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21-06-2017

Still Autonomous After All

Author: Andrew Knoll

Published in: Minds and Machines | Issue 1/2018

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Abstract

Recent mechanistic philosophers (in particular, Boone and Piccinini in Synthese 193(5):1287–1321, 2016) have argued that the cognitive sciences are not autonomous from neuroscience proper. I clarify two senses of autonomy–metaphysical and epistemic—and argue that cognitive science is still autonomous in both senses. Moreover, mechanistic explanation of cognitive phenomena is not therefore an alternative to the view that cognitive science is autonomous of neuroscience. If anything, it’s a way of characterizing just how cognitive processes are implemented by neural mechanisms.

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Note that this is a claim about explanatory efficacy, not existence. If you’re so inclined to draw ontological conclusions from explanatory considerations, you are welcome to do so. If you think such an ontological program is misguided, I won’t contradict you here. We have enough to worry about without getting bogged down in ontological disputes per se.

There’s been lots of recent interest lately on the explanatory usefulness of representations, in particular whether representations with intentional content—or inherent aboutness or correctness conditions—buy you any explanatory work at all. For negative views, (see Stich 1983; Chomsky 2000; Collins 2007; Egan 2010; Ramsey 2007; Orlandi 2014), inter alia. Georges Rey and myself (Knoll and Rey in press) and Tyler Burge (2010), all erstwhile defenders of the explanatory efficacy of intentional content, concede that some cognitive explanations do not appeal to intentional contents.

See Woodward (2010) for an overview of how such factors feature in biological explanation.

Cf. Burge (2010).

Hale and Reiss (2008, pp. 154–56); Knoll (under review).

I’ll leave it to the metaphysicians to figure out whether the properties still exist.

Pace Polger and Shapiro (2016), who argue in favor both of the autonomy of psychology and a type-identity theory of its states (see, in particular, Chap. 10).

Indeed, Piccinini and Craver (2011, p. 284. n. 2; pp. 288–89) claim as much.

I’d argue that he is wrong to suppose that such place cell activity has representational content in any explanatorily useful sense. But, I’ll not do so now. The current point is that even if we grant that this activity has representational content, it doesn’t undermine the metaphysical autonomy thesis.

The quick argument is that a content like ‘sun’ can function to token a false belief that the sun revolves around the earth, but can also function to token a true belief that the earth revolves around the sun. So, ‘sun’ must be individuated independently of its functional role in cognition.

Fodor’s treatment of atomic representations generally extends to other entities posited by cognitive scientists. For example, there’s reason to think (Hale and Reiss 2008, chap. 5–7) that the distinctive features (e.g., [+velar], [−voice]) posited as mental states by generative phonology are individuated independently of their functional roles. See further discussion of such distinctive features below.

See Pietroski and Rey (1995) for an account of ceteris paribus laws along these lines.

Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for raising this possibility.

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Title: Still Autonomous After All
Author: Andrew Knoll
Publication date: 21-06-2017
Publisher: Springer Netherlands
Published in: Minds and Machines / Issue 1/2018
Print ISSN: 0924-6495
Electronic ISSN: 1572-8641
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11023-017-9440-7

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