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Published in: WIRTSCHAFTSINFORMATIK 2/2014

01-04-2014 | State of the Art

Kurszuordnung über stabile Zuordnungsverfahren

Authors: Franz Diebold, Haris Aziz, Prof. Dr. Martin Bichler, Prof. Dr. Florian Matthes, Alexander Schneider

Published in: WIRTSCHAFTSINFORMATIK | Issue 2/2014

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Zusammenfassung

Die Zuordnung von Studierenden zu Kursen ist eine immer wiederkehrende Aufgabenstellung an Universitäten, die meist nach dem Windhund-Prinzip (first-come-first-served, FCFS) organisiert ist. Im vergangenen Jahr wurde der Nobelpreis für Ökonomie für Marktdesign, insbesondere für stabile Zuordnungsverfahren vergeben. Diese Verfahren sind auch aus Sicht der Informatik und Wirtschaftsinformatik interessant. Im vorliegenden Artikel werden etablierte und neue stabile Zuordnungsverfahren vorgestellt, die sich für Kurszuordnungsprobleme eignen. Neben dem bekannten Verfahren von Gale und Shapley (SOSM) ist EADAM ein signifikanter neuer Beitrag, der bisher im Rahmen von Kurszuordnungen noch nicht untersucht wurde, der aber Effizienzprobleme von SOSM adressiert. Neben diesen zwei herausragenden Mechanismen wird ein Überblick über aktuelle Literatur zur Zuweisung gewünschter Bündel von Kursen zu Studierenden, nicht nur einzelner Kurse, gegeben. Der Überblick wird ergänzt mit Ergebnissen eines Feldexperimentes, das Entscheidern eine Einschätzung darüber geben soll, wie stark sich die Zuordnung von Kursen zu Studierenden über stabile Matchingverfahren in realen Umgebungen verbessern lässt.

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Metadata
Title
Kurszuordnung über stabile Zuordnungsverfahren
Authors
Franz Diebold
Haris Aziz
Prof. Dr. Martin Bichler
Prof. Dr. Florian Matthes
Alexander Schneider
Publication date
01-04-2014
Publisher
Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden
Published in
WIRTSCHAFTSINFORMATIK / Issue 2/2014
Print ISSN: 0937-6429
Electronic ISSN: 1861-8936
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11576-014-0408-4

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