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19-03-2021 | Original Paper

Is a Rational Politics of Disaster Possible? Making Useful Decisions for Others in an Experimental Disaster Game

Authors: Talbot M. Andrews, Andrew W. Delton, Reuben Kline

Published in: Political Behavior | Issue 1/2023

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Abstract

Disaster responses are political. But can citizens make useful disaster decisions? Potential obstacles are that such decisions are complex, involve public goods, and often affect other people. Theories of political decision-making disagree on whether these problems can be overcome. We used experimental economic games that simulate disaster to test whether people are willing and able to prevent disasters for others. Groups of players face a complex task in which options that might help vary in their riskiness. Importantly, although all options are reasonable, which option is most useful depends on the experimental condition. We find that players will pay to help, can identify which option is most useful across experimental conditions, and will pay to learn how best to help. Thus, players were able to make useful and costly decisions to prevent others from experiencing disaster. This suggests that, in at least some situations, citizens may be able to make good disaster decisions.

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The disaster game differs from the standard (linear) public goods game. Standard public goods games involve a group creating a shared benefit; the disaster game involves preventing a shared loss, which is better for simulating disasters. Also, the disaster game is a threshold game: There is a sharp point at which the public good is attained. In game theory terms, this makes the disaster game a coordination game, not a pure social dilemma. In turn, this makes cooperation more likely than in standard public goods games (Jordan et al., 2017).

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Title: Is a Rational Politics of Disaster Possible? Making Useful Decisions for Others in an Experimental Disaster Game
Authors: Talbot M. Andrews
Andrew W. Delton
Reuben Kline
Publication date: 19-03-2021
Publisher: Springer US
Published in: Political Behavior / Issue 1/2023
Print ISSN: 0190-9320
Electronic ISSN: 1573-6687
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-021-09700-2

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