We know from the literature that historical entrepreneurship (Section
2.1) can have a significant impact on current start-up activity. We also know that there can be long-term effects of historical entrepreneurship even in situations where the original population was more or less completely replaced (Fritsch et al.,
2019b). However, we do not know whether the magnitude of these effects depends on certain historical-regional context factors. For example, we do not know whether persistent effects are weaker when there are more or certain kinds of disruptive shocks as compared to other contexts, for example, when there is an exchange in the original population in some places but not in the others. The diversity of Polish regions in terms of both their levels of economic development and their turbulent histories over the past centuries provides a well-suited framework for investigating the role of historical roots of entrepreneurship. In the following, we first give an overview on recent history of Poland (Section
3.1) and then explain how we use the diversity of regional-historical context for our empirical analysis (Section
3.2).
3.1 A brief overview of recent Polish history
During the Polish partitions between 1772 and 1918, the country was split up and assigned to Austria-Hungary, Prussia (which became part of the German Empire in 1871), and Russia. At that time, economic development of most parts of the country lagged behind many Western European countries (Koryś,
2018, 15–18). Poland regained sovereignty over parts of its former territories at the end of the First World War (WWI) in 1918. At that time, Poland also claimed territories in the east (the
Kresy) that fell to the Soviet Union after WWII, and are currently part of the Ukraine, Belarus, and Lithuania. Figure
A.1 in the Appendix shows the regions of Poland today with their historical affiliations.
Until the end of WWII, some northern regions and the western areas of contemporaneous Poland were part of Germany. In the last months of the war, the German population of this area fled from the approaching Russian Army or was expelled after the war. The incoming population came from other parts of Poland, particularly from the
Kresy. By the year 1950, only 19.6% of the population in the pre-1945 German areas was indigenous, 49.1% was displaced from other regions of post-war Poland, and 29.5% were repatriates and returnees, the vast majority of those (86.1%) from former Polish territories (for further details, see Kosiński,
1963, 47, 61; Curp,
2006; Becker et al.,
2020). Beginning in 1945, the country experienced more than 40 years of state-mandated socialism, then made a rapid transition to a market-based economy in the 1990s, followed by accession to the European Union in 2004.
For our empirical analysis, the economic history of the contemporaneous Polish regions is the most interesting because of the tremendous differences in the levels of population expulsion, entrepreneurship, industrialization, and economic development among them. The regions that were already Polish before WWII were characterized by general economic backwardness, coinciding with a permanent lack of capital and low levels of private investment (Sawicki & Sawicka-Brockie,
1982), factors that severely hampered any attempts at industrialization. The overall workforce’s level of education was considerably lower than in the German regions. The economy was dominated by agriculture with a few industrial centers, such as the steel and textile industries around Lodz and Bialystok, and the oil industry around Boryslaw and in the Carpathians region, which today belongs to Ukraine (Koryś,
2018). At that time the newly established Polish state showed a pronounced tendency to take over private firms, particularly those who had economic problems after the Great Depression of the late 1920s (Macieja,
2001).
Although the previously German part of contemporary Poland was much more economically developed than the rest of the country, it also exhibited significant differences throughout its territories. In the southeastern region of Silesia, self-employment flourished before WWII, fueled by rapid industrialization, high levels of innovation, and a relatively well-developed education system (Geiss,
2013; Kouli,
2014). In contrast, the northern and northeastern regions were considerably less economically and technologically advanced (Kokot,
1959; Pierenkemper,
1979; Tipton,
1974). Their economies were dominated by large-scale farms often owned by nobles, and there were high levels of outmigration.
After WWII, the largest part of the Polish economy was nationalized and became subject to a planned economic system under socialist regime. Self-employment, while not almost illegal as in the Soviet Union (Gerber,
2004, 277), was highly regulated and fraught with challenges due to arbitrary laws and state despotism (Aslund,
1985). In 1990, the re-introduction of a market economy system induced a tremendous blossoming of self-employment, leading to 1.3 million self-employed people by 1995, which accounted for 9% of the workforce (Rutkowski,
1998, 48). The number of self-employed people stabilized at 1.33 million in 2002 (7.95% of total workforce) and reached 1.52 million in 2011 (8.88% of total workforce), a level slightly lower than that of post-socialist East Germany (Fritsch et al.,
2014).
3.2 Setting the scene of potential roots of entrepreneurship in Poland
The considerable diversity of historical political regimes as well as of economic structures and levels of development make Poland an ideal spatial framework for analyzing historical roots of entrepreneurship. Moreover, comparing those parts of the country where population was replaced with other parts where it remained relatively stable allows for investigating the role of different types of historical shocks as well as identifying the relevance of different channels for a transmission of entrepreneurship over time. Persistence in areas that were already part of Poland before 1945 could be driven by an intergenerational transmission of historical entrepreneurship and entrepreneurship-facilitating values as well as by a place-based collective memory of (high-quality) entrepreneurship. However, if we find the persistence of this phenomenon in the former German part, where the largest part of the original population was replaced because of WWII, this can hardly be driven by intergenerational transmission. This persistence can therefore rather be attributed to a place-based collective memory of entrepreneurship that was particularly activated during the period of transformation to a market economy in the 1990s.
Based on our assumptions concerning the role of the regional knowledge base and the quality of entrepreneurship in the prevalence of a place-based collective memory of successful entrepreneurship (see Section
2), we expect that historical levels of high-quality self-employment should contribute to explaining current levels of entrepreneurship. Therefore, we distinguish between knowledge-intensive and non-knowledge intensive historical entrepreneurship in the empirical assessment. Note, that knowledge-intensive entrepreneurship in Poland made only a tiny share of self-employment in the 1920s. In the German part, only 2.5% of all self-employed (excluding agriculture) and in the Polish part only 1% (excluding agriculture) were in knowledge-intensive industries. Hence, if our conjecture about the role of historic self-employment in knowledge-intensive industries is correct, we may find higher levels of current entrepreneurship in the formerly German part of Western Poland (Silesia) that was far more industrialized and economically developed before WWII than the rest of the country (see Section
3.1). In that case, the historical economic structure of that area would have been particularly conducive to the prevalence of a place-based collective memory of successful entrepreneurship. At the same time, given the extremely low shares of knowledge-intensive entrepreneurship historically any effect on the general level of start-up activity is unlikely an effect of persistence of industry structures.
Conversely, however, the replacement of the original German population at the end of WWII has largely impeded the intergenerational transmission of entrepreneurship and entrepreneurship-facilitating values. Hence, we have no firm hypothesis on whether the effect of high-quality historical entrepreneurship on current start-up activity will be weaker or stronger in the former German regions of Western Poland when compared to the rest of the country. Comparing the effect size of the historical legacy of high-quality entrepreneurship across the types of regions will, however, provide insights as to whether persistence of population magnifies the effect of a history of high-quality entrepreneurship on current start-up activity.