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20-09-2023 | Theoretical / Philosophical Paper

Destiny, Love and Rational Faith in Husserl’s Post World War I Ethics

Author: Saulius Geniusas

Published in: Human Studies | Issue 3/2023

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Abstract

The fundamental goal of this paper is to clarify the importance of Husserl’s reflections on destiny (Schicksal) in the context of his post-WWI ethics. In the first section, I sketch Husserl’s reflections on war in his private correspondence. In the second section, I show that, in his post-WWI research manuscripts on ethics, Husserl conceptualized various forms of meaningless suffering under the heading of destiny. One of the main questions of Husserl’s post-WWI ethics can be formulated as follows: in the dark horizon of senselessness, how is an ethical life possible? In the remaining sections, I show that Husserl’s reflections on this question led him to deformalize his earlier ethics and motivated him to ground his ethics of reason in an ethics of love. In the third and fourth sections, I sketch Husserl’s two fundamental answers to this question, the first of which concerns his phenomenology of love, while the second one – his phenomenological metaphysics in general, and his phenomenological teleology, in particular. While for Husserl, these answers are complementary, after clarifying Husserl’s view on the conflicts of values, I conclude with some reflections on the importance of not overlooking that these answers are analytically distinct.

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In recent literature, this established distinction has been brought into question and solid reasons have been provided to revise it (see especially Rinofner-Kreidl, 2022). I will return to this below. For the moment, let me remark that a more careful approach would distinguish between three stages, which one could conveniently divide into the early stage (Halle: 1887-1901), middle stage (Göttingen: 1901-1916), and late stage (Freiburg: 1916-1938). An even more detailed classification would distinguish between four stages. First, still at the end of the 1890s, while he was at the University of Halle, Husserl regularly gave courses on ethics, only fragments of which remain. Second, already in Göttingen, between 1908 and 1914, Husserl gave three lecture courses on ethics and wrote several manuscripts on ethics. Third, already in Freiburg, between 1920 and 1925, he wrote three articles and numerous manuscripts on ethics. Fourth, already after his retirement, between 1930 and 1935, he wrote yet further manuscripts on ethics and its relation to metaphysics. See in this regard Melle, 2002, Cavallaro & Heffernan, 2019, and Cavallaro & Heffernan, 2022.

In the lectures that he had delivered to the wounded German soldiers in 1917, Husserl refers to the following texts by Fichte: The Vocation of Man (1800), The Characteristics of the Present Age (1806), The Way to the Blessed Life (1806), Speeches to the German Nation (1808), On the Essence of the Scholar (1805), and Lectures on the Vocation of the Scholar (1811) (see Hua XXV, 114). As John Drummond notes, these texts constitute Husserl’s Fichtean inheritance (see Drummond, 2018: 143). For critical analyses, see especially Hart, 1992, 1995, 2006b; Drummond, 2018. For the link that binds phenomenology to German idealism, see, among others, Schnell, 2018.

According to Husserl, intentional acts are of three different kinds: acts of thinking, of willing, and of feeling. Analogously, reason also is of three different kinds: theoretical, practical, and axiological. See, among others, Melle, 2007 and Drummond, 2018 for accounts that bind Husserl’s ethics to his phenomenology of reason.

So as to indicate how prevalent this theme is in the framework of Husserl’s writings on ethics, let me allude the reader to those manuscripts in Hua XXVII and Hua XLII in which Husserl addresses “the problem of destiny”: see Hua XXVII: 98, 111, 115, 123, 126, 165, 173, 188, 193, 216, 239, 242, and Hua XLII: 91, 101, 120, 130, 195, 206, 213, 232, 234, 235, 238, 254, 261, 262, 285, 286, 304, 322, 323, 324, 325, 329, 293, 398, 400, 401, 402, 403, 404, 407, 408, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 417, 420, 421, 422, 434, 435, 439, 447, 448, 449, 486, 503, 506, 507, 508, 516, 520, 521, 522, 526, 527.

See in this regard Husserl’s letter to his brother, Heinrich Husserl, written on August 8, 1914 (Husserl 1994: 288f.).

Wherever Husserl’s original texts in German are quoted, the translations are my own.

As I will show in the next section, the war was one of the existential factors that led Husserl to reflections on destiny (Schicksal). My contention is that the phenomenological elucidation of a possible ethical response to the problems of destiny called for philosophical revisions in Husserl’s pre-WWI ethics. As my further analysis will show, there were also other reasons, and they were philosophical (see especially Geiger’s objection).

I can only agree with John Drummond when he describes the transformations in Husserl’s phenomenology that occurred around the years of WWI in the following terms: “Undoubtedly, there are both personal and cultural reasons for the shift…. There are, however, also fundamental philosophical reasons behind this shift” Drummond, 2018: 136).

While on occasion Husserl qualified “cultural renewal” (Erneuerung) as a utopian goal, i.e., as a goal that the pessimists and “Realpolitiker” will see as “chimerical,” he at the same time maintained that it is precisely an “ethical battle” for renewal that raises the person to the level of a true human being (see Hua XXVII: 4). As Husserl further notes, the belief in cultural renewal that is grounded in rational justification, can move mountains not only in phantasy but also in reality (see Hua XXVII: 5).

Such religious concepts as sin feature not only in Husserl’s private correspondence but also in his research manuscripts in one of which Husserl remarks that evil is the one who sins against himself by closing his eyes (see A V 21, 117). That is, sin is, for Husserl, the agent’s complicity and self-deception. For Husserl, absolute ethical wakefulness, i.e., the full capacity to avoid all complicity and self-deception, can only be a regulative idea. A genuinely human life is not a life that unfolds above complicity and self-deception, but a life that takes the form of a struggle against complicity and self-deception: we are human insofar as we do not give up. “I can only become good, not be good; but I can only become good in wanting to become good” (E III 1, 4).

One should not overlook that, as Thomas Nenon notes in a recent contribution, the development of the concept of genuine humanity relies on Husserl’s earlier work that he was engaged in still before the war, and especially his manuscripts on personhood, which were later incorporated into Ideas II.

See in this regard Ferrarello, 2016: 215-221. As my further remarks will make clear, for Husserl, belief in God was first and foremost a postulate of practical reason, which has its healing power in this life. In contrast to Kant, however, for Husserl, such a practical postulate goes beyond intellectual insight. See in this regard Nenon, 2015.

As Husserl remarks in his lectures on ethics in 1914, “it is a limitation if we take ethics as morality. […] Moral action, however we define it, is a limited sphere of action in general; thus, if we want to gain the most comprehensive concept, ethics must be assigned to reason in praxis in general” (Hua XXVIII: 33).

Such ethical heroism need not necessarily be grounded in one’s dedication to ideal values, such as those that we come across in arts and sciences. So, it would be wrong to presume that, according to Husserl, only a philosopher can be a true ethical hero. Rather, what is necessary is that ethical heroism be grounded in what Husserl identifies as absolute subjective values. The distinctive characteristic of such values is that they are rooted in love (more on that later). In Husserl’s analyses such absolute values issue from the inner depths of the person, which in effect means that absolute values are deeply personal (see, among others, Heinämaa, 2020: 433). It thereby becomes understandable why Husserl’s prototype for ethical heroism is neither a philosopher, nor a scientist, nor an artist, considered in terms of their dedication to ideal values, but rather a mother considered in terms of her unconditional dedication to the well-being of her child.

In Husserl’s phenomenology, we come across a large variety of different formulations of the categorical imperative (see especially Hua XXVII, Hua XXVIII, Hua XXXVII and Hua XLII). Recently, George Heffernan has suggested that we can understand the development of Husserl’s moral philosophy by following, as a clue, the evolution in Husserl’s understanding of the categorical imperative (see Heffernan, 2022). A detailed analysis of this issue lies beyond the scope of this paper.

As Melle has it, “according to Husserl’s own critique, this ideal of reason [as expressed in the Brentanoian formulation of the categorical imperative— SG] is ultimately too formal, too universalist, too objectivistic, and too calculating; in short, it is too cold and heartless. It fails to see the dimension of the depth of personal being and personal subjectivity” (Melle, 2007: 12).

George Heffernan remarks that there is a mistake in Husserl’s manuscript and the year in question should be 1909 (see Heffernan, 2022: 98).

In a manuscript written in 1914 (see Hua XXVIII: 421-22), Husserl also touches on Geiger’s objection and the “problem of love”. Yet in this framework, he still did not consider this objection to be so powerful as to require him to either abandon or reconceptualize the categorical imperative. Rather, in 1914 he thought that Geiger’s objection required him to draw explicit distinctions between different kinds of absorption, understood as an ethical principle. While one kind demands that one subsume lower values under higher values, another kind is equated with sacrifice. As my following comments will make clear, in his later manuscripts and lectures on ethics, Husserl came to see absorption and sacrifice as two fundamentally different principles.

As Mariano Crespo points out, “Geiger’s critique is of interest for two reasons. On the one hand, it contains a philosophical argument insofar as it highlights the difficulties of a uniform conception of the world of values; on the other hand, it has historical interest in that it caused Husserl to take on new approaches in his late ethics” (Crespo 2021: 370).

This manuscript was already previously published in Husserl Studies 13: 201-235, 1997.

Arguably, the reason for this is that the mother’s love for the child is rooted in what Husserl in other texts identifies as “Mutterinstinkt” (see Mat VIII: 170). Taking this into account, instead of identifying the mother’s love for the child as paradigmatic of ethics, here I conceive of it as being prototypical of ethics in Husserl’s sense of the term.

As Nam-in Lee further points out, in the phenomenological sense, human beings possess more instincts than animals. “Humans possess most of the instincts that animals possess, such as the slumber instinct, the hunger instinct, the sexual instinct, and so on. But in addition, humans have instincts that are inherent only to humans and that animals do not possess. Representative examples are the knowledge instinct, the artistic instinct, the moral instinct, the religious instinct, and so on. One could certainly not propose the idea of instinct-reduction with respect to this concept of instinct” (Nam-in Lee, 2020: 242). Thus to qualify the mother’s love for the child as being rooted in instincts does not mean to reduce the mother to an instinctively operating animal. Quite on the contrary, such a qualification refers to the origins of an ethical drive that is characteristic not only of mothers but of human beings as a whole. Husserl contends that the values of love are rooted in the innermost center of the person. To claim that they emerge from the deepest egoic core is to suggest that human life is characterized by an instinctive drive for personal values (see Ferrarello, 2016: 215).

As Sara Heinämaa maintains in a recent contribution, for Husserl, vocations are grounded in the values of love, which “differ from other values in three related respects: First, they are given to us in emotions that emerge and drive their strength from our own egoic cores; second, despite their essentially egoic character, personal values oblige us unconditionally; and third, these values are incomparable and do not allow for subsumption under any value hierarchies, subjective or objective” (Heinämaa, 2023: 464). In other words, vocations “are established on the bases of axiological acts of valuing and conative acts of willing or, more concretely, on personal emotions, decisions and commitments” (Heinämaa, 2023: 477).

While arguing that Husserl’s concept of love is fragmented, for it is presented in highly diverse contexts of analysis (in Hua XXVII, Hua XLII and Mat IX), and while contrasting Husserl’s values of love with objective values, Sara Heinämaa has helpfully singled out five essential features of Husserl’s values of love: They “(1) are rooted in egoic depths and define who we are as persons, (2) differ from objective values in being absolute and non-comparative, (3) ground vocational lives as organizing principles, (4) are endlessly self-disclosing and self-intensifying, and (5) establish transitive relations of care between human beings” (Heinämaa, 2020: 431).

In his account of the formation of types and habits, Husserl maintained that the experiences we undergo in highly diverse ways shape our subsequent experiences. For instance, after we see an object of a certain type for the first time, we come to recognize similar objects in the future as objects that belong to the same type. As Dieter Lohmar has argued especially forcefully, experiential types are of a highly diverse kind — some much more, while others much less general. If the filial love that characterizes the child’s relation to her parents is to replicate itself in other relations as well, it must do so due to the sedimented nature of experiences: consciousness must be able to “carry over” a loving relation from one “object” to another. This does not mean, however, that we love anyone and everyone the same way. Nonetheless, just as there is a sense in which we learn how to see, so also, there is a sense in which we learn how to love. In virtue of affective sedimentation, we can come to recognize others as worthy of a loving disposition, and therefore, as deserving moral respect.

Husserl touches on this issue in his lecture course, Introduction to Philosophy (1919-1920), where he explicitly remarks that his concept of love calls for further differentiation, for one cannot love everything and anything the same way. One cannot love all children the way one loves one’s own, and the same goes for one’s friends, one’s parents, or one’s country (see Mat IX: 146).

Yet love can also be deeply unjust and dividing. There is nothing surprising about the suggestion that human beings are prone to live through the first “crisis of love” with the birth of their siblings. Already at this early level, we are guided not only by instinctual love, but by the command of a new “ought”: we learn that we must also love our siblings as well. In the same way, we learn this lesson later, when we encounter other fellow human beings who are not members of our own family. Husserl’s ethical writings suggest that the whole logic of ethical and social development replicates this structure at highly complicated levels of socialization: I can and I must overcome the suspicion and distrust of the outsiders, whether they come from another house, or another street, or another village, or another city, or another country, or another continent.

This standing in relation to each other can take different forms. Mariano Crespo has convincingly shown that Husserl’s concept of Einfühlung can be understood in two significantly different ways. “On the one hand, one can allude to ‘mere’ empathy, in the sense of empty, intuitively unfulfilled empathy, to an ‘ihn als Anderen verstehend, aber objektiv ihn haben’ and, on the other, a ‘mitleben, miterfahren, mitdenken, sich mitfreuen, in seinem Sein aufgehen und somit eventuell in seinem Lebensstreben streben” (Crespo, 2018: 242). We are faced here with a difference between mere empathy and sympathy.

Husserl’s explicit recognition of a “dual” life that members of a community of love continue to lead provides us with a much-needed resource to address the important problem that Mariano Crespo formulates in the following terms: “I think that Husserl should have explained a little better the sense in which the individualities that enter into play in personal love are preserved as themselves despite the Deckung of the aspirations that take place in it. If in personal love it is the other who lives in me and I who live in the other, to what extent is my individuality not “absorbed” in the personality of a higher order that is the Liebesgemeinschaft with the beloved?” (Crespo, 2018: 244) Husserl’s concept of Liebesgemeinschaft is incompatible with complete absorption, which would mark the suppression of a double life, both individual and social.

These two terms – Zufriedenheit and Glückseligkeit – feature already in Kant’s moral writings (Kant, 1999: 234f.). In the present context, it is not possible to offer a comparative analysis of how Husserl and Kant have employed these concepts.

This is, as Drummond insightfully remarks, Husserl’s idealized consequentialism, which he inherited from Brentano (see Drummond, 2018: 140), and which he subsequently abandoned in his post-WWI ethics (see Drummond, 2018: 142).

As Sonja Rinofner-Kreidl has clearly demonstrated in a recent contribution, Husserl had spoken of the absolute ought not only in the framework of his ethics of love but also in the context of his pre-WWI ethics (Rinofner-Kreidl, 2022: 255f.). Drawing on this research, one could further distinguish between three accounts of the absolute ought in Husserl’s ethics: (a) the purely formal and objectively oriented absolute ought that is clarified under the heading of the law of absorption; (b) the material and subjectively oriented absolute ought, accounted for in the ethics of love; (c) the social and “metaphysically” oriented absolute ought that obtains its meaning in the communal framework of phenomenological teleology.

For a further reiteration of this position, see Melle, 2007: 3.

Why is a specific value a value, asks Husserl in one of his manuscripts? He offers the following answer: “Not because I can believe that values that I create are preserved forever or are value-means for enabling higher values in infinitum and that the world is a museum of values to be created through my actions and the actions of my fellow human beings or an infinite sequence of ever higher values…. Only if I have this belief and set myself the corresponding goal of collaborating in the infinite development will my value have the character of a means; but even then it is not merely a means, but a value in itself…” (Hua XLII: 310). Love is what makes a value valuable in itself, while rational faith, which grounds the teleological framework, allows us to think of values as subject to the law of deadening. May the world be hell, I can still perform my duty (see Hua XLII: 310-311), yet not only if I commit myself to rational faith, but also if, in a much more modest way, my commitment is rooted in love.

While for Mencius, human nature refers to four original beginnings of benevolence, righteousness, propriety, and wisdom, and while it is made up of two fundamental aspects, viz., form and function, Husserl’s concept of human nature is grounded in his phenomenology of personhood.

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Title: Destiny, Love and Rational Faith in Husserl’s Post World War I Ethics
Author: Saulius Geniusas
Publication date: 20-09-2023
Publisher: Springer Netherlands
Published in: Human Studies / Issue 3/2023
Print ISSN: 0163-8548
Electronic ISSN: 1572-851X
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10746-023-09687-1

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