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2016 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

A Survey of Security Analysis in Federated Identity Management

verfasst von : Sean Simpson, Thomas Groß

Erschienen in: Privacy and Identity Management. Facing up to Next Steps

Verlag: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

We conduct a systematic survey of security analysis in Federated Identity Management (FIM). We use a categorisation system based off the Malicious and Accidental Fault Tolerance framework (MAFTIA) to categorise security incidents in FIM. When security incidents are categorised, we can paint a picture of the landscape of problems that have been studied in FIM. We outline the security incidents that are happening across FIM protocols and present solutions to those security incidents as proposed by others.

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Metadaten
Titel
A Survey of Security Analysis in Federated Identity Management
verfasst von
Sean Simpson
Thomas Groß
Copyright-Jahr
2016
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-55783-0_16