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2014 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

16. A Computational Study of Rule Learning in “Do-It-Yourself Lottery” with Aggregate Information

verfasst von : Takashi Yamada, Takao Terano

Erschienen in: Advances in Computational Social Science

Verlag: Springer Japan

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Abstract

This chapter computationally studies Barrow’s “do-it-yourself lottery” where players choose a positive integer that is expected to be the smallest one that is not chosen by anyone else. Here, we employ and modify the rule learning framework by Stahl (Games Econ Behav 32:105–138, 2000) based on the experimental findings by Östling et al. (Am Econ J Microecon 3:1–33, 2011), and incorporate them into our simulation model to see individual and collective behavior by changing the numbers of players and the upper limit. Our main conclusion is threefold: First, the game dynamics depends on both the number of players and the upper limit. Second, a lottery with a large sensitivity parameter divides the players into winner(s) and losers. Third, finding the “stick” rule immediately makes a player a winner and imitating behavior is not observed in four-player games.

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Fußnoten
1
The “do-it-yourself lottery” is also called the “Swedish lottery” [29, 42]. Indeed, Winkler’s book was published earlier than Barrow’s. However, since the corresponding author (Yamada) first came to know this game from Barrow’s book, we will continue to use “do-it-yourself lottery” in the rest of this chapter.
 
2
The mixed strategy equilibrium in DIY-L with N ≥ 3 and M = 2, namely the binary choice game, is independent of the number of players; the mixed strategy equilibrium is 0.5 for each integer. Hence, we have omitted this kind of game setup.
 
3
Östling et al. have a succinct algorithm to calculate the mixed strategy equilibrium in this setup [29].
 
4
We thank the anonymous referee for pointing this out.
 
5
The computational setup is not the same as those explained in Östling et al. [29]. In this sense, the comment by one of the anonymous referees is right.
 
6
As one of the anonymous referees pointed out, we need to consider more which value is the most appropriate. Since there is no related experimental study in this game setup, we intend to see the relations between the value of this parameter and the game dynamics rather than to find a value that better explains, for instance, the experimental results of Östling et al. [29].
 
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Metadaten
Titel
A Computational Study of Rule Learning in “Do-It-Yourself Lottery” with Aggregate Information
verfasst von
Takashi Yamada
Takao Terano
Copyright-Jahr
2014
Verlag
Springer Japan
Buch
Advances in Computational Social Science

Print ISBN: 978-4-431-54846-1

Electronic ISBN: 978-4-431-54847-8

Copyright-Jahr: 2014

DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-4-431-54847-8_16

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