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2019 | OriginalPaper | Chapter

Normalized Equilibrium in Tullock Rent Seeking Game

Authors : Eitan Altman, Mandar Datar, Gerard Burnside, Corinne Touati

Published in: Game Theory for Networks

Publisher: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

Games with Common Coupled Constraints represent many real-life situations. In these games, if one player fails to satisfy its constraints common to other players, then the other players are also penalized. Therefore these games can be viewed as being cooperative in goals related to meeting the common constraints, and non-cooperative in terms of the utilities. We study in this paper the Tullock rent-seeking game with additional common coupled constraints. We have succeeded in showing that the utilities satisfy the property of diagonal strict concavity (DSC), which can be viewed as an extension of concavity to a game setting. It not only guarantees the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium but also of the normalized equilibrium.

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Metadata
Title
Normalized Equilibrium in Tullock Rent Seeking Game
Authors
Eitan Altman
Mandar Datar
Gerard Burnside
Corinne Touati
Copyright Year
2019
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-16989-3_8

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