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Where Are the Shareholders’ Mansions? CEOs’ Home Purchases, Stock Sales, and Subsequent Company Performance Read chapter Read first chapter

2012 | OriginalPaper | Chapter

The State of Corporate Governance Research

Authors : Lucian A. Bebchuk, Michael S. Weisbach

Published in: Corporate Governance

Publisher: Springer Berlin Heidelberg

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Abstract

This paper, which serves as an introduction to the special issue on corporate governance of the Review of Financial Studies, reviews and comments on the state of corporate governance research. The special issue features seven papers on corporate governance that were presented in a meeting of the National Bureau of Economic Research’s (NBER’s) corporate governance project. Each of the papers represents state-of-the-art research in an important area of corporate governance research. For each of these areas, we discuss the importance of the area and the questions it focuses on, how the paper in the special issue makes a significant contribution to this area, and what we do and do not know about the area. We discuss in turn work on shareholders and shareholder activism, directors, executives and their compensation, controlling shareholders, comparative corporate governance, cross-border investments in global capital markets, and the political economy of corporate governance.

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previous chapter Board Independence, Corporate Governance and Earnings Management in France
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Footnotes
1
Recent work (Chhaochharia and Grinstein 2006) also documents that reforms requiring some firms to increase their use of independent directors were associated with increases in the firm value of such firms.
 
2
There is also evidence that weaker corporate governance is associated with lower sensitivity of pay to performance (Bertrand and Mullainathan 2001) and opportunistic compensation practices such as those manifested by option backdating (Bebchuk et al. 2010; Bizjak et al. 2009).
 
3
At the time of the study, the database was owned by I.S.S. and is consequently referred to as the I.S.S. database by Aggarwal, Erel, Stulz, and Williamson (and other authors).
 
4
This work is naturally related to the substantial literature on regulatory competition among states seeking to attract incorporations (Romano 1985, 1997; Bebchuk 1992; Daines 2001; Bebchuk and Hamdani 2002; Bebchuk and Cohen 2003; Kahan 2006; Bar-Gill et al. 2006).
 
5
Note that both the Bebchuk and Neeman (2009) line of work focus on lobbying by interest groups, in contrast to earlier work that has focused on how investor protection is shaped by the citizens’ voting decisions and the preferences of the median voter (e.g., Pagano and Volpin 2005a, 2005b; Perotti and von Thadden 2006). Bebchuk and Neeman argue that, in the ordinary course of events, most corporate issues are intensely followed by the interest groups with sufficient stake and expertise but are not sufficiently understood and salient to most citizens. But they recognize that the ordinary pro-insider operation of interest group politics can sometimes be interrupted by pro-investor reforms resulting from corporate scandals or a stock market crash that makes voters more attentive to corporate governance problems, and they allow for this possibility in their model.
 
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Metadata
Title
The State of Corporate Governance Research
Authors
Lucian A. Bebchuk
Michael S. Weisbach
Copyright Year
2012
Publisher
Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Book
Corporate Governance

Print ISBN: 978-3-642-31578-7

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-642-31579-4

Copyright Year: 2012

DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-31579-4_14