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2019 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

Normalized Equilibrium in Tullock Rent Seeking Game

verfasst von : Eitan Altman, Mandar Datar, Gerard Burnside, Corinne Touati

Erschienen in: Game Theory for Networks

Verlag: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

Games with Common Coupled Constraints represent many real-life situations. In these games, if one player fails to satisfy its constraints common to other players, then the other players are also penalized. Therefore these games can be viewed as being cooperative in goals related to meeting the common constraints, and non-cooperative in terms of the utilities. We study in this paper the Tullock rent-seeking game with additional common coupled constraints. We have succeeded in showing that the utilities satisfy the property of diagonal strict concavity (DSC), which can be viewed as an extension of concavity to a game setting. It not only guarantees the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium but also of the normalized equilibrium.

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Titel: Normalized Equilibrium in Tullock Rent Seeking Game
verfasst von: Eitan Altman
Mandar Datar
Gerard Burnside
Corinne Touati
Verlag: Springer International Publishing
Buch: Game Theory for Networks
Print ISBN: 978-3-030-16988-6

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-030-16989-3

Copyright-Jahr: 2019
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-16989-3_8

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