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2017 | Buch

A Diary of the Euro Crisis in Cyprus

Lessons for Bank Recovery and Resolution

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This book tells the story of the euro crisis in Cyprus from the inside. Written by the former Governor of the Central Bank of Cyprus, Panicos Demetriades, who was in office during this turbulent period, this book shows how the crisis unravelled through a series of key events that occurred during his tenure.

Written in chronological order, and broadly based on the author’s personal diary, starting from his first day in office, this volume brings together economics, banking, regulation, governance, history, politics and international relations.

Presenting personal witness statements, including records of noteworthy telephone conversations, informal meetings and other milestones, it examines crucial questions like: How did Cyprus become so systemically important to the rest of the euro area? Why was Cyprus treated so differently in comparison to other peripheral countries in Europe? Why were bank depositors targeted? What role did Cyprus’ links with Russia play in the design of the programme? What has been the toxic fallout from the bail-in? Are there any longer-term implications for the euro? What are the lessons for regulators around the world?

The book will appeal to readers interested in financial crises, the euro’s architecture, the evolution of the European Monetary Union, and those with an interest in how Europe and the IMF dealt with crises in peripheral European countries.

Inhaltsverzeichnis

Frontmatter
Chapter 1. Baptism of Fire
Abstract
3 May 2012. Barcelona. A delightful setting with views of the Mediterranean sea. Warm and sunny with only a slight breeze.
Panicos Demetriades
Chapter 2. Entering a War Zone
Abstract
The Cypriot banking sector started growing uncontrollably in 2004, the year that Cyprus became a full member of the European Union. By 2011, banking sector assets more than doubled to reach €141.0 billion, or 9.5 times GDP.
Panicos Demetriades
Chapter 3. A German Question
Abstract
‘Panicos, why do you need the Russians in Cyprus?’ asked the most senior German official at the ECB, as soon as he sat down for our lunchtime meeting on Thursday, 14 June 2012 in one of the highest floors of the Euro tower, where the ECB used to be located.
Panicos Demetriades
Chapter 4. Buying Time
Abstract
At the European Council meeting on 26 October 2011, EU national governments agreed that they would be providing a backstop for banks that needed recapitalisation following the Europe-wide stress tests carried out by the European Banking Authority (EBA) in 2011.
Panicos Demetriades
Chapter 5. “Two” Big to Fail
Abstract
My first six weeks in office coincided with unprecedented political turmoil in Greece, which unleashed a huge wave of financial contagion in Cyprus.
Panicos Demetriades
Chapter 6. Too Big to Save?
Abstract
Philip was clearly an old hand at the IMF. When he broke the news about his top-down estimates of the capital needs of the domestic banking sector, he had a grin on his face. It looked like he had done this sort of thing before. Many times.
Panicos Demetriades
Chapter 7. A Russian Playground
Abstract
Within days from 25 June 2012, the date that Cyprus applied for financial assistance from Europe and the IMF, troika technocrats started descending on the Island.
Panicos Demetriades
Chapter 8. A Bank Run and a Tearful Agreement
Abstract
November 2012 was a tough month. The troika descended on Cyprus but the negotiations started falling apart. President Christofias and his labour minister were reluctant to accept the labour reforms. There was also disagreement over other reforms, ranging from the management of gas reserves to privatisation of the ports, telecommunications and electricity.
Panicos Demetriades
Chapter 9. The Euro at Breaking Point
Abstract
The euro was created as an irrevocable currency union. A country can opt in but can never opt out. This design was intended to prevent speculation, which could force it to unravel—the reason why fixed exchange rate regimes and informal currency unions are unlikely to be long-lasting. It was also intended to promote convergence among member states. However, like much else in Europe, the architecture of the euro left a lot to be desired. While member states have a common monetary policy, fiscal policy is left in the hands of national governments.
Panicos Demetriades
Chapter 10. Illusions
Abstract
On Friday, 15 February 2013, there was a high-level Eurosystem-Bank of Russia seminar in Moscow which I attended.
Panicos Demetriades
Chapter 11. Taxing the Poor (to Protect the Rich)
Abstract
At his first Eurogroup meeting, held in Brussels on 4 March 2013, Michael Sarris, the new finance minister of Cyprus, was faced with some tough facts.
Panicos Demetriades
Chapter 12. Heading Towards the Abyss
Abstract
On Monday, 18 March 2013, when financial markets around the world reopened, there was a noticeable reaction to the news of the deposit levy in Cyprus. The Guardian, for example, reported heavy losses in Asia, smaller losses in Europe and a fall on Wall Street by 60 points, all attributed to the news of the unprecedented deposit levy in Cyprus. Bloomberg, which provided more comprehensive coverage, was reporting a fall of the euro and a rise in Spanish and Italian bond yields. The uncertainty that had been created started raising questions about the euro’s survival.
Panicos Demetriades
Chapter 13. “Take It or Leave It”
Abstract
The days and nights that followed the passing of the resolution legislation on 22 March 2013 felt like we were about to enter hell. To start with, as of the morning of Saturday, 23 March, there was the divide between the government and the troika on the resolution actions to be taken.
Panicos Demetriades
Chapter 14. Resolution and Capital Controls
Abstract
Once the agreement with the troika was reached on the evening of Sunday, 24 March, Anastasiades and Sarris headed for Larnaca airport.
Panicos Demetriades
Chapter 15. Toxic Fallout
Abstract
We were certainly expecting the resolution actions to be challenged in court, but not so soon. On Wednesday, 27 March, in the early afternoon, I was informed by our lawyers that the Greek Orthodox Church of Cyprus—which happened to be the largest single shareholder of Bank of Cyprus—had obtained an interim court injunction stopping the application of the bail-in tool to the shares of the bank.
Panicos Demetriades
Chapter 16. The Final Act
Abstract
‘Governor, the President wants to talk to you. Please use my office’, Harris Georgiades, the minister of finance, said to me politely.
Panicos Demetriades
Chapter 17. The Key Ingredients of the Crisis
Abstract
The boom that sowed the seeds of the crisis was to a large extent driven by a business model that was heavily dependent on the financial sector, with domestic banks and politically connected law firms playing a major role.
Panicos Demetriades
Chapter 18. Lessons for Europe and Beyond
Abstract
Soon after the crisis erupted, I felt it was important for the CBC to draw lessons from the crisis and put forward proposals to make the Cypriot banking industry stronger, more resilient and better suited to meet the country’s banking needs. To this end, in November 2012, the CBC appointed an Independent Commission to make recommendations on the long-term recovery of the Cypriot banking industry.
Panicos Demetriades
Backmatter
Metadaten
Titel
A Diary of the Euro Crisis in Cyprus
verfasst von
Prof. Panicos Demetriades
Copyright-Jahr
2017
Electronic ISBN
978-3-319-62223-1
Print ISBN
978-3-319-62222-4
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-62223-1