Top

Public Choice

Published in:

23-01-2018

Kenneth Arrow’s impossibility theorem stretching to other fields

Author: Wulf Gaertner

Published in: Public Choice | Issue 1-2/2019

Activate our intelligent search to find suitable subject content or patents.

search-config

AI-assisted search

Off

Abstract

Arrow’s impossibility result not only had a profound influence on welfare economics, but was, as this paper shows, also widely discussed in philosophy of science and in the engineering design literature.

previous article Reflections on Arrow’s theorem and voting rules

next article Arrow, and unexpected consequences of his theorem

Dont have a licence yet? Then find out more about our products and how to get one now:

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

über 102.000 Bücher
über 537 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

Automobil + Motoren
Bauwesen + Immobilien
Business IT + Informatik
Elektrotechnik + Elektronik
Energie + Nachhaltigkeit
Finance + Banking
Management + Führung
Marketing + Vertrieb
Maschinenbau + Werkstoffe
Versicherung + Risiko

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

inform now

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

über 67.000 Bücher
über 340 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

Bauwesen + Immobilien
Business IT + Informatik
Finance + Banking
Management + Führung
Marketing + Vertrieb
Versicherung + Risiko

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

inform now

Arrow, K. J. ([1951] 1963). Social choice and individual values, 2nd edn. New York: Wiley.

Dym, C. L., Wood, W. H., & Scott, M. J. (2002). Rank ordering engineering designs: Pairwise comparison charts and Borda counts. Research in Engineering Design, 13, 236–242.CrossRef

Franssen, M. (2005). Arrow’s theorem, multi-criteria decision problems and multi-attribute preferences in engineering design. Research in Engineering Design, 16, 42–56.CrossRef

Franssen, M., & Bucciarelli, L. L. (2004). On rationality in engineering design. Journal of Mechanical Design, 126, 945–949.CrossRef

Gaertner, W. (2001). Domain conditions in social choice theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRef

Gaertner, W. (2009). A primer in social choice theory (rev ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Gaertner, W. (2016). Aggregating qualitative verdicts: From social choice to engineering design. Open Journal of Applied Sciences, 5, 319–326.CrossRef

Gaertner, W., & Wüthrich, N. (2016). Evaluating competing theories via a common language of qualitative verdicts. Synthese, 193, 3293–3309.CrossRef

Kuhn, Th S. (1962). The structure of scientific revolutions. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Kuhn, Th. S. (1974, 1977). Objectivity, value judgment, and theory choice. In Th. S. Kuhn (Ed.), The essential tension—selected studies in scientific tradition and change (pp. 320–339). Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Morreau, M. (2014). Mr. Fit, Mr. Simplicity and Mr. Scope: From social choice to theory choice. Erkenntnis, 79, 1253–1286.CrossRef

Morreau, M. (2015). Theory choice and social choice: Kuhn vindicated. Mind, 124(493), 239–262.CrossRef

Okasha, S. (2011). Theory choice and social choice: Kuhn vs. Arrow. Mind, 129(477), 83–115.CrossRef

Rawls, J. (1971). A theory of justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Rizza, D. (2014). Arrow’s theorem and theory choice. Synthese, 191, 1847–1856.CrossRef

Saari, D. G. (1995). Geometry of voting. Heidelberg: Springer.CrossRef

Samuelson, P. A. (1967). Arrow’s mathematical politics. In S. Hook (Ed.), Human values and economic policy (pp. 41–52). New York: New York University Press.

Scanlon, Th M. (1998). What we owe to each other. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Scott, M. J., & Antonsson, E. K. (1999). Arrow’s theorem and engineering design decision making. Research in Engineering Design, 11, 218–228.CrossRef

Sen, A. (1970). Collective choice and social welfare. San Francisco: Holden-Day.

Sen, A. (1977). On weights and measures: Informational constraints in social welfare analysis. Econometrica, 45, 1539–1572.CrossRef

Sen, A. (2009). The idea of justice. Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press.

Stegenga, J. (2015). Theory choice and social choice: Okasha versus Sen. Mind, 124(493), 263–277.CrossRef

Strasnick, St. (1976). Social choice and the derivation of Rawls’s difference principle. The Journal of Philosophy, 73, 85–90.CrossRef

Suppes, P. (1966). Some formal models of grading principles. Synthese, 16, 284–306.CrossRef

Svensson, L.-G. (1977). Social justice and fair distributions. Lund: Lund University.

Temkin, L. S. (1993). Inequality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Weber, M. (2011). Experimentation versus theory choice: A social-epistemological approach. In H. B. Schmidt, D. Sirtes, & M. Weber (Eds.), Collective epistemology (pp. 1–26). Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.

Title: Kenneth Arrow’s impossibility theorem stretching to other fields
Author: Wulf Gaertner
Publication date: 23-01-2018
Publisher: Springer US
Published in: Public Choice / Issue 1-2/2019
Print ISSN: 0048-5829
Electronic ISSN: 1573-7101
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-018-0503-y

Springer Professional

Abstract

Please log in to get access to your license.

Dont have a licence yet? Then find out more about our products and how to get one now:

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik"

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft"

Other articles of this Issue 1-2/2019

Arrow, and unexpected consequences of his theorem

Exploring the effects of national and regional popular vote Interstate compact on a toy symmetric version of the Electoral College: an electoral engineering perspective

Why Arrow’s theorem matters for political theory even if preference cycles never occur

Reflections on Arrow’s theorem and voting rules

Weak rationalizability and Arrovian impossibility theorems for responsive social choice

Introduction to a special issue in honor of Kenneth Arrow