Japan and Asia’s Contested Order

Japan has contributed in major ways to the shaping of regional order, and the role of Prime Minister Abe Shinzo as a leader has been prominent in raising Japan’s regional and global influence—what is called the “Abe Effect.” This leads to a mixed picture of cooperative and competitive regional dynamics in which the forces of security, economics, and identity operate differently yet simultaneously and their interplay fundamentally shapes the regional order in Northeast Asia. This chapter provides a conceptual approach to the “economic-security-identity nexus” that explains Japan’s response to, and efforts to shape the regional order.

This chapter explains the notion of “regional order,” outlining its three dimensions of structure, norm-governed interaction, and quality. It then explores four key ways in which the economic-security-identity nexus works: two “theories,” or idealized models, of this nexus that push in opposite directions—the “virtuous cycle” and the “vicious circle”—and two “practices,” or means by which policymakers and scholars have tended to deal with the economic-security-identity nexus—the former practically by pursing “parallel realities” and the latter analytically using a “balance of effect” framework. Illustrated with examples from Northeast and Southeast Asia, this analysis elucidates the main competing ways in which regional order can be shaped by complex interactions among economics, security, and identity. It also suggests the most significant avenues for further research.

This chapter analyzes three broad pillars of the Asia-Pacific regional order during the Cold War and its immediate aftermath. The first pillar involves the long-term absence of state-to-state military conflicts since 1979. The second is the increase in intra-regional economic interdependence through the combination of expanded foreign direct investment, trade, and regional production networks. The third pillar relates to the expansion of formal government arrangements that institutionalize multilateral cooperation. For nearly four decades, these three have generated a positive spiral of cooperation, however wary, among the major regional powers. The current question is whether that positive interaction can continue, particularly as China’s regional influence increases and the administration of Donald Trump systematically reduces that of the US.

Unlike the historical East Asia, today’s East Asia has a different geopolitical landscape. The United States has maintained a strong military and diplomatic presence in the region. China is surrounded by several major powers or strong middle powers. China has demonstrated both the desire and potential capabilities to play a more active role in regional economic integration. China’s goals concerning regional security remain much more ambivalent. If China’s ultimate goal is to become a more influential co-leader in Asia, its aim might be compatible with those of other countries. If the “Chinese Dream” is to restore a Sino-centered order, it will remain an impossible dream. China and Japan are likely to remain both competitors and partners in the emerging order.

Japan’s strategic landscape is increasingly dominated by great power rivalry between the United States and China. This chapter sheds new light on the historical evolution of that great power contest by exploring the role of intelligence, subversion, and espionage in Sino-US relations. It sheds new light on the question of “great power conflict” between the United States and China by examining the identity struggle in terms of covert efforts, or the perception of such efforts, to undermine one another. Taking a broad historical perspective, covert action is identified as a principal arena of contestation in Sino-US relations since the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949. This approach also draws attention to the positive contribution of “intelligence sharing” in building trust between adversaries, a notable feature of US-China rapprochement in the 1970s. With China’s continued rise, fear of subversion resurfaced as a key element in the relationship, shaping Japan’s choices as Tokyo carves out a role in the Northeast Asian order.

How has North Korea challenged regional order in East Asia, at times driving some actors apart and others together? These trends are explained by and reflected in North Korean national identity, detailed in this chapter’s study of North Korean political history, institutions, and diplomacy. Even under the heavy influence of the Kim regime, North Korean national identity is not monolithic, either in its projection from Pyongyang or in the perception of international observers. The findings of this chapter advise against writing off North Korea as a bad actor doomed to collapse or caricaturizing it as a subject in need of “sunshine” or as a member of an “evil” axis. The open question is whether and how North Korea can coexist with Asia’s changing regional order.

There are numerous signs of a recrudescent nationalism in contemporary Japan, a trend that is elite driven and vigorously promoted by the nation’s political leadership. This is manifested in patriotic education initiatives ranging from textbooks and mandatory flag and anthem veneration, to narratives of denial in the media, manga, and film. Japan’s hardball diplomacy targeting United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) over the comfort women issue is emblematic of just how counterproductive reactionary identity politics is on the world stage. It is striking that such efforts, and the more assertive Abe Doctrine on security, have not gained strong domestic support and are provoking a nationalist backlash in China and South Korea inimical to Japan’s interests.

This chapter addresses what it sees as the Abe administration’s resolve to enhance a “patriotic love of nation” among Japan’s citizens by whitewashing the history and legacy of prewar Japanese expansion and in the process denying the legitimacy of territorial boundaries established following World War II. Its central focus is on the 2014 publication of a map by Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs that claims “inherent sovereignty” over all maritime areas to which Japan continues to exert claims, disregarding counterclaims by other states, and the divergent understandings of the pre-1945 histories that made them Japanese territory in the first place.

In this chapter, it is argued that the security bills are the product of Abe’s pragmatism. This means that Prime Minister Abe exerted great efforts to make the security bills acceptable to Japanese voters largely by abandoning his original ideological agenda. It can be said that Abe’s administration is not anxious to make a radical shift in national security policy, as that might endanger previous positive support for Abe’s security agendas. In this sense, Abe’s security shifts have so far been largely the result of incrementalism. Furthermore, it remains necessary to create a new consensus on Japan’s security strategy that can move Japan beyond the Yoshida Doctrine. Abe’s intention has been to replace that doctrine with his own. But the task remains undone.

This chapter analyzes Japan’s ongoing efforts to shape the regional order in the Asia-Pacific as competition accelerates between the regionally integrative forces of economics and the fragmenting forces of hard security. The election of Donald Trump has increased regional as well as Japanese uncertainties. In response, Prime Minister Abe has sought to develop a closer personal relationship with Trump to ensure America’s security commitment while advancing a revised Trans-Pacific Partnership, absent the US, as a way to stabilize the liberal regional trade order.

Cooperation between Japan and China as the two largest economies in East Asia is essential for any stable and predictable East Asian international order. But the two countries now experience heightened security tension over territorial disputes. They also have competing nationalist narratives about history. Japan is concerned about China gaining more ground and will do its utmost to thwart that. Japan and China are adequate spoilers for each other’s regional leadership ambition. Thus, the Japan-China conflict means an absence of a peaceful and coherent East Asian regional order however we define the term. With uncertainties abound partly due to the unpredictable Trump administration, one cannot rule out a scenario of cautious bilateral improvement of Japan-China relations but that is unlikely to extend to regional cooperation.

This chapter examines the new Sino-Japanese rivalry that revolves around their conflictual identity as regional sea powers. It argues that Obama’s “Pivot to (maritime) Asia” policy and Trump’s yet-to-be-named harder line policy have rejuvenated Japanese traditional identity as a sea power. They have also created the background against which China has been shifting its attention to the South and East China Seas and the Indo-Pacific Ocean, departing from its traditional identity as a land power. Such an action-reaction cycle is likely to create additional pressure within the regional seas which have already been heating up both geopolitically and geoeconomically. The growing rivalry over the seas will redefine the balance of power and interest in the region. In this regard, Japan’s role will be critical.

This chapter explores how the complex dynamic mixture of identity conflicts, security cooperation, and economic interdependence is present under the Republic of Korea (ROK)-Japan relationship. It examines the ways in which identity conflicts led to negative spillovers or to a vicious cycle in security and economic affairs, and also explores how structural forces mitigate the vicious cycle from falling into a diplomatic crisis. My analysis finds that the complex dynamics of security-economic considerations have worked to mitigate the identity conflicts, forcing rivals to compromise with each other as well as to push back against one’s domestic constituency. Deteriorations have led to an apparent paradox of identity politics that invited countervailing forces toward amelioration of the bilateral tie.

This chapter examines the vicissitudes of Northeast Asian regional integration, with a focus on the development of the trilateral free trade agreement (FTA) and the trilateral investment treaty. It emphasizes that Northeast Asian regionalism has proceeded through gradualism, informality, and lower-profile approaches as a realistic way for the development of cooperation, which in turn is due to the political fragility generated by Japan’s strained bilateral relations with China and Korea concerning persistent historical and territorial disputes, pushing the triangle to a 2:1 split. The chapter explores this particular structural problem in Northeast Asia as a fundamental vulnerability to the sound development of trilateral cooperation. The structural instability of Northeast Asian political relations with the cautious steps for the promotion of regionalism also exposes trilateral cooperation to potential external pressures, such as the US-led Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which eventually compelled China and Japan to reach middle ground in their different approaches to integration and generated a key impetus for Northeast Asian integration. The chapter thus concludes that given the existence of historical and territorial tensions in Northeast Asia, the incremental growth of trilateral integration will continue to be subject to external pressures such as the TPP or growing US pressure on China over its trade practices, which the chapter identifies as an independent variable. The Trump administration’s decision to withdraw from the TPP in January 2017 thus removes one of the key drivers for the development of trilateral integration.

This conclusion uses the research from the preceding chapters to examine future prospects for the Asia-Pacific order. Without question, changes are myriad and predictions must be tentative. Yet one of the most important influences shaping future options is the rise of China, militarily, economically, and institutionally. To assume that China’s rise will be determinative of the future order is, however, a mistake. Numerous other states, not least being Japan, enjoy active agency in structuring Asia’s future. Furthermore, state action, again not least in the case of Japan, will be deeply reflective of changes in the domestic politics of key states.