2. The Theory: Lead Groups and EU Foreign Policy-Making

Writing in 1997, Moravcsik felt compelled to remind his readers that a number of liberal theories (most of them non-institutionalist) already rejected the notion that interests are given, and in fact contained elements of a theory of interests as endogenous to actors. He complained that this fact was generally neglected due to the prevailing tendency to assimilate liberalism with its institutionalist version (Moravcsik 1997: 514).

The British referendum on EU membership split the country into those who felt that the national and EU identity layers were compatible and those who felt the opposite. The fact that almost half of voters, and a majority of elites, thought of the United Kingdom as a sovereign state and an EU member revealed that EU membership had profoundly impacted even traditionally Eurosceptic Britain.

Europeanisation also refers to the export of EU values and standards beyond the Union’s borders. In these terms, Europeanisation indicates a process of approximation by external actors to EU values and standards and is therefore irrelevant to the present discussion.

Accepting the definition of social constructivism as the theoretical approach that posits the mutual constitutiveness of agency and structure logically implies the acceptance of other assumptions, namely the socially constructed nature of interests. Coupled with the critique of the neorealist notion of anarchy as having no real explanatory potential, these assumptions make up the core of all branches of social constructivism (Wendt 1992, 1999; Hurd 2008: 300–305).

For a review of the criticisms of social constructivism’s alleged inability to prove its claims, see, among others, Risse (2009): 144–147 and Steans et al. (2010): 201–202. On the difference between ‘explaining’ and ‘understanding’, see Hollis and Smith (1990).

Not all EU theorists share Haas’ opinion that neo-functionalism has run its course. Jakob O. Øhrgaard maintains that it still provides the “most promising basis for theorising” about the sui generis nature of the CFSP (Øhrgaard 2004: 27). Øhrgaard’s core argument is based on the rejection of Haas’ strict definition of integration as a shift of nation states’ expectations, loyalties and eventually attributions to a supranational centre. He argues instead that the neo-functionalist understanding of integration as a three-staged process consisting of socialisation, cooperation and formalisation remains valid even if the last step does not involve supranationalisation of policies. He justifies this conclusion by stressing that such neo-functionalist categories as socialisation of EU elites, the upgrading of common interests and spillover effects retain theorising potential also about the CFSP (ibidem: 38–40).

Assuming Øhrgaard’s perspective, EU lead groups could be seen as a result of socialisation and a (peculiar) instance of cooperation that nonetheless occurs at the expense of formalisation. If lead groups are regarded as a form of intra-EU cooperation on issues where CFSP mechanisms are hardly applicable, they should be conceptualised as suboptimal solutions to functional deficiencies. In this sense, they might (or should?) paradoxically lead to greater foreign policy integration, or at least create a strong demand for it. Øhrgaard’s ‘use’ of neo-functionalism has a certain appeal for the purpose of this study, since it provides a clear-cut solution to the question regarding the implications of lead groups for EU foreign policy, namely that they lead to, or at least smooth the way for, foreign policy supranationalisation. This (hidden) form of automatism, of which not even Øhrgaard’s softer version of neo-functionalism is fully free, eventually discourages the inclusion of neo-functionalist solutions in a working theoretical framework for EU lead groups.

Parsons (2015) insists forcefully on the need for constructivists to engage rationalists on their own ground.

But, awkwardly, in line with Wendt’s position about the role of rationalism within a constructivist account of international politics, as articulated in his Social Theory of International Politics.

Otherwise referred to as ‘logic of consequentialism’ or of ‘the expected consequences’.