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Published in: Group Decision and Negotiation 1/2022

22-10-2021

What Forms the Trajectory of Social Reforms? The Roles of Decision Rules and Communication under Epistemic Uncertainty

Authors: Taiga Tsubota, Masahide Horita

Published in: Group Decision and Negotiation | Issue 1/2022

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Abstract

This paper presents a theoretical model that explains how decision rules and communication jointly affect collective outcomes in a small community under epistemic uncertainty. To see the likelihood of social reform and the probability of sensible decision-making under uncertainty, we compare two types of decision rules: unanimity rule and majority rule with veto. Also, we analyze the role of communication among voters before the voting occurs. We show that there exist equilibria and that once each player’s preference is determined, the equilibrium behavior is specified. In addition, we use simulation methods to examine how the precision of group decision and the voters’ welfare vary.

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Appendix
Available only for authorised users
Footnotes
1
We thank the referee for clarifying this point.
 
2
Again, since the voting system includes the voting set, we say the Unanimity system, not the unanimity rule.
 
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Metadata
Title
What Forms the Trajectory of Social Reforms? The Roles of Decision Rules and Communication under Epistemic Uncertainty
Authors
Taiga Tsubota
Masahide Horita
Publication date
22-10-2021
Publisher
Springer Netherlands
Published in
Group Decision and Negotiation / Issue 1/2022
Print ISSN: 0926-2644
Electronic ISSN: 1572-9907
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-021-09763-w

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