In inter- and intra-organizational negotiations parties are often represented by one or more individuals. Representatives face the challenging task to negotiate an acceptable agreement with their counterpart, while also satisfying the demands of their constituents. Indeed, representatives tend to negotiate in a more competitive way than non-representatives, due to experienced accountability pressures from their constituency (e.g. Benton and Druckman
1973; Ben-Yoav and Pruitt
1984a). Research has consistently shown the important influence of constituent voices on negotiation outcomes. When the constituency takes a
hawkish stance, representatives may use more competitive tactics to secure high outcomes for their party (Steinel et al.
2009), but these may lead to suboptimal agreements, when the structure of the negotiation allows for mutually beneficial solutions for both parties (De Dreu et al.
2014). Alternatively, when constituents favor a
dovish, cooperative approach, this increases collaborative tactics and negotiation outcomes (Aaldering and Ten Velden
2018), but can also backfire if representatives concede too much (Steinel et al.
2009).
Integrating research in the domain of representative negotiations with research on motivational orientation in negotiations, we suggest that the influence of constituency voices on negotiation tactics and agreements depends on features of the negotiation setting (distributive or integrative task) and on the dynamic between representatives and their constituencies: the (a)symmetry in constituency composition between negotiating representatives. We also explore the role of potential future interactions and accountability.
This manuscript contributes to literature on negotiations in five ways. First, we explore the impact of hawkish and dovish constituency voices in both distributive and integrative negotiations. Second, we investigate how constituency voices differentially impact representatives’ negotiation behavior depending on whether the
opponents’ constituency is similar to (doves vs doves; hawks vs hawks) or different from (doves vs hawks) one’s own. Third, we aim to replicate previous findings that representatives with exclusively dovish constituency members obtain higher outcomes than those with a hawkish constituency in integrative negotiations (Aaldering and Ten Velden
2018). Fourth, we empirically test whether the expectation of future negotiation interaction with the same counterpart may increase cooperation and reduce the competitive influence of hawkish constituency voices on negotiation outcomes. Fifth, and finally, we test whether accountability pressures, even when implicit, increase competitiveness among representatives, regardless of the nature of their constituency.
1.1 Negotiation Behavior Depends on the Task Setting and Motivational Orientation
There are two complementary strategies to reach high outcomes in a negotiation (Pruitt and Lewis
1975; De Dreu et al.
2007):
Claiming value (a distributive strategy focused on dividing resources and eliciting concessions from the other party) and
creating value (an integrative strategy focused on collaboratively identifying common interests and finding trade-offs that are beneficial for both parties). The simultaneity of value creation and value claiming (Kopelman
2014) enables optimal individual and joint outcomes. However, value creation is counterintuitive. Negotiators fall prey to a fixed-pie bias (Thompson and Hastie
1990) and assume only competitive tactics will ensure higher gains (Bazerman et al.
2000; Lax and Sebenius
1986), thereby missing opportunities to gain value in integrative settings. In purely distributive settings, the only way to gain value is to claim it, for example, by setting high demands and through a reluctance to make concessions (Siegel and Fouraker
1960; White and Neale
1991,
1994, for a review see Hüffmeier et al.
2014).
Value creation and value claiming strategies, which play out differently in distributive and integrative negotiation settings, are adopted not only based on the structure of the task. The choice of strategy also depends on the motivational orientation of negotiators; a preference for a particular distribution of resources between oneself and the counterpart (McClintock
1977; Rubin and Brown
1975). Generally, individuals can be classified as pro-self (mainly valuing high outcomes for oneself) or as pro-social (valuing high outcomes for both oneself and others). This classification is somewhat artificial, and indeed, social motives can rather be seen as a continuum (Murphy et al.
2011). However pro-self and pro-social motives have been used abundantly to classify, as well as induce, motivational orientations in negotiation research (e.g., Weingart et al.
1993; De Dreu et al.,
2000). In integrative negotiations, which allow for both value claiming and value creating strategies, pro-socially motivated negotiators generally reach higher joint outcomes than negotiators with a pro-self motivation, but only when they resist concession making (De Dreu et al.
2000; Tzafrir et al.
2012). When a pro-social negotiator faces a pro-self counterpart, joint outcomes are generally low; the integrative task is approached in a distributive manner, leading to lower than optimal outcomes for both parties and to higher outcomes for the pro-self party (Schei and Rognes
2003; Olekalns et al.
1996a,
b).
Thus, strategies to achieve higher outcomes are informed both by the motivation of each party and by the structure of the negotiation setting. Motivational orientation can be derived from stable individual differences in social value orientation (Messick and McClintock
1968), however, it can also be induced with specific goal instructions (e.g., Weingart et al.
1993) or by the accountability pressure of representing a constituency (Ben-Yoav and Pruitt
1984a).
1.2 Hawkish and Dovish Constituency Influence: Symmetrical and Asymmetrical Constituencies
Broadly, the presence of a constituency induces a competitive motivational orientation in representatives. It raises feelings of accountability; negotiators need to be able to justify the agreement to their constituency and resist yielding to the other parties’ wishes (Druckman
1994; Ben-Yoav and Pruitt
1984a). Such resistance to yielding could be efficient in creating value in integrative negotiations, but only if combined with a cooperative motivational orientation (De Dreu et al.
2000). The nature of constituencies’ preferences can form another source of motivation, in addition to the competitive motivation caused by the representational role, to guide negotiators’ behavior.
Hawkish (competitive) versus dovish (conciliatory) constituency voices have differential effects on representatives’ negotiation behavior and outcomes. Generally, even when in the minority, hawkish constituency voices increase competitive or value-claiming negotiation behavior of representatives (Steinel et al.
2009; Aaldering and Ten Velden
2018). Importantly however, the research on the role of hawkish and dovish constituencies, hitherto, either investigated the effect of constituency voices on behavior of one independent party (without actual interaction with a counterpart, Steinel et al.
2009) or assumed symmetric constituencies between representatives (both representatives represented a constituency with the same number of hawkish and dovish voices; Aaldering and De Dreu
2012; Aaldering and Ten Velden
2018). More insight into asymmetric constituencies between negotiating representatives (one represents a hawkish constituency, whereas the other represents a dovish constituency) is crucial to understand how constituency composition impacts outcomes. We explore negotiation outcomes for asymmetrical and symmetrical constituencies in the context of both distributive and integrative negotiation tasks.
In distributive negotiations, drawing on the well-established work that a hardline strategy will pay off in terms of outcomes only if the other party will concede (Hüffmeier et al.
2014; Olekalns et al.
1996a,
b), we expect among asymmetric constituencies that hawkish representatives will secure more value than their conciliatory dovish counterparts. The representative with the dovish mandate could be more likely to compromise by making concessions, allowing the larger share of the pie for the party with the hawkish constituency. However, when faced with a (symmetric) hawkish counterpart, representatives of hawkish constituencies likely reciprocate competitive strategies and reluctance to make concessions. Such a competitive cycle could disrupt the negotiation process to the extent that no agreement is reached at all. Indeed, negotiators with a pro-self social motive are more likely to reach impasses in negotiations than pro-socially motivated individuals (Schweinsberg et al.
2012; Trötschel et al.
2011).
Thus, we predict different patterns of negotiation results depending on the symmetric (dovish negotiating with dovish; hawkish with hawkish) versus asymmetric (dovish negotiating with hawkish) structure of constituencies, such that:
In contrast, when the negotiation has an integrative structure, the constituency dynamics may play out in a different way, such that it could pay off to have a dovish constituency. Although a mere cooperative orientation may induce quick concession making (De Dreu and Van Lange
1995), we argue that dovish constituencies encourages a combination of value creation with resistance to yielding that could be advantageous in integrative settings. The mere presence of a constituency induces feelings of accountability, raising resistance to yielding among representatives (Ben-Yoav and Pruitt
1984a), such that the dovish orientation of the constituency may enable the representative to balance both value claiming and the pursuit of creative solutions, thereby leading to high joint outcomes, when the counterpart has a similar (symmetric) constituency. Representatives of hawkish constituencies would likely reciprocate a competitive approach to their (symmetric) hawkish counterpart, and such pursuit of merely value claiming strategies would fail in realizing the integrative potential of the negotiation. Indeed, previous research shows that representatives with dovish constituencies discover more integrative potential and reach fewer impasses than hawkish representatives facing each other (Aaldering and Ten Velden
2018). Replicating and extending this work, we therefore predict that:
The outcomes in integrative negotiations could look very different when the constituencies are asymmetric. On the one hand, representatives with a dovish constituency may end up with less value than their hawkish counterpart, because they make less competitive demands, as well as because they may provide information that weakens their position without reciprocation from their hawkish counterpart. This line of reasoning is supported by research on groups, where pro-self-oriented members secure higher value for themselves than pro-socially oriented members (Schei and Rognes
2005) and findings that pro-self individuals reach higher negotiation outcomes when faced with a pro-socially oriented counterpart (Chen et al.
2003). Following this logic, representatives with a hawkish constituency will claim more value than their compromising dovish counterparts, leading to higher individual outcomes.
On the other hand, there is evidence that pro-social individuals who face a pro-self counterpart match competitive behavior (Rhoades and Carnevale
1999; Schei and Rognes
2003) adopting a tit-for-tat approach both in prisoner dilemma games and negotiations (e.g.,
triangle hypothesis, Kelley and Stahelski
1970; for a review of tit-for-tat, see Kopelman
2020). Additionally, pro-social individuals reach higher outcomes when they face a pro-self counterpart (Olekalns et al.
1996a,
b). Thus, representatives with a dovish mandate may be less likely to unilaterally concede—a dynamic further fueled by their representational role obligation—while being open to collaborative opportunities that increase gains, thus being simultaneously competitive and cooperative (Kopelman
2014). Following this logic and past findings, in asymmetric settings, a dovish representative may realize more of the integrative negotiation potential than the hawkish counterpart.
Given these competing theoretical perspectives and predictions, we approach the question of whether, in integrative settings, representatives with a dovish constituency will reach lower or higher outcomes than their counterpart with a hawkish constituency, through an exploratory analysis.
1.3 Mitigating Hawkish Influence: The Role of Expected Future Interaction
Given the potentially detrimental impact of the mere presence of a constituency, and the influence of a hawkish constituency on lower quality negotiation agreements (Aaldering and De Dreu
2012; Druckman
1977), it is important to consider psychological factors that may mitigate competitive dynamics in representative negotiations. We suggest that one such factor is the expectation of a future interaction, a situational feature inducing a pro-social motivation (Ben-Yoav and Pruitt
1984b; Schei and Rognes
2005).
Most negotiations do not take place in isolation. Whether in diplomatic or labor/business settings, negotiators may meet one another again. The prospect of negotiating with the same party reduces exploitation, which could backfire in a subsequent negotiation (Marlowe et al.
1966), promotes friendliness and cooperation (Shaffer and Ogden
1986), softer influence tactics (Van Knippenberg and Steensma
2003) and more satisfaction with the negotiation (Patton and Balakrishnan
2010). Moreover, it increases concern for the interests of the other party, a problem-solving approach, and the realization of higher joint outcomes in an integrative task (Ben-Yoav and Pruitt
1984b). A future-oriented perspective in a given negotiation allows for another dimension of integrative potential: concessions in the current negotiation can potentially be compensated in the next negotiation. Such thinking may enhance a focus on integrative potential, as well as elicit a collaborative and cooperative negotiation style in the current negotiation. In a distributive task, the expectation of future interaction may increase concession making as a friendly gesture to build towards a positive relationship (Hüffmeier et al.
2014).
However, a future-oriented perspective may impact negotiation behavior differently depending on the constituents’ approach. Representatives with a hawkish constituency, even if they are motivated by self-interest, may realize that the way to further their own interests is no longer to demand concessions without reciprocating. Some concession making, even when strategic, could open the door to trade-offs and realizing integrative potential. This would translate into higher outcomes in an integrative task, and fewer impasses in a distributive task. Representatives with a dovish constituency would be less influenced by the expectation of future interaction, as they adopt a collaborative approach even if a future interaction is not salient. The expectation of future interaction may reduce their resistance to yielding, thereby inviting more concessions and lower outcomes both in distributive (less value claiming) and integrative (less value claiming, as well as more focus on unilateral concessions rather than value creation) tasks. These effects are anticipated regardless of the nature of the counterparts’ constituency. We thus predict that: