Introduction
According to appraisal theory, emotions result from how the individual believes the world to be, how events are believed to have come about, and what implications events are believed to have. Beliefs thus are regarded as one of major determinants of emotion, and therefore an important part of the study of emotion can properly be seen as falling under the umbrella of cognitive psychology. Oddly enough, however, the reverse direction of influence in the relation between emotion and cognition has received scant attention. This is in itself rather odd, because one midgt easily regard emotions as being among the determinants of an individual’s beliefs, and their resistance to modification. Indeed, such an influence has traditionally been considered to be one of the most important things to be said about emotions. Spinoza (1677/1989) defined emotions as “states that make the mind inclined to think one thing rather than another”. The influence of emotions upon beliefs can be vieweed as the port through which emotions exert their influence upon human life. (…)
Recent empirical work such as described in, for example, Eich et al. (2000), Forgas et al. (2005, 2009), Niedenthal (2007), Schooler and Eich (2000), Winkielman et al. (2009), reports such types of effects of emotions on beliefs in experimental contexts (but does not relate them to neurological findings or theories).The general proposal thus is that emotions can awaken, intrude into, and shape beliefs, by creating them, by amplifying or altering them, and by making them resistant to change.(Frijda et al. 2000b, pp. 1, 5)
A person is parking his car for a short time at a place where this is not allowed. When he comes back, from some distance he observes that a small paper is attached at the front window of the car. He starts to generate the belief that the paper represents a charge to be paid. This belief generates a negative feeling, which, depending on the type of personality, for this case has an impact on the belief by strengthening it. Coming closer, some contours of the type of paper that is attached become visible. As these are not clearly recognized as often occurring for a charge, the person starts to generate a second belief, namely that it concerns an advertising of a special offer. This belief generates a positive feeling which, again depending on the type of personality, in this case has an impact on the latter belief by strengthening it.
From believing to feeling and vice versa
From believing to feeling
Notice that in Damasio (1999) a distinction is made between an emotion (or emotional response), which is considered a preparation for a bodily response triggered by some cause, and a feeling for this emotion, which is generated by forming a sensory representation for the body state induced as an emotional response. Damasio (1999) explains emotion as follows:Even when we somewhat misuse the notion of feeling – as in “I feel I am right about this” or “I feel I cannot agree with you”—we are referring, at least vaguely, to the feeling that accompanies the idea of believing a certain fact or endorsing a certain view. This is because believing and endorsing cause a certain emotion to happen. As far as I can fathom, few if any exceptions of any object or event, actually present or recalled from memory, are ever neutral in emotional terms. Through either innate design or by learning, we react to most, perhaps all, objects with emotions, however weak, and subsequent feelings, however feeble. (Damasio 2003, p. 93)
Here the substrate for the representation of an (internal) emotional state is considered a collection of neural dispositions in the brain, which are activated as a reaction on a certain stimulus. Once this occurs, it entails modification of both the body state (which can be considered as an expressed, externally observable emotional state), and the state of other brain regions. By these events, an emotional state is created which is accessible for external observation; this state may have multiple facets or dimensions. In schematic form, emotion generation and feeling the emotion via a body loop roughly proceeds according to the following causal chain; see Damasio (1999, 2003):The substrate for the representation of emotions is a collection of neural dispositions in a number of brain regions (…) They exist, rather, as potential patterns of activity arising within neuron ensembles. Once these dispositions are activated, a number of consequences ensue. On the one hand, the pattern of activation represents, within the brain, a particular emotion as ‘neural object’. On the other, the pattern generates explicit responses that modify both the state of the body proper and the state of other brain regions. By so doing, the responses create an emotional state, and at that point, an external observer can appreciate the emotional engagement of the organism being observed. (Damasio 1999, p. 79)
As a variation, an ‘as if body loop’ uses a direct causal relationbelief → preparation for the induced bodily response → body modification → sensing the body state → sensory representation of the body state → feeling
as a shortcut in the causal chain. The body loop (or as if body loop) is extended to a recursive body loop (or recursive as if body loop) by assuming that the preparation of the bodily response is also affected by the state of feeling the emotion:preparation for the induced bodily response →sensory representation of the body state
as an additional causal relation. Such recursiveness is also assumed by Damasio (2003), as he notices that what is felt by sensing is actually a body state which is an internal object, under control of the person:feeling → preparation for the bodily response
The brain has a direct means to respond to the object as feelings unfold because the object at the origin is inside the body, rather than external to it. The brain can act directly on the very object it is perceiving. It can do so by modifying the state of the object, or by altering the transmission of signals from it. The object at the origin on the one hand, and the brain map of that object on the other, can influence each other in a sort of reverberative process that is not to be found, for example, in the perception of an external object. (…)
Thus the obtained model is based on reciprocal causation relations between emotion felt and body states, as roughly shown in Fig. 1.In other words, feelings are not a passive perception or a flash in time, especially not in the case of feelings of joy and sorrow. For a while after an occasion of such feelings begins – for seconds or for minutes – there is a dynamic engagement of the body, almost certainly in a repeated fashion, and a subsequent dynamic variation of the perception. We perceive a series of transitions. We sense an interplay, a give and take. (Damasio 2003, pp. 91–92)
From feeling to believing
can be added. This introduces a second recursive loop, as shown in Fig. 2.feeling → belief
Usually the Somatic Marker Hypothesis is applied to provide endorsements or valuations for options for a person’s actions. However, it may be considered plausible that such a mechanism is applicable to valuations of internal states such as beliefs as well.the somatic marker (..) forces attention on the negative outcome to which a given action may lead, and functions as an automated alarm signal which says: Beware of danger ahead if you choose the option which leads to this outcome. The signal may lead you to reject, immediately, the negative course of action and thus make you choose among other alternatives. (…) When a positive somatic marker is juxtaposed instead, it becomes a beacon of incentive. (…) on occasion somatic markers may operate covertly (without coming to consciousness) and may utilize an ‘as-if-loop’. (Damasio 1994, pp. 173–174)
The computational model for believing and feeling
denotes that whenever a state property a occurs (for example, the fact that the activation level of a certain neuron or group of neurons has a certain value), then after a certain time delay, state property b (for example, the fact that the activation level of another neuron or group of neurons has a certain value) will occur. This time delay (for example, the step size ∆t in discrete forms of differential equations) can be specified for each relation instance as any positive real number. In the hybrid language LEADSTO both logical and numerical calculations can be specified in an integrated manner, and a dedicated software environment is available to support specification and simulation.a ↠ b
charge
and
offer
. Note that to indicate that not only V is a variable, but also W, the formal notation
world_state(W, V)
is used in Figs. 1 and 2 and in Boxes 1 and 2; this expression indicates that world state property W has activation value or strenght V. This notation also could be written (with the same meaning) alternatively as
world_state(W)(V)
or
world_state
W(V). The same applies to other expressions involving world states W or body states B. In Figs. 2 and 3 small letters w and b are used to indicate specific instances.Example simulation results of the interaction of belief and feeling
Learning to believe by feeling
feeling(b, V
1) & belief(w, V
2) &has_connection_strength(b, w, ω) &
has_learning_rate(b, w, η) & has_extinction_rate(b, w, ζ)
↠has_connection_strength(b, w, ω + (ηV
1V2(1 − ω)
−ζω) ∆
t)
Example simulation results for learning to believe
Mathematical analysis
Non-adaptive case
β
2
| 0 | 0.5 | 1 | |||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
β1
| f = 0 | b = 1 | b = f | f = 1 | b = 0 | |
0 | b = sf | b = f = 0 | b = f = s = 1 | b = f = 0 or b = f and s = 1 | b = s f = 1 | b = s = 0 or b = f = 0 |
0.5 | b = (s + f)/2 | b = s/2 f = 0 | b = f = s = 1 | b = f = s | b = (s + 1)/2 f = 1 | b = f = s = 0 |
1 | 1 − b = (1 − s)(1 − f) | b = s f = 0 | b = f = 1 or b = s = 1 | b = f = 1 or b = f and s = 0 | b = f = 1 | b = f = s = 0 |
Adaptive case
β2
| 0 | 0.5 | 1 | |||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
β1
| f = 0 | b = 1 | b = f | f = 1 | b = 0 | |
0 | b = ωsf | b = f = ω = 0 | – | b = f = ω = 0 | b = ωs f = 1 ω = 0 or \( \omega = 1 - {\frac{\zeta }{\eta s}} \)
| b = ω = 0 |
0.5 | b = (s + f)/2 | b = s/2 f = ω = 0 | b = f = s = 1
\( \omega = {\frac{1}{{1 + {\frac{\zeta }{\eta }}}}} \)
| b = f = s
\( \omega = {\frac{1}{{1 + {\frac{\zeta }{{\eta s^{2} }}}}}} \)
| b = (s + 1)/2 f = 1
\( \omega = {\frac{1}{{1 + {\frac{{2\zeta }}{{\eta (s + 1)}}}}}}\)
| b = f = s = ω = 0 |
1 | 1 − b = (1 − s)(1 − ωf) | b = s f = ω = 0 | b = f = ω = 1 or b = s = 1
\( \omega = {\frac{1}{{1 + {\frac{\zeta }{\eta f}}}}} \)
| b = f
\( \omega = {\frac{1}{{1 + {\frac{\zeta }{{\eta b^{2} }}}}}} \)
\( \omega = {\frac{{1 - \,\left( {\frac{s}{b}} \right)}}{1 - s}} \)
| f = 1
\( \omega = {\frac{{b - s}}{{1 - s}}} \)
\( \omega = {\frac{1}{{1 + {\frac{\zeta }{{\eta b}}}}}} \)
| b = s = ω = 0 |
Discussion
Given such differentiations, a more specific validation of the model is a challenge on its own, involving a number of nontrivial aspects (including the issue of quantitative comparison: how strong is the effect on a belief), and aspects of subjective personal contextual situations and personal characteristics. For example, consider the situation that two persons A and B both are in contact with a third person C, and both desparately try to persuade her to have an exclusive relationship with them. Moreover, consider information a coming from a (not always reliable) friend of C, stating that C intends to choose for A, compared to information b that C intends to choose for B, coming from the same person. Suppose for A and B’s personal characteristics as a biases for beliefs associated with positive resp. negative feelings are taken. Then, given the different subjective contexts, and depending on A and B’s personal characteristics, still all possible combinations of beliefs on a or b for A and B may occur, see Table 3. For example, if A has a bias for negative feelings, he will not believe a, whereas in case B has a bias for negative feelings, she will believe a. Only in case A has a positive bias and B a negative bias, both will believe a, and in the opposite case neither of them will believe a.Numerous mundane everyday experiences are capable of inducing affect. (…) Such everyday moods often have a mood-congruent influence on many cognitive tasks (…) The cognitive consequences of moods are neither simple, nor straightforward, however. While numerous studies found a clear pattern of mood congruence in thoughts and judgements, many other experiments fail to find mood congruence, and even report an opposite, mood-incongruent effect on cognitions. (see Forgas 1995, for a detailed review) (Forgas 2000, p. 109)
Information | A bias | B bias | A believes a | B believes a | A believes b | B believes b |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
a | Positive | Positive | + | − | − | − |
a | Positive | Negative | + | + | − | − |
a | Negative | Positive | − | − | − | − |
a | Negative | Negative | − | + | − | − |
b | Positive | Positive | − | − | − | + |
b | Positive | Negative | − | − | − | − |
b | Negative | Positive | − | − | + | + |
b | Negative | Negative | − | − | + | − |
LP1 sensing a world state
| |
If | world state property W occurs of strength V
|
then | a sensor state for W of strength V will occur. |
world_state(W, V)
↠
sensor_state(W, V)
| |
LP2 generating a sensory representation for a sensed world state
| |
If | a sensor state for world state property W with level V occurs, |
then | a sensory representation for W with level V will occur. |
sensor_state(W, V)
↠
srs(W, V)
| |
LP3 generating a belief state for a feeling and a sensory representation
| |
If | a sensory representation for w with strength V
1 occurs, |
and | the associated feeling of b has strength V
2
|
and | the belief for w has strength V
3
|
and | the connection from sensory representation to belief of w has strength ω1
|
and | the connection from feeling b to belief of w has strength ω2
|
and | β1 is the person’s orientation for believing |
and | γ1 is the person’s flexibility for beliefs |
then | after ∆t the belief for w will have strength V
3 + γ1(g(β1, ω1, ω2, V
1, V
2) − V
3) ∆t. |
srs(w, V
1
) & feeling(b, V
2
) & belief(w, V
3
) & | |
has_connection_strength(srs(w), belief(w), ω
1) & | |
has_connection_strength(feeling(b), belief(w), ω
2) | |
↠
belief(w, V
3 + γ1 (g(β1, ω1, ω2, V1,V2) − V3) ∆t) | |
LP4 from belief and feeling to preparation of a body state
| |
If | belief w with strength V
1 occurs |
and | feeling the associated body state b has strength V
2
|
and | the preparation state for b has strength V
3
|
and | the connection from belief of w to preparation for b has strength ω3
|
and | the connection from feeling b to preparation for b has strength ω4
|
and | β2 is the person’s orientation for emotional response |
and | γ2 is the person’s flexibility for bodily responses |
then | after ∆t the preparation state for body state b will have strength V
3 + γ2(h(β2, ω3, ω4, V
1, V
2) − V
3) ∆t. |
belief(w, V
1
) & feeling(b, V
2
) & preparation_state(b, V
3) & | |
has_connection_strength(belief(w), preparation(b), ω
3) & | |
has_connection_strength(feeling(b), preparation(b), ω
4) | |
↠
preparation_state(b, V
3 + γ2(h(β2, ω3, ω4, V1, V2) − V3) ∆t) |
LP5 from preparation to effector state for body modification
| |
If | preparation state for body state B occurs with level V, |
then | the effector state for body state B with level V will occur. |
preparation_state(B, V)
↠
effector_state(B, V)
| |
LP6 from effector state to modified body state
| |
If | the effector state for body state B with level V occurs, |
then | the body state B with level V will occur. |
effector_state(B, V)
↠
body_state(B, V)
| |
LP7 sensing a body state
| |
If | body state B with level V occurs, |
then | this body state B with level V will be sensed. |
body_state(B, V)
↠
sensor_state(B, V)
| |
LP8 generating a sensory representation of a body state
| |
If | body state B with level V is sensed, |
then | a sensory representation for body state B with level V will occur. |
sensor_state(B, V)
↠
srs(B, V)
| |
LP9 from sensory representation of body state to feeling
| |
If | a sensory representation for body state B with level V occurs, |
then | B is felt with level V. |
srs(B, V)
↠
feeling(B, V)
| |
LP10 From preparation to sensory representation of a body state
| |
If | preparation state for body state B occurs with level V, |
then | a sensory representation for body state B with level V will occur. |
preparation_state(B, V)
↠
srs(B, V)
|