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2018 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

A Homomorphic Masking Defense Scheme Based on RSA Cryptography Algorithm

verfasst von : Juanmei Zhang, Zichen Li, Yafei Sun, Boya Liu, Yatao Yang

Erschienen in: Cloud Computing and Security

Verlag: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

Aiming at the implement of RSA algorithm, the attack methods are variety. In order to ensure the algorithm can against the side channel attack, in this paper, we present a masking scheme for RSA decryption. Our scheme exploits the multiply-homomorphic property of the existing RSA encryption scheme to compute an multiply-mask as an encryption of a random message and randomly splits the secret key into two shares as the sub-calculate such that each share is statistically independent from the original value. Our solution differs in several aspects from the recent masking RSA implementation. According to encrypted random number, the original ciphertext is blinded and the splitting secret key can reduce the size of the key and speed up the calculation of the algorithm. During the decryption, all the operations are under the masking state, therefore, through multiply masking and secret key splitting, we can secure a RSA implementation, the scheme we proposed can against the timing attack, simple power attack and differential power attack. Compared with others, this scheme can reach a higher calculation and security level.

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Metadaten
Titel
A Homomorphic Masking Defense Scheme Based on RSA Cryptography Algorithm
verfasst von
Juanmei Zhang
Zichen Li
Yafei Sun
Boya Liu
Yatao Yang
Copyright-Jahr
2018
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-00012-7_36