How policy instruments are chosen: patterns of decision makers’ choices

For such dynamics in the European Union, see Kazepov (2010); for a comparative perspective see: Moher et al. (2000), Sellers and Lidstrom (2007); for this trend in Latin America see: Tulchin and Garland (2000), Brosio and Jimenez (2012).

Our distinction between specialized and generic instruments echoes the more traditional one between substitutable and non-substitutable policy instruments (Trebilcock and Hartle 1982; Doern and Phidd 1988; Howlett 2004; Landry and Varone 2005). We try to overcome the limits of this literature from two points of view. Firstly, by assuming the relevance of decision makers’ perceptions we underline how the intrinsic attributes of a policy instrument (technical or in terms of political economy) are not objective, but are based on subjective assessment. Secondly, the use of the labels “specialized” and “generic” offers a more precise picture of the real features that decision makers attribute to the instruments. In fact, the dichotomy substitutable/non-substitutable is based on a kind of technical assessment (while a non-substitutable instrument is considered to be the only means by which to achieve a given goal, a substitutable instrument can be replaced by others in order to reach a pursued goal) in terms of effectiveness. Nevertheless, our emphasis on decision makers’ perceptions and the adoption of a second driver (legitimacy), means not only that the choice of instruments cannot involve a technical evaluation alone, but also that a non-substitutable instrument may not be chosen, notwithstanding the perception of its technical superiority, because decision makers that it is not sufficiently well-accepted in a specific context: in this latter case, the choice of a “generic” instrument is considered the best in terms of the balance between effectiveness-seeking and sense-seeking.

Contamination, then, can also derive from a generic acceptance of policy transfer, or as a minor learning process due to internal dynamics, as proposed by the Advocacy Coalition Framework (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993; Jenkins Smith et al. 2014).

Contamination may echo the “conversion” type of institutional change as perceived by Streeck, Thelen and Mahoney, only if, as some scholars have shown, conversion implies at the very least a previous layering process (Boas 2007; Thatcher and Coen 2008; Barnes 2008).

We use the term “hybridization” in the biological sense, that is, in the sense of the interbreeding of individuals from genetically distinct populations. This concept is also used in organizational theory (Minkoff 2002; Hargrave and Van de Ven 2006) and in public administration studies (Christensen and Laegreid 2001). Here, generally speaking, hybridization means the combination of different institutional logics. In this sense, the term is more specific than the generic use of hybrid type seen in policy instrument literature, where it is simply synonymous with “mix” (see: Gunningham and Grabosky 1998; Jordan et al. 2005).

Routinization, in representing the maintenance of the status quo, could be considered dependent on the strength of the contextual factor more than on a choice made due to the freedom of choice, albeit limited, of decision makers. For example, it could assumed that in the presence of a policy community (Heclo and Wildawsky 1981), or a highly politicized issue—which according to the Advocacy Coalition Framework is the basis for the maintenance of the status quo (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993)—decision makers would be forced to opt for routinization. However, the rationale of our framework would suggest that decision makers: