such diverse areas as Europe and the EU; the Cold war, the USA, and the EU; the European Communities belonging to all its members; the Community not being an end in itself; national power against supranational constructions; weak bureaucracy; policies of the EU; European Market; European defence and relations between Europe and the USA.

The UK rebate in the early days was largely devised and negotiated by Margaret Thatcher, yet its acceptance by the EC and the challenges that it posed to the union throughout the coming decades—or so this chapter will argue—have indirectly contributed to political reforms and new treaties that have in fact accelerated European political integration. Similarly, Thatcher’s support for what she thought and advocated should remain a merely economic single market has had unforeseen political ramifications, mainly advancing elements of European federalism that she vehemently opposed. This article maps the role of economic integration in advancing political integration and traces both of their successes back to some at first seemingly unsuccessful visions to formulate a more integrated Europe.

Prime Ministers Tony Blair, Gordon Brown, and David Cameron all were supportive towards the European integration, but as they attempted to combine it with the powerful images of British otherness and island nation, British foreign and security policy doctrines have paid tribute to the British exceptionalism and the special relationship policy with the United States. The exceptionalist neo-conservative doctrine of the George W. Bush administration of the United States produced a gap between Atlanticist and community-oriented EU nations. In sum it forced the British government to develop more Atlanticist stand in its foreign and security policy and gave rise to the integration dilemma with the Franco-German alliance. Following the Global War on Terrorism, national security issues became more prevalent and pushed cooperative politics of the 1990s into the background. Later, the Euro-zone crisis and the migration crisis weakened the European unity and nationalist movements became stronger. In Britain, euroscepticist UKIP has met success in the European Parliament elections. As follows, the Conservative Party adopted more eurocritic positions on the European Union and David Cameron decided to lead the British nation to the secessionist referendum—Brexit.

While being part of the European Union, the United Kingdom is under a looser obligation in relation to economic and fiscal policy coordination, it has retained control over its monetary policy and it is not part of the euro area. It has also retained responsibility for the supervision of the United Kingdom banks.

The idea of the European Union as a lasting association of European democracies warranting a stable yet constantly evolving institutional framework was formulated in the Schuman Declaration and has remained the political corner-stone of the Union. Although the EU has enlarged through successive waves, this has also generated new tensions between its members, including among those willing to move towards closer integration and those determined to preserve the intactness of national sovereignty in core areas. Here, a multi-speed Europe, or at least a double-speed Europe, has the potential to advance further integration among only interested members. Also, institutionalizing a multispeed Europe would in fact simply recognize the existing working system in the EU.

This chapter focuses on legal aspects, respectively the constitutional assumptions of the departure of the Member State from the European Union. It offers an analysis of past debates and theoretical models that preceded the official introduction of the exit clause in today’s Article 50 TEU. It also addresses the question of the nature of the withdrawal and casts doubt on the nature of the “right to withdraw.” Article 50 is working with two alternatives on how to leave the Union—a consensual exit and unilateral withdrawal. Although the authors accept the theoretical extreme possibility of unilateral exit without agreement, they also point to the factual necessity of the agreement (that is necessary from the point of view of legal certainty, economic stability, political accountability, and international status of the outgoing state), which in fact makes the consensual exit the only possible way of terminating membership and therefore casts doubts on the existence of right to withdraw.

Brexit is announced to take place and it appears, that the most probable scenario for the UK is the “Norway-Option”, i.e., to (again) become a member of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and join the EEA. The chapter identifies the major claims of the leave-campaign to analyse, whether by doing so, the Brexit proponents will achieve what they campaigned for. Furthermore, the paper explains the functioning of the EEA, exploring the potential changes for the UK, the EU, and the EEA/EFTA.

While private law as such has not yet been comprehensively harmonized on the EU level, this is—to a large degree—already the case for private international law. As these harmonized rules will cease to apply once the UK is not member of the Union any more, the Brexit will cause essential challenges when jurisdiction and applicable substantical law have to be determined for disputes between British and EU parties.

Consumer insolvency and consumer debt discharge are at present one of those fields where this harmonization has an especially significant impact, as the UK serves—based on the provisions of the European Insolvency Regulation—as a popular consumer insolvency tourism destination. This chapter analyzes the impact of Brexit on the UK’s and EU private international law on UK and European parties and exemplifies consequences and feasible options of handling these shortcomings by the phenomenon of UK-based consumer insolvency tourism.

BREXIT has created a new situation in the field on free movement of workers within the EU. It was the change introduced by Lisbon Treaty that gives the EU Member States the right to exit from the European Union. On 29 March 2017, Theresa May send a letter to President of the European Council Donald Dusk a letter with a wish to use the Art. 50 of TEU to exit from the EU, and from European Atomic Energy Community. Europe and Britain are now facing a new situation that has never happened before and therefore any decision of the further collaboration and co-existence gives precedents to potential new “dissociates“ from the EU. The current situation affects also the EU citizens living in Great Britain and British citizens living in other EU countries, as the principles of free movement of persons will no longer automatically apply to either of those groups of people and new agreements need to be imposed.

This chapter analyses the application of Art. 50 of TEU and its impact on free movement rights of the EU citizens who are workers, from both perspectives the British citizens abroad and the other EU citizens living in the United Kingdom. What would be the options for further cooperation after Brexit to maintain the rights of workers? It elaborates on five different post Brexit solutions that can be introduced to resolve the questions of workers’ rights that were created by EU legislation.

The scientific research problem was formulated: how to explain controversial UK position regarding the membership in the EU? The aim of the study is to prognosticate the future of economic international relations between the EU and the UK in Brexit case. The tasks of the study are to systemise the dynamics of the EU and the United Kingdom economic relations in the perspective of history; to predict possible EU-UK relations scenarios after the Brexit; as well as to investigate the opinion of experts regarding the research object. The research methods used: literature analysis, focusing on primary sources but also including secondary sources; survey of experts using structured questionnaires with closed questions. The design of the study is formed in chronological order. It includes a historical analysis of the UK’s road to the European Communities, as well as the dynamics of the UK’s membership in the EU. The study also includes analysis of secondary sources to identify the most conceivable Brexit strategy, and then analysing the possible impacts of the most probable scenarios, which are based on that strategy. The key results address a few propositions. To begin with, although British were among the conceptualists of European integration, it took almost 20 years when the UK finally became a member of the developing EU. Those two decades had negative economic implications for British economy as it missed out opportunities provided by the common market. The eventual UK membership boosted most of the numbers concerning the British economy, however, disagreements with the EU still existed, particularly through issues of EU Budget contributions and immigration. Moreover, the “hard” Brexit is understood as the most probable Brexit strategy. In this case, the future EU-UK relation scenarios range is very limited. It includes a presumable Free Trade Agreement or bilateral trade based on World Trade Organization rules. We conclude that neither of those two solutions would ensure the UK trade with EU without tariffs or quantitative restrictions.