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Asia Pacific Journal of Management
Published in: Asia Pacific Journal of Management 2/2013

01-06-2013

Government regulation, corruption, and FDI

Authors: Ram Mudambi, Pietro Navarra, Andrew Delios

Published in: Asia Pacific Journal of Management | Issue 2/2013

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Abstract

We analyze favors as utilization of informal modes of exchange within a formal economy, relating their negative aspects to corruption. This exercise enables us to integrate them into a model linking national institutional factors to the magnitude of cross-country FDI flows. In our empirical tests of FDI inflows in 55 countries across four distinct time periods, we find that the level of economic regulation is a major determinant of the extent of FDI inflows as well as the level of corruption, but corruption does not have an independent influence on levels of FDI inflows. Our results have important policy implications regarding the role of the state in influencing the location decisions of MNEs.
previous article Asian favors: More than a cookie cutter approach
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Metadata
Title
Government regulation, corruption, and FDI
Authors
Ram Mudambi
Pietro Navarra
Andrew Delios
Publication date
01-06-2013
Publisher
Springer US
Published in
Asia Pacific Journal of Management / Issue 2/2013
Print ISSN: 0217-4561
Electronic ISSN: 1572-9958
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10490-012-9311-y

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