Top

Political Behavior

Published in:

22-02-2021 | Original Paper

Public Services, Geography, and Citizen Perceptions of Government in Latin America

Authors: Gary Bland, Derick Brinkerhoff, Diego Romero, Anna Wetterberg, Erik Wibbels

Published in: Political Behavior | Issue 1/2023

Activate our intelligent search to find suitable subject content or patents.

search-config

AI-assisted search

Off

Abstract

One of the linchpins of democratic accountability runs through service quality. Because citizens are sensitive to the quality of basic services, they can translate (dis)satisfaction into assessments of incumbent politicians. Yet, although previous research has shown that both access to, and the quality of, basic services decline in rural settings, this seems not to translate into increased dissatisfaction with incumbents. In this paper we seek to understand why. We theorize four potential mechanisms that might underpin the weaker accountability for poor service outcomes in more remote settings. To test these mechanisms, we use data from 34,514 geocoded survey respondents across 19 countries in Latin America. We show that the likelihood of translating dissatisfaction with services into discontent with elected officials decreases as distance to urban centers increases. We find some evidence that a low sense of political efficacy and deference to hierarchy mediate the relationship between remoteness, service quality and accountability. Nevertheless, some of the direct relationship between distance and attitudes towards elected officials persists in the face of our mediation analysis, suggesting that more work needs to be done on the relationship between remoteness, service quality and accountability.

previous article When are Explicit Racial Appeals Accepted? Examining the Role of Racial Status Threat

next article The Electoral Costs and Benefits of Feminism in Contemporary American Politics

Dont have a licence yet? Then find out more about our products and how to get one now:

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

über 102.000 Bücher
über 537 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

Automobil + Motoren
Bauwesen + Immobilien
Business IT + Informatik
Elektrotechnik + Elektronik
Energie + Nachhaltigkeit
Finance + Banking
Management + Führung
Marketing + Vertrieb
Maschinenbau + Werkstoffe
Versicherung + Risiko

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

inform now

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

über 67.000 Bücher
über 340 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

Bauwesen + Immobilien
Business IT + Informatik
Finance + Banking
Management + Führung
Marketing + Vertrieb
Versicherung + Risiko

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

inform now

Available only for authorised users

World Development Indicators accessed January 7, 2020.

Labor force participation in agriculture come from World Development Indicators.

In Online Appendix B, however, we replicate our analysis using a dichotomous urban/rural measure and a measure of rurality based on population.

Direct analysis of household locations is not possible given the anonymity promised to respondents. Geolocating to the centroid of the nearest population center of 1000 introduces (random) error, but it maintains a great deal of spatial variation while preserving the anonymity. A total of 86.65\(\%\) of the respondents from these 19 countries were successfully geolocated, which reduces our sample from 39,832 to 34,514 observations.

All distances were calculated as geodesic distances, employing the Geonear package in Stata 14.2. The file with locations of towns with populations greater than 15,000 can be retrieved from http://download.geonames.org/export/dump/cities15000.zip. The file used in the present analysis was accessed on September 6th, 2016.

LAPOP relies on each country’s census definition to code respondents as living in urban or rural areas. Thus, utilizing an urban/rural dummy would involve comparing apples and oranges to some extent.

Our results, however, hold in unitary and federal countries alike.

A more complete study of remoteness and accountability would also include citizens’ assessments of the performance of locally elected officials in cases where the responsibility for provision of a given public service falls on them rather than on nationally elected officials. The best we can do, however, is to presents results using trust in the municipal government as dependent variable (Online Appendix Fig. A3).

More information on LAPOP’s weighing schemes can be obtained here: http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/docs/AmericasBarometer_weighting_scheme_all_years_of_AB_v2.pdf.

Though it is not the subject of our investigation, we find mixed evidence that satisfaction with public services significantly decreases with distance from urban centers as one might expect from previous research showing that service quality does decline with distance. Nevertheless, we do not aim to explore the link between service quality and service satisfaction per se. Instead, we seek to understand why remote citizens are less likely than urban citizens to translate their dissatisfaction with public services into disapproval of their president/prime minister, irrespective of the source of their dissatisfaction. Thus, our argument does not rest on the claim that service satisfaction must be lower in rural areas.

35 km is roughly the mean distance to a city of 15,000 individuals plus one standard deviation.

The gap is not statistically significant at the 5% level in the case of public education, but it is significant at the 10% level.

It is important to note that the pattern uncovered is not simply a product of the chosen functional form. Online Appendix Fig. A4 shows plots of the relation between satisfaction with public services and approval of the president/prime minister at high and low distance from urban centers, fitting a LOWESS curve. Far away from urban centers, the relation between service satisfaction and approval of the president/prime minister is flatter than closer to cities. In other words, the closer citizens are to urban centers, the more responsive their approval of their president/prime minister is to changes in their perceptions of the quality of public services.

See Online Appendix Tables B3 and B4.

Once again, distances were calculated as geodesic distances, employing the Geonear package in Stata 14.2. The file with locations of towns with populations greater than 5000 can be retrieved from http://download.geonames.org/export/dump/cities5000.zip.

16 km is roughly the mean distance to a city of 5000 individuals plus one standard deviation.

Neither La Paz (administrative capital) nor Sucre (judicial capital) is the largest city in Bolivia.

To the geographical center of the capital city, to be more precise. Coordinates were obtained using Google maps.

8% of respondents were interviewed in places classified as rural within national capitals and cities of all sizes.

Online Appendix C presents the list of questions used in the creation of each of the indices.

As an alternative, we report in Online Appendix C.1 on the survey-based measure of state reach across territory developed by Luna and Soifer (2017), which was included in the 2014 LAPOP survey. Their other questions that tap into state capacity—the state’s capacity to impose taxes and enforce property rights—were asked in a much smaller set of countries.

The same holds true when using Luna and Soifer’s (2017) measure of state presence (see Online Appendix Table C1).

Since both of our outcome variables are not rare (i.e. more than 10\(\%\) of respondents approve of or trust the president/prime minister of their country), it would be ideal to estimate (1) by way of a log-binomial model. The models, however, did not converge, which is a well-known issue with such models (McNutt et al. 2003).

The variable takes the value of one for respondents who considered issues of crime, drug trafficking, safety, road quality, and/or access to and quality of education and healthcare as the main problem in their country.

Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., & Robinson, J. (2002). Reversal of fortune: Geography and institutions in the making of the modern world economy. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117(4), 1231–1296.CrossRef

Adida, C., Gottlieb, J., Kramon, E., & McClendon, G. (2019). When does information influence voters?. The Joint Importance of Salience and Coordination: Comparative Political Studies, 0010414019879945

Ahmad, E., & Brosio, G. (2009). Decentralization and local service provision: What do we know? LSE Asia Research Centre Working Paper No. 27. London: London School of Economics and Political Science.

Arias, E., Balan, P., Larreguy, H., Marshal, J., & Querubin, P. (2019). Information provision, voter coordination, and electoral accountability: Evidence from Mexican social networks. American Political Science Review, 113(2), 475–498.CrossRef

Banerjee, A., Chattopadhyay, R., Duflo, E., Keniston, D., & Singh, N. . (2012). Improving police performance in Rajasthan, India: Experimental evidence on incentives, managerial autonomy and training. Working paper No. 17912. National Bureau of Economic Research.

Banerjee, A., Kumar, S., Pande, R., & Su, F. (2011). Do informed voters make better choices? Experimental evidence from urban India. Working Paper.

Bates, R. (1981). Markets and states in Tropical Africa. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Batista Pereira, F. (2011). Political knowledge levels across the urban-rural divide in Latin America and the Caribbean. Americas Barometer Insights Series, 68, 1–7.

Björkman, M., & Svensson, J. (2009). Power to the people: Evidence from a randomized field experiment on community-based monitoring in Uganda. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 124(2), 735–769.CrossRef

Blanco, L., & Ruiz, I. (2013). The impact of crime and insecurity on trust in democracy and institutions. American Economic Review, 103(3), 284–288.CrossRef

Borowski, H., Reed, R., Scholl, L., Webb, D., & Corral, M. (2011). Political efficacy in the Americas. Americas Barometer Insights, 65, 1–10.

Börzel, T. A., & Risse, T. (2015). Dysfunctional state institutions, trust, and governance in areas of limited statehood. Regulation & Governance, 10, 149–160.CrossRef

Bratton, M. (2012). Citizen perceptions of local government responsiveness in Sub-Saharan Africa. World Development, 40(3), 516–527.CrossRef

Brinkerhoff, D. W., Wetterberg, A., & Wibbels, E. (2018). Distance, services, and citizen perceptions of the state in rural Africa. Governance, 31(1), 103–124.CrossRef

Bruton, H. J. (1998). A reconsideration of import substitution. Journal of Economic Literature, 36(2), 903–936.

Burnett, C. M., & Kogan, V. (2017). The politics of potholes: Service quality and retrospective voting in local elections. The Journal of Politics, 79(1), 302–314.CrossRef

Calderón, C. & Servén, L. (2010). Infrastructure in Latin America. Policy Research Working Paper No. 5317. Washington, DC: World Bank.

Carreras, M. (2013). The impact of criminal violence on regime legitimacy in Latin America. Latin American Research Review, 48(3), 85–107.CrossRef

Cavangero, E., Almeida, G., Seely, E. S., & Marinho, F. (2015). Setting the context for universal health coverage reforms in Latin America and the Caribbean. In T. Dmytraczenko & G. Almeida (Eds.), Toward universal health coverage and equity in Latin America and the Caribbean: Evidence from selected countries (pp. 19–51). Washington, DC: World Bank.CrossRef

Ceccato, V., & Ceccato, H. (2017). Violence in the rural global south: Trends, patterns, and tales from the Brazilian countryside. Criminal Justice Review, 42(3), 270–290.CrossRef

Cerra, V., Cuevas, A., Góes, C., Karpowicz, I., Matheson, T., Samaké, I., et al. (2016). Highways to heaven: Infrastructure determinants and trends in Latin America and the Caribbean. Working Paper No. WP/16/185. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund.

Chong, A., Ana, L., Karlan, D., & Wantchekon, L. (2012). Looking beyond the incumbent: The effects of exposing corruption on electoral outcomes. Working paper No. 17679. National Bureau of Economic Research.

Corbacho, A., Philipp, J., & Ruiz-Vega, M. (2015). Crime and erosion of trust: Evidence for Latin America. World Development, 70(June), 400–415.CrossRef

Córdova, R., & Orellana, V. (2002). Cultura Pólitica, Gobierno Local y Descentralización. San Salvador: FLACSO-El Salvador.

Cotlear, D., Gómez-Dantés, O., Knaul, F., Atun, R., Barreto, I., Cetrángolo, O., et al. (2015). Overcoming social segregation in health care in Latin America. The Lancet, 385(9974), 1248–1259.CrossRef

Dmytraczenko, T., Almeida, G., Werneck, H., Cercone, J., Díaz, Y., Maceira, D., et al. (2015). Progress toward universal health coverage in Latin America and the Caribbean: outcomes, utilization, and financial protection. In T. Dmytraczenko & G. Almeida (Eds.), Toward Universal health coverage and equity in Latin America and the Caribbean: Evidence from selected countries (pp. 81–146). Washington, DC: World Bank.CrossRef

Dunning, T., Grossman, G., Humphreys, M., Hyde, S. D., McIntosh, C., & Nellis, G. (2019). Information, accountability, and cumulative learning: Lessons from Metaketa I. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRef

Dussault, G., & Franceschini, M. C. (2006). Not enough there, too many here: Understanding geographical imbalances in the distribution of the health workforce. Human Resources for Health, 4(1), 12.CrossRef

Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), and the Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture (IICA). (2015). The outlook for agriculture and rural development in the Americas: A perspective on Latin America and the Caribbean 2015–2016. San José, Costa Rica: ECLAC, FAO, and IICA.

Edwards, G. C., Mitchell, W., & Welch, R. (1995). Explaining presidential approval: The significance of issue salience. American Journal of Political Science, 39(1), 108–134.CrossRef

Fiorina, M. P. (1981). Retrospective voting in American national elections. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Fjeldstad, O. H., & Moore, M. (2007). Taxation and state-building: Poor countries in a globalised world. Working paper.

Fournier, P., Blais, A., Nadeau, R., Gidengil, E., & Nevitte, N. (2003). Issue importance and performance voting. Political Behavior, 25(1), 51–67.CrossRef

Fox, J. (2012). State power and clientelism: eight propositions for discussion. In T. Hilgers (Ed.), Clientelism in everyday Latin American politics. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Gálvez, B. V., & Bailey, C. H. (2001). Cultura política en torno a los gobiernos locales y la descentralización en Guatemala: Informe final de la encuesta. San Salvador: FLACSO-El Salvador.

Gonzalez, Y. (2016). Varieties of participatory security: Assessing community participation in policing in Latin America. Public Administration and Development, 36(2), 132–143.CrossRef

Gonzalez-Ocantos, E., Kiewiet, C., de Jonge, C., Meléndez, J. O., & Nickerson, D. (2012). Vote buying and social desirability bias: Experimental evidence from Nicaragua. American Journal of Political Science, 56(1), 202–217.CrossRef

Gonzalez-Ocantos, E., Kiewiet, C., de Jonge, C., Meléndez, D. N., & Osorio, J. (2020). Carrots and sticks: Experimental evidence of vote-buying and voter intimidation in Guatemala. Journal of Peace Research, 57(1), 46–61.CrossRef

Gottlieb, J. (2016). Greater expectations: A field experiment to improve accountability in Mali. American Journal of Political Science, 60(1), 143–157.CrossRef

Grossman, G., Michelitch, K., & Santamaria, M. (2017). Texting complaints to politicians: Name personalization and politicians’ encouragement in citizen mobilization. Comparative Political Studies, 50(10), 1325–1357.CrossRef

Grossman, G., Platas, M. R., & Rodden, J. (2018). Crowdsourcing accountability: ICT for service delivery. World Development, 112, 74–87.CrossRef

Guagliardo, M. F. (2004). Spatial accessibility of primary care: Concepts, methods and challenges. International Journal of Health Geographics, 3(1), 3.CrossRef

Hall, T. D., & Fenelon, J. V. (2015). Indigenous peoples and globalization: Resistance and revitalization. New York: Routledge.CrossRef

Harding, R. (2015). Attribution and accountability: Voting for roads in Ghana. World Politics, 67(4), 656–689.CrossRef

Harding, R. (2020). Rural democracy: elections and development in Africa. Oxford University Press.

Herbst, J. (2000). States and power in Africa. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Heyneman, S. P., & Stern, J. M. B. (2014). Low cost private schools for the poor: What public policy is appropriate? International Journal of Educational Development, 35, 3–15.CrossRef

Holland, A. C. (2018). Diminished expectations: Redistributive preferences in truncated welfare states. World Politics, 70(4), 555–594.CrossRef

Hopkin, J. (2006). Clientelism and party politics. In R. S. Katz & W. Crotty (Eds.), Handbook of party politics (pp. 406–412). London: Sage Publications.CrossRef

Houessou, R. (2015). Are policy reforms enough to improve satisfaction with health care? Evidence from Benin. Afrobarometer Policy Paper No. 28.

Humphreys, M., & Weinstein, J. (2012). Policing politicians: Citizen empowerment and political accountability in Uganda. Working Paper.

Imai, K., Keele, L., Tingley, D., & Yamamoto, T. (2011). Unpacking the black box of causality: Learning about causal mechanisms from experimental and observational studies. American Political Science Review, 105(4), 765–89.CrossRef

Ingram, M. C., & Curtis, K. M. (2015). Violence in Central America: A spatial view of homicide in the region, Northern Triangle, and El Salvador. In Crime and Violence in Central America’s Northern Triangle: How U.S. Policy Responses are Helping, Hurting, and Can Be Improved. Woodrow Wilson Center Reports on the Americas No. 34, Eric L. Olson, ed. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, pp. 245–284.

Ippolito, M., Chary, A., Daniel, M., Barnoya, J., Monroe, A., & Eakin, M. (2017). Expectations of health care quality among rural Maya villagers in Sololá Department, Guatemala: A qualitative analysis. International Journal for Equity in Health, 16(1), 51–58.CrossRef

Joshi, A., & Moore, M. (2004). Institutionalized co-production: Unorthodox public service delivery in challenging environments. Journal of Development Studies, 40(4), 31–49.CrossRef

Kaawa-Mafigiri, D., & Walakira, E. J. (2017). Child abuse and neglect in Uganda. New York: Springer.CrossRef

Khemani, S. (2015). Buying votes versus supplying public services: Political incentives to under-invest in pro-poor policies. Journal of Development Economics, 117, 84–93.CrossRef

Kitschelt, H., & Wilkinson, S. I. (2007). Patrons, clients, and policies: Patterns of democratic accountability and political competition. New York: Cambridge University Press.CrossRef

Krishna, A., & Schober, G. (2014). The gradient of governance: Distance and disengagement in Indian villages. Journal of Development Studies, 50(6), 820–838.CrossRef

Lee, K., Brewer, E., Christiano, C., Meyo, F., Miguel, E., & Podolsky, M. (2016). Electrification for “under grid” households in rural Kenya. Development Engineering, 1, 26–35.CrossRef

Levi, M., Sacks, A., & Tyler, T. (2009). Conceptualizing legitimacy, measuring legitimating beliefs. American Behavioral Scientist, 53(3), 354–375.CrossRef

Levy, S., & Schady, N. (2013). Latin America’s social policy challenge: Education, social insurance, redistribution. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 27(2), 193–218.CrossRef

Lieberman, E. S., Posner, D. N., & Tsai, L. L. (2014). Does information lead to more active citizenship? Evidence from an education intervention in rural Kenya. World Development, 60, 69–83.CrossRef

Lipton, M. (1977). Why poor people stay poor: A study of urban bias in world development. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Lloyd-Sherlock, P. (2009). Social policy and inequality in Latin America: A review of recent trends. Social Policy & Administration, 43(4), 347–363.CrossRef

Lohela, T. J., Campbell, O. M. R., & Gabrysch, S. (2012). Distance to care, facility delivery and early neonatal mortality in Malawi and Zambia. PLoS ONE, 7(12), e52110.CrossRef

Luna, J. P., & Soifer, H. D. (2017). Capturing sub-national variation in state capacity: A survey-based approach. American Behavioral Scientist, 61(8), 887–907.CrossRef

Majumdar, S., Mani, A., & Mukand, S. W. (2004). Politics, information and the urban bias. Journal of Development Economics, 75(1), 137–165.CrossRef

Mani, A., & Mukand, S. W. (2007). Democracy, visibility and public good provision. Journal of Development Economics, 83(2), 506–529.CrossRef

Martínez, L., Short, J., & Ortíz, M. (2015). Citizen satisfaction with public goods and government services in the global urban south: A case study of Cali, Colombia. Habitat International, 49, 84–91.CrossRef

McNutt, L.-A., Chuntao, W., Xue, X., & Hafner, J. P. (2003). Estimating the relative risk in cohort studies and clinical trials of common outcomes. American Journal of Epidemiology, 157(10), 940–943.CrossRef

Medicines Transparency Alliance. (2014). Client satisfaction with services in Uganda’s public health facilities: A study by the Medicines Transparency Alliance (MeTA), Uganda. Kampala: MeTA and Uganda National Health Consumer/Users Organisation.

Montalvo, D. (2010). Understanding trust in municipal governments. Americas Barometer Insights Series 35.

Moser, C., Winton, A., & Moser, A. (2005). Violence, fear, and insecurity among the urban poor in Latin America. In M. Fay (Ed.), The urban poor in Latin America (pp. 125–178). Washington, DC: World Bank.

Myers, D., et al. (2002). The dynamics of local empowerment: an overview. In D. Myers & H. Dietz (Eds.), Capital city politics in Latin America: Democratization and empowerment (pp. 1–28). Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.CrossRef

Nathan, N. L. (2019). Electoral politics and Africa's Urban transition: class and ethnicity in Ghana. Cambridge University Press.

Nauges, C., & Van den Berg, C. (2008). Economies of density, scale and scope in the water supply and sewerage sector: A study of four developing and transition economies. Journal of Regulatory Economics, 34(2), 144–163.CrossRef

Nichter, S. (2018). Votes for survival: Relational clientelism in Latin America. New York: Cambridge University Press.CrossRef

Noor, A. M., Amin, A. A., Gething, P. W., Atkinson, P. M., Hay, S. I., & Snow, R. W. (2006). Modelling distances travelled to government health services in Kenya. Tropical Medicine & International Health, 11(2), 188–196.CrossRef

Nunn, N., & Puga, D. (2012). Ruggedness: The blessing of bad geography in Africa. Review of Economics and Statistics, 94(1), 20–36.CrossRef

OECD. (2010). Strategies to improve rural service delivery. Paris: OECD.CrossRef

Pande, R. (2011). Can informed voters enforce better governance? Experiments in low-income democracies. Annual Review of Economics, 3(1), 215–237.CrossRef

Pierskalla, J., Schultz, A., & Wibbels, E. (2017). Order, distance, and local development over the long-run. Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 12(4), 375–404.CrossRef

Remmer, K. L. (1998). The politics of neoliberal economic reform in South America, 1980–1994. Studies in comparative international development, 33(2), 3–29.CrossRef

Riker, W. H. (1982). Liberalism against populism. San Francisco: NV. H. Freeman.

Rosas, G., Johnston, N. P., & Hawkins, K. (2014). Local public goods as vote-purchasing devices? Persuasion and mobilization in the choice of clientelist payments. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 26(4), 573–598.CrossRef

Schussman, A., & Soule, S. A. (2005). Process and protest: Accounting for individual protest participation. Social Forces, 84(2), 1083–1108.CrossRef

Springman, J. (2020). The political economy of aid flows and NGO service delivery: Evidence from Uganda. Working Paper.

Tellez, J. (2020). Wartime displacement and land grabbing: Evidence from Colombia. Working Paper.

The Economist. (2017). The world’s most dangerous cities. The Economist. Retrieved from http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2017/03/daily-chart-23.

United Nations Human Settlements Programme. (2012). State of Latin American and Caribbean Cities 2012: Towards a new urban transition. Nairobi, Kenya: UN-Habitat.

Urquiola, M. (2016). Competition among schools: traditional public and private schools. In E. A. Hanushek, S. Machin, & L. Woessmann (Eds.), Handbook of the Economics of Education (Vol. 5). Amsterdam: Elsevier.

VanderWeele, T. J. (2016). Mediation analysis: A practitioner’s guide. Annual Review of Public Health, 37, 17–32.CrossRef

Vegas, E., & Petrow, J. (2008). Raising student learning in Latin America: The challenge for the 21st century. Washington, DC: World Bank, Latin American Development Forum Series.

Verba, S., Schlozman, K. L., & Brady, H. E. (1995). Voice and equality: Civic volunteerism in American politics. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.CrossRef

Willis, E., Garman, C., & Haggard, S. (1999). The politics of decentralization in Latin America. Latin American Research Review, 34(1), 7–56.CrossRef

World Bank. (2004). Making services work for poor people. World Development Report. Washington, DC: World Bank.

Title: Public Services, Geography, and Citizen Perceptions of Government in Latin America
Authors: Gary Bland
Derick Brinkerhoff
Diego Romero
Anna Wetterberg
Erik Wibbels
Publication date: 22-02-2021
Publisher: Springer US
Published in: Political Behavior / Issue 1/2023
Print ISSN: 0190-9320
Electronic ISSN: 1573-6687
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-021-09691-0

Springer Professional

Abstract

Please log in to get access to your license.

Dont have a licence yet? Then find out more about our products and how to get one now:

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik"

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft"

Other articles of this Issue 1/2023

Economic Self-Interest and Americans’ Redistributive, Class, and Racial Attitudes: The Case of Economic Insecurity

In Need of the Devil’s Advocate? The Impact of Cross-Cutting Exposure on Political Discussion

Attacking the Weak or the Strong? An Experiment on the Targets of Parochial Altruism

You’re Not From Here!: The Consequences of Urban and Rural Identities

Macropartisanship in Multiparty Systems: A Comparative Study of Five Democracies

Testing the Participation Hypothesis: Evidence from Participatory Budgeting