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From Intrusion Detection to Software Design Read chapter Read first chapter

2017 | OriginalPaper | Chapter

Zero Round-Trip Time for the Extended Access Control Protocol

Authors : Jacqueline Brendel, Marc Fischlin

Published in: Computer Security – ESORICS 2017

Publisher: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

The Extended Access Control (EAC) protocol allows to create a shared cryptographic key between a client and a server. While originally used in the context of identity card systems and machine readable travel documents, the EAC protocol is increasingly adopted as a universal solution to secure transactions or for attribute-based access control with smart cards. Here we discuss how to enhance the EAC protocol by a so-called zero-round trip time (0RTT) mode. Through this mode the client can, without further interaction, immediately derive a new key from cryptographic material exchanged in previous executions. This makes the 0RTT mode attractive from an efficiency viewpoint such that the upcoming TLS 1.3 standard, for instance, will include its own 0RTT mode. Here we show that also the EAC protocol can be augmented to support a 0RTT mode. Our proposed EAC+0RTT protocol is compliant with the basic EAC protocol and adds the 0RTT mode smoothly on top. We also prove the security of our proposal according to the common security model of Bellare and Rogaway in the multi-stage setting.

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Footnotes
1
Remarkably, the publication of this analysis pre-dates the latest version of SP800-73-4 [12], dated May 2015, which lists OPACITY as a suitable solution for key establishment.
 
2
The latest version of the TLS draft [32] focuses on a pre-shared key 0RTT version and has for now dropped the Diffie-Hellman based version; the main EAC protocol only supports a Diffie-Hellman based key exchange, though.
 
3
For the necessity of \(K_\text {mac}'\) in a proof in the Bellare-Rogaway-style we refer to the discussion in [14].
 
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Metadata
Title
Zero Round-Trip Time for the Extended Access Control Protocol
Authors
Jacqueline Brendel
Marc Fischlin
Copyright Year
2017
Book
Computer Security – ESORICS 2017

Print ISBN: 978-3-319-66401-9

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-319-66402-6

Copyright Year: 2017

DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-66402-6_18

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