Skip to main content
Top
Published in: Group Decision and Negotiation 2/2021

03-01-2021

An Appropriate Way to Extend the Banzhaf Index for Multiple Levels of Approval

Authors: Josep Freixas, Montserrat Pons

Published in: Group Decision and Negotiation | Issue 2/2021

Log in

Activate our intelligent search to find suitable subject content or patents.

search-config
loading …

Abstract

The Banzhaf power index for games admits several extensions if the players have more than two ordered voting options. In this paper we prove that the most intuitive and recognized extension of the index fails to preserve the desirability relation for games with more than three ordered input levels of approval, a failure that undermines the index to be a good measure of power. This leads us to think of an alternative to the Banzhaf index for several input levels of approval. We propose a candidate for which it is proved that: (1) coincides with the Banzhaf index for simple games, (2) it is proportional to its known extension for three levels of approval, and (3) preserves the desirability relation regardless of the number of input levels of approval. This new index is based on measuring the total capacity the player has to alter the outcome. In addition, it can be expressed through a very appropriate mathematical formulation that greatly facilitates its computation. Defining extensions of well-established notions in a wider context requires a careful analysis. Different extensions can provide complementary nuances and, when this occurs, none of them can be considered to be ‘the’ extension. As shown in this paper, this situation applies when trying to extend the Banzhaf power index from simple games to the broader context of games with several ordered input levels of approval.

Dont have a licence yet? Then find out more about our products and how to get one now:

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

  • über 102.000 Bücher
  • über 537 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

  • Automobil + Motoren
  • Bauwesen + Immobilien
  • Business IT + Informatik
  • Elektrotechnik + Elektronik
  • Energie + Nachhaltigkeit
  • Finance + Banking
  • Management + Führung
  • Marketing + Vertrieb
  • Maschinenbau + Werkstoffe
  • Versicherung + Risiko

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

  • über 67.000 Bücher
  • über 340 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

  • Bauwesen + Immobilien
  • Business IT + Informatik
  • Finance + Banking
  • Management + Führung
  • Marketing + Vertrieb
  • Versicherung + Risiko




Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Literature
go back to reference Albizuri MJ, Ruiz LM (2001) A new axiomatization of the Banzhaf semivalue. Span Econ Rev 3:97–109CrossRef Albizuri MJ, Ruiz LM (2001) A new axiomatization of the Banzhaf semivalue. Span Econ Rev 3:97–109CrossRef
go back to reference Alonso-Meijide JM, Álvarez-Mozos M, Fiestras-Janeiro MG (2017) Power indices and minimal winning coalitions for simple games in partition function form. Group Decis Negot 26:1231–1245CrossRef Alonso-Meijide JM, Álvarez-Mozos M, Fiestras-Janeiro MG (2017) Power indices and minimal winning coalitions for simple games in partition function form. Group Decis Negot 26:1231–1245CrossRef
go back to reference Amer R, Carreras F, Magaña A (1998) The Banzhaf-Coleman index for games with r alternatives. Optimization 44:175–198CrossRef Amer R, Carreras F, Magaña A (1998) The Banzhaf-Coleman index for games with r alternatives. Optimization 44:175–198CrossRef
go back to reference Aubin JP (1974) Coeur et valeur des jeux flous à paiements latéraux. C R Hebdomad D 279–A:891–894 Aubin JP (1974) Coeur et valeur des jeux flous à paiements latéraux. C R Hebdomad D 279–A:891–894
go back to reference Banzhaf JF (1965) Weighted voting doesn’t work: a mathematical analysis. Rutgers Law Rev 19:317–343 Banzhaf JF (1965) Weighted voting doesn’t work: a mathematical analysis. Rutgers Law Rev 19:317–343
go back to reference Barua R, Chakravarty SR, Roy S (2005) A new characterization of the Banzhaf index of power. Int Game Theory Rev 7:545–553CrossRef Barua R, Chakravarty SR, Roy S (2005) A new characterization of the Banzhaf index of power. Int Game Theory Rev 7:545–553CrossRef
go back to reference Bernardi G (2018) A new axiomatization of the Banzhaf index for games with abstention. Group Decis Negot 27:165–177CrossRef Bernardi G (2018) A new axiomatization of the Banzhaf index for games with abstention. Group Decis Negot 27:165–177CrossRef
go back to reference Bhaumik A, Roy SK, Weber GW (2020) Hesitant interval-valued intuitionistic fuzzy-liguistic term set approach in Prisoners dilemma game theory using TOPSIS: a case study on Human-trafficking. CEJOR 28:797–816CrossRef Bhaumik A, Roy SK, Weber GW (2020) Hesitant interval-valued intuitionistic fuzzy-liguistic term set approach in Prisoners dilemma game theory using TOPSIS: a case study on Human-trafficking. CEJOR 28:797–816CrossRef
go back to reference Bolger E (1986) Power indices for multicandidate voting games. Int J Game Theory 15:175–186CrossRef Bolger E (1986) Power indices for multicandidate voting games. Int J Game Theory 15:175–186CrossRef
go back to reference Bolger E (1990) A characterization of an extension of the Banzhaf value for multicandidate voting games. SIAM J Discret Math 3:466–477CrossRef Bolger E (1990) A characterization of an extension of the Banzhaf value for multicandidate voting games. SIAM J Discret Math 3:466–477CrossRef
go back to reference Bolger E (2002) Characterizations of two power indices for voting games with r alternatives. Soc Choice Welf 19:709–721CrossRef Bolger E (2002) Characterizations of two power indices for voting games with r alternatives. Soc Choice Welf 19:709–721CrossRef
go back to reference Borkotokey S (2008) Cooperative games with fuzzy coalitions and fuzzy characteristic functions. Fuzzy Sets Syst 159:138–151CrossRef Borkotokey S (2008) Cooperative games with fuzzy coalitions and fuzzy characteristic functions. Fuzzy Sets Syst 159:138–151CrossRef
go back to reference Casajus A (2011) Marginality, differential marginality, and the Banzhaf value. Theory Decis 71(3):365–372CrossRef Casajus A (2011) Marginality, differential marginality, and the Banzhaf value. Theory Decis 71(3):365–372CrossRef
go back to reference Casajus A (2012) Amalgamating players, symmetry, and the Banzhaf value. Int J Game Theory 41(3):497–515CrossRef Casajus A (2012) Amalgamating players, symmetry, and the Banzhaf value. Int J Game Theory 41(3):497–515CrossRef
go back to reference Coleman JS (1971) Control of collectivities and the power of a collectivity to act. In: Lieberman B (ed) Social choice. Gordon and Breach, New York, pp 269–300 Coleman JS (1971) Control of collectivities and the power of a collectivity to act. In: Lieberman B (ed) Social choice. Gordon and Breach, New York, pp 269–300
go back to reference Courtin S, Tchantcho B (2020) Public good indices for games with several levels of approval. B.E. J Theor Econ 20(1):1–20 Courtin S, Tchantcho B (2020) Public good indices for games with several levels of approval. B.E. J Theor Econ 20(1):1–20
go back to reference Dubey P, Einy E, Haimanko O (2005) Compound voting and the Banzhaf index. Game Econ Behav 51(1):20–30CrossRef Dubey P, Einy E, Haimanko O (2005) Compound voting and the Banzhaf index. Game Econ Behav 51(1):20–30CrossRef
go back to reference Dubey P, Shapley LS (1979) Mathematical properties of the Banzhaf power index. Mathe Oper Res 4(2):99–131CrossRef Dubey P, Shapley LS (1979) Mathematical properties of the Banzhaf power index. Mathe Oper Res 4(2):99–131CrossRef
go back to reference Einy E (1985) The desirability relation of simple games. Math Soc Sci 10(2):155–168CrossRef Einy E (1985) The desirability relation of simple games. Math Soc Sci 10(2):155–168CrossRef
go back to reference Felsenthal DS, Machover M (1997) Ternary voting games. Int J Game Theory 26(3):335–351CrossRef Felsenthal DS, Machover M (1997) Ternary voting games. Int J Game Theory 26(3):335–351CrossRef
go back to reference Felsenthal DS, Machover M (1998) The measurament of voting power: theory and practice, problems and paradoxes. Edward Elgar, CheltenhamCrossRef Felsenthal DS, Machover M (1998) The measurament of voting power: theory and practice, problems and paradoxes. Edward Elgar, CheltenhamCrossRef
go back to reference Feltkamp V (1995) Alternative axiomatic characterizations of the Shapley and the Banzhaf values. Int J Game Theory 24(2):179–186CrossRef Feltkamp V (1995) Alternative axiomatic characterizations of the Shapley and the Banzhaf values. Int J Game Theory 24(2):179–186CrossRef
go back to reference Freixas J (2005) Banzhaf measures for games with several levels of approval in the input and output. Ann Oper Res 137(1):45–66CrossRef Freixas J (2005) Banzhaf measures for games with several levels of approval in the input and output. Ann Oper Res 137(1):45–66CrossRef
go back to reference Freixas J (2012) Probabilistic power indices for voting rules with abstention. Math Soc Sci 64(1):89–99CrossRef Freixas J (2012) Probabilistic power indices for voting rules with abstention. Math Soc Sci 64(1):89–99CrossRef
go back to reference Freixas J (2020) The Banzhaf value for cooperative and simple multichoice games. Group Decis Negot 29:61–74CrossRef Freixas J (2020) The Banzhaf value for cooperative and simple multichoice games. Group Decis Negot 29:61–74CrossRef
go back to reference Freixas J, Lucchetti R (2016) Power in voting rules with abstention: an axiomatization of two components power index. Ann Oper Res 244(2):455–474CrossRef Freixas J, Lucchetti R (2016) Power in voting rules with abstention: an axiomatization of two components power index. Ann Oper Res 244(2):455–474CrossRef
go back to reference Freixas J, Zwicker WS (2003) Weighted voting, abstention, and multiple levels of approval. Soc Choice Welf 21(3):399–431CrossRef Freixas J, Zwicker WS (2003) Weighted voting, abstention, and multiple levels of approval. Soc Choice Welf 21(3):399–431CrossRef
go back to reference Freixas J, Tchantcho B, Tedjeugang N (2014) Achievable hierarchies in voting games with abstention. Eur J Oper Res 236(1):254–260CrossRef Freixas J, Tchantcho B, Tedjeugang N (2014) Achievable hierarchies in voting games with abstention. Eur J Oper Res 236(1):254–260CrossRef
go back to reference Freixas J, Tchantcho B, Tedjeugang N (2014) Voting games with abstention: Linking completeness and weightedness. Decis Support Syst 57:172–177CrossRef Freixas J, Tchantcho B, Tedjeugang N (2014) Voting games with abstention: Linking completeness and weightedness. Decis Support Syst 57:172–177CrossRef
go back to reference Gallego I, Fernández A, Jiménez-Losada A, Ordóñez M (2014) A Banzhaf value for games with fuzzy communication structure: Computing the power of the political groups in the European Parliament. Fuzzy Sets Syst 255:128–145CrossRef Gallego I, Fernández A, Jiménez-Losada A, Ordóñez M (2014) A Banzhaf value for games with fuzzy communication structure: Computing the power of the political groups in the European Parliament. Fuzzy Sets Syst 255:128–145CrossRef
go back to reference Haller H (1994) Collusion properties of values. Int J Game Theory 23:261–281CrossRef Haller H (1994) Collusion properties of values. Int J Game Theory 23:261–281CrossRef
go back to reference Holler MJ (1982) Forming coalitions and measuring voting power. Political Stud 30(2):262–271CrossRef Holler MJ (1982) Forming coalitions and measuring voting power. Political Stud 30(2):262–271CrossRef
go back to reference Hsiao CR, Raghavan TES (1992) Monotonicity and dummy free property for multi-choice cooperative games. Int J Game Theory 21(1):301–302CrossRef Hsiao CR, Raghavan TES (1992) Monotonicity and dummy free property for multi-choice cooperative games. Int J Game Theory 21(1):301–302CrossRef
go back to reference Hsiao CR, Raghavan TES (1993) Shapley value for multichoice cooperative games, I. Games Econ Behav 5(2):240–256CrossRef Hsiao CR, Raghavan TES (1993) Shapley value for multichoice cooperative games, I. Games Econ Behav 5(2):240–256CrossRef
go back to reference Jana J, Roy SK (2019) Dual hesitant fuzzy matrix games: based on new similarity measure. Soft Comput 23:8873–8886CrossRef Jana J, Roy SK (2019) Dual hesitant fuzzy matrix games: based on new similarity measure. Soft Comput 23:8873–8886CrossRef
go back to reference Johnston RJ (1978) On the measurement of power: some reactions to Laver. Environ Plan A 10(8):907–914CrossRef Johnston RJ (1978) On the measurement of power: some reactions to Laver. Environ Plan A 10(8):907–914CrossRef
go back to reference Kenfack JAM, Tchantcho B, Tsague BP (2019) On the ordinal equivalence of the Johnston, Banzhaf and Shapley–Shubik power indices for voting games with abstention. Int J Game Theory 48(2):647–671CrossRef Kenfack JAM, Tchantcho B, Tsague BP (2019) On the ordinal equivalence of the Johnston, Banzhaf and Shapley–Shubik power indices for voting games with abstention. Int J Game Theory 48(2):647–671CrossRef
go back to reference Kurz S (2020) A note on limit results for the Penrose–Banzhaf index. Theory Decis 88:191–203CrossRef Kurz S (2020) A note on limit results for the Penrose–Banzhaf index. Theory Decis 88:191–203CrossRef
go back to reference Lehrer E (1998) An axiomatization of the Banzhaf value. Int J Game Theory 17:89–99CrossRef Lehrer E (1998) An axiomatization of the Banzhaf value. Int J Game Theory 17:89–99CrossRef
go back to reference Lidner I (2008) A special case of Penrose’s limit theorem when abstention is allowed. Theory Decis 64(4):495–518CrossRef Lidner I (2008) A special case of Penrose’s limit theorem when abstention is allowed. Theory Decis 64(4):495–518CrossRef
go back to reference Lidner I, Machover M (2004) L.S. Penrose’s limit theorem: proof of some special cases. Math Soc Sci 47(1):37–49CrossRef Lidner I, Machover M (2004) L.S. Penrose’s limit theorem: proof of some special cases. Math Soc Sci 47(1):37–49CrossRef
go back to reference Lidner I, Owen G (2007) Cases where the Penrose limit theorem does not hold. Math Soc Sci 53(3):232–238CrossRef Lidner I, Owen G (2007) Cases where the Penrose limit theorem does not hold. Math Soc Sci 53(3):232–238CrossRef
go back to reference Meng F, Zhang Q, Chen X (2017) Fuzzy multichoice games with fuzzy characteristic functions. Group Decis Negot 26:565–595CrossRef Meng F, Zhang Q, Chen X (2017) Fuzzy multichoice games with fuzzy characteristic functions. Group Decis Negot 26:565–595CrossRef
go back to reference Ono R (2001) Values for multialternative games and multilinear extensions. In: Holler MJ, Owen G (eds) Power indices and coalition formation. Springer, Boston Ono R (2001) Values for multialternative games and multilinear extensions. In: Holler MJ, Owen G (eds) Power indices and coalition formation. Springer, Boston
go back to reference Owen G (1975) Multilinear extensions and the Banzhaf value. Naval Res Logist Q 22(4):741–750CrossRef Owen G (1975) Multilinear extensions and the Banzhaf value. Naval Res Logist Q 22(4):741–750CrossRef
go back to reference Owen G (1978) Characterization of the Banzhaf–Coleman index. SIAM J Appl Math 35:315–327CrossRef Owen G (1978) Characterization of the Banzhaf–Coleman index. SIAM J Appl Math 35:315–327CrossRef
go back to reference Parker C (2012) The influence relation for ternary voting games. Games Econ Behav 75(2):867–881CrossRef Parker C (2012) The influence relation for ternary voting games. Games Econ Behav 75(2):867–881CrossRef
go back to reference Penrose LS (1946) The elementary statistics of majority voting. J R Stat Soc 109(1):53–57CrossRef Penrose LS (1946) The elementary statistics of majority voting. J R Stat Soc 109(1):53–57CrossRef
go back to reference Pongou R, Tchantcho B, Diffo Lambo L (2011) Political influence in multichoice institutions: cyclicity, anonymity and transitivity. Theory Decis 70(2):157–178CrossRef Pongou R, Tchantcho B, Diffo Lambo L (2011) Political influence in multichoice institutions: cyclicity, anonymity and transitivity. Theory Decis 70(2):157–178CrossRef
go back to reference Taylor AD, Zwicker WS (1999) Simple games: desirability relations, trading, and pseudoweightings. Princeton University Press, New Jersey Taylor AD, Zwicker WS (1999) Simple games: desirability relations, trading, and pseudoweightings. Princeton University Press, New Jersey
go back to reference Tchantcho B, Diffo Lambo L, Pongou R, Mbama Engoulou B (2008) Voters’ power in voting games with abstention: influence relation and ordinal equivalence of power theories. Games Econ Behav 64(1):335–350CrossRef Tchantcho B, Diffo Lambo L, Pongou R, Mbama Engoulou B (2008) Voters’ power in voting games with abstention: influence relation and ordinal equivalence of power theories. Games Econ Behav 64(1):335–350CrossRef
Metadata
Title
An Appropriate Way to Extend the Banzhaf Index for Multiple Levels of Approval
Authors
Josep Freixas
Montserrat Pons
Publication date
03-01-2021
Publisher
Springer Netherlands
Published in
Group Decision and Negotiation / Issue 2/2021
Print ISSN: 0926-2644
Electronic ISSN: 1572-9907
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-020-09718-7

Other articles of this Issue 2/2021

Group Decision and Negotiation 2/2021 Go to the issue

Premium Partner